Menachos 74
Summary
- The text follows the opening sugya of the seventh perek in Menachos, laying out which *menachos* require *kemitzah* and leave *sheyareiha* that are eaten by *kohanim*, how the Gemara derives that rule from explicit pesukim and from “זאת תורת המנחה,” and why *menachos* of barley like *Minchas HaOmer* and *Minchas Kenaos* need special derivations. It brings the Meshech Chochmah of Rav Meir Simcha that the Torah states the eating of wheat-based *menachos* explicitly but only hints to the eating of barley-based *menachos* because barley is *maachal behemah* and the Torah shows sensitivity to the *kohen*. It then turns to the dispute about *Minchas Chotei* of *kohanim* and the pasuk “וכל מנחת כהן כליל תהיה לא תאכל,” develops the derashos of “והיתה לכהן כמנחה,” and presents the three views about what happens to the *sheyarim* of that offering. It continues with the Mishnah’s contrast between *menachos* that go entirely to the *mizbeach* and those that go entirely to the *kohanim*, the Gemara’s attempts to find additional cases and the answers given, and the application of “לא תאכל” as a *lav* to eating anything that is “בכליל תהיה.” It ends with a lengthy digression tying the sugya of *ketziras haOmer* and “חשב אדם לעשות מצוה ונאנס ולא עשה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו עשה” to a Rashba responsum and several Chasam Sofer sources that portray that “כאילו” as yielding full *sechar mitzvah*.
- The seventh perek opens with a Mishnah listing *menachos* that have a mitzvah of *kemitzah* and whose *sheyarim* are eaten by *kohanim*: *Minchas Soles*, *Machavas*, *Marcheshes*, *Chalos*, and *Rekikin* as the five forms of *Minchas Nedavah*, along with *Minchas Ovdei Kochavim*, *Minchas Nashim*, *Minchas HaOmer*, *Minchas Chotei*, and *Minchas Kenaos*. The Gemara brings sources for how each of these *menachos* has the rule that after *kemitzah* the *sheyarim* are eaten, sometimes because it is explicit in the Torah and sometimes because “זאת תורת המנחה” in Parshas Tzav functions as an inclusive *hekesh* that gives the *sheyarim* to the *kohanim* even where it is not explicit.
- The sugya remains “left hanging” about *menachos* that are *bas se’orim*, specifically *Minchas HaOmer* and *Minchas Kenaos*, because the Gemara’s *sevara* suggests “זאת תורת המנחה” might only relate to the main *menachos* that are *bas chitim*. The Gemara gives two approaches, attributed to Chizkiyah and Ravina, to derive the rule for the barley *menachos*. Rav Meir Simcha in Meshech Chochmah explains that the Torah states explicitly that wheat *menachos* are eaten by *kohanim* but does not state it explicitly for barley *menachos* because Chazal call barley *maachal behemah* and the Torah shows sensitivity about sounding as if people give the *kohen* animal food, even though the *kohen* fulfills a *mitzvas aseh de’oraisa* by eating the barley *minchah* just as he does by eating the wheat *minchah*. The text frames the need for difficult hints and *remezim* in Menachos 73 as reflecting that sensitivity.
- Rabbi Shimon holds that one *minchah* has *kemitzah* yet its *sheyarim* are not eaten at all, because the *sheyarim* go to the *mizbeach* like the *kometz*, and this is *Minchas Chotei* of *kohanim*. The background is the *korban oleh v’yored*, where a person who cannot afford the animal *chatas* and cannot afford birds brings a *minchah* for the sin, called *Minchas Chotei*, and ordinarily it has *kemitzah* with *sheyarim* eaten. The pasuk in Parshas Tzav, “וכל מנחת כהן כליל תהיה לא תאכל,” plainly teaches that a *kohen*’s *Minchas Nedavah* is entirely burned, and the text explains that “כליל תהיה” there implies no *kemitzah* at all for that *nedavah*. Rabbi Shimon extends the principle of “לא תאכל” to the *kohen*’s *Minchas Chotei* in a different way by requiring *kemitzah* but placing the *sheyarim* on the *mizbeach* as well, while the Chachamim restrict that pasuk to *Minchas Nedavah* of a *kohen*.
- A braysa expounds the words “והיתה לכהן כמנחה” in the parashah of *Minchas Chotei* and presents two possible readings: one that it validates that the *kohen* bringing his own *Minchas Chotei* may perform its *avodah*, and another that it would permit eating a *Minchas Chotei* of *kohanim* despite “וכל מנחת כהן כליל תהיה לא תאכל,” which the braysa resolves by saying that pasuk applies to *Minchas Nedavah* but not to the *chovah*. The Gemara then argues that if the pasuk were only about whether it is eaten, it would more naturally compare the *kohen*’s obligation to his *nedavah* and conclude it is not eaten, and it claims no pasuk is needed to know it is not eaten. The conclusion presented is that “והיתה לכהן כמנחה” serves to teach that the *kohen*’s *avodah* is valid when he brings his own *Minchas Chotei*.
- Rabbi Shimon rejects reading “והיתה לכהן כמנחתו” because the Torah says only “כמנחה,” and he uses the phrase to establish the procedure for *Minchas Chotei* of *kohanim*. Rabbi Shimon equates it to *Minchas Chotei* of Yisrael to require *kemitzah*, then uses the emphasis “לכהן כמנחה” to limit the comparison to the *kohen*’s side of the process while denying that it is “ולא לאישים כמנחה.” Rabbi Shimon’s practical conclusion is that the *kometz* is offered on the *mizbeach* by itself and the *sheyarim* are offered on the *mizbeach* by themselves, creating a case where there is *kemitzah* and yet nothing is eaten.
- The Tanna Kamma uses “והיתה לכהן כמנחה” to teach that a *kohen* bringing his own *Minchas Chotei* may do the *avodah* himself, analogizing to ordinary *menachos* where the *avodos* from *kemitzah* onward are *avodah*. The Gemara challenges why this pasuk is needed because another pasuk, “ובכל אות נפשו יבוא וישרת,” establishes that a *kohen* who comes to offer his own korban may do so whenever he desires, despite the normal system of *mishmaros* and *goralos*. The Gemara answers that without “והיתה לכהן כמנחה” one might think that rule applies only to a korban with no sin, not to something “שיש בו חטא,” and it brings a separate pasuk, “וכיפר הכהן על הנפש השוגגת בחטא בשגגה,” to show a *kohen* can achieve atonement through himself. The Gemara then suggests that pasuk might be limited to *shogeg* and says “והיתה לכהן כמנחה” teaches the rule even where the *korban oleh v’yored* can come for a *mezid*, identifying *shevuas ha’eidus* as the case where *zadon shevuah* brings an *oleh v’yored*.
- The text cites the Chasam Sofer that although *shechitah* is kosher by a non-*kohen* and “שחיטה לאו עבודה היא,” historically the *zar* did not usually perform his own *shechitah* and the *kohanim* would do it *lechatchilah*. It adds that by *bechor* there was a distinctive practice where the *baal ha’bechor* would try *lechatchilah* to do the *shechitah* himself even though the *bechor* belongs to the *kohen*. The Chasam Sofer links this to *makkas bechoros* being “אני ולא שליח,” making the ideal fulfillment of *bechor* resemble “אני ולא שליח,” and the text presents this as part of the broader question of whether a *kohen* may do his own *avodah*, concluding that he may even for a korban “שבא על חטא” and even when the sin was *mezid*.
- A braysa presents a third view: Rabbi Shimon says the *kometz* is offered by itself and the *sheyarim* are offered by themselves, while Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon says the *kometz* is offered by itself and the *sheyarim* are scattered on the *Beis HaDeshen*. Rabbi Yochanan wonders which *Beis HaDeshen* is meant, because if it is the *Beis HaDeshen* above on the *mizbeach* it resembles ordinary *hak’tarah*, and if it is the *Beis HaDeshen* below outside the camp it looks like throwing sacred remnants “in the garbage.” Rav Abba answers that “דמי לאיבוד,” and the *beis midrash* responds that there is no precedent for something that is brought *lechatchilah* “לאיבוד,” sharpening the question of how Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon can require the *sheyarim* to be discarded.
- A teaching from the father of רבי אבין is brought from “כל מנחת כהן כליל תהיה לא תאכל,” and Abaye explains it by assigning “לא תאכל” to the *chovah* of a *kohen* and “כליל תהיה” to his *nedavah*, reading the pasuk as describing two different categories. The text explains this creates Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s “middle” position because the *Minchas Chotei* of a *kohen* is “לא תאכל” but is not “כליל תהיה,” so it is neither eaten nor fully burned, leaving *Beis HaDeshen* as its destination. Rava states the same split in straightforward order, “כליל תהיה” for *nedavah* and “לא תאכל” for *chovah*, and the text notes that the Rishonim discuss what Abaye and Rava are actually disputing since their allocations appear identical. The Gemara asks “ואיפוך אנא,” and it concludes that it is more plausible that *nedavah* is “כליל תהיה” because it resembles *Minchas Chavitin* in being *tadir*, “לא חוטא,” and “בושם וריח,” while *Minchas Chotei* lacks those and instead shares fewer similarities like being an *issaron* and being an obligation.
- The Gemara asks what the Rabbanan and Rabbi Shimon do with “כל מנחת כהן כליל תהיה לא תאכל” if they do not use it as Abaye and Rava did. A braysa derives from a “כליל כליל” *gezeirah shavah* between *Minchas Chavitin* (“כליל תוקטר”) and *Minchas Kohen* that both are burned completely and that “לא תאכל” supplies a *lo ta’aseh* for eating them. The text adds that “לא תאכל” becomes not a source for procedural distinctions but a source that eating something designated for complete burning violates a prohibition.
- Ravina asks about a *kohen* who eats from the *eimurim* of an ordinary korban, focusing not on the prohibition of *zarus* but on whether he also violates the specific *lav* implied by “כליל תהיה לא תאכל.” The Gemara says the *lav* of *zarus* is obvious because with respect to *eimurim* even a *kohen* is considered a “זר” under “וכל זר לא יאכל קודש,” and the question is whether “לאו דכליל תהיה” applies broadly. Rav Aharon answers from a braysa of Rabbi Elazar that anything that is “בכליל תהיה” carries a *lo ta’aseh* against eating it. The text explains that “זר” is framed as “a stranger” relative to a given domain of permissible eating, so even a *kohen* can be a “זר” with respect to *eimurim*, and it brings the Minchas Chinuch’s framing that a *kohen hedyot* might be treated like a “זר” relative to the *avodah* of Yom Kippur which must be done by the *kohen gadol*, though it notes the Minchas Chinuch cites the Shaar HaMelech as saying there is no decisive proof in Shas for the full ramifications.
- The Mishnah lists *Minchas Kohanim*, *Minchas Kohen Mashiach* identified as *Minchas Chavitin*, and *Minchas Nesachim* as offerings that go entirely to the *mizbeach* with nothing for the *kohanim*, and it calls this “ובזה יפה כח המזבח מכח הכהנים.” It then lists *Shtei HaLechem* and *Lechem HaPanim* as offerings eaten by the *kohanim* with nothing for the *mizbeach*, calling this “ובזה יפה כח הכהנים מכח המזבח.” The text notes that although *Shtei HaLechem* itself does not go on the *mizbeach*, it is bound to the *Kevasim* of *Shalmei Tzibbur* which do go on the *mizbeach*, and *Lechem HaPanim* comes with *Bazichei Levonah*.
- The Gemara challenges whether there are no other cases on the *mizbeach* side by asking about *Olah*, and it answers that *Olah* gives its hide to the *kohanim*. The Gemara asks about *Olas HaOf* and answers that it has *mor’ah* and *notzah* that do not go on the *mizbeach*, and it asks about *nesachim* and answers that they go to the *shitin* rather than being “eaten” by the *mizbeach* as *hak’tarah*. The word “בזו” is read as excluding Shmuel’s view that a person who volunteers wine pours it on the fire, because that would create an additional case of “יפה כח המזבח,” while the Mishnah simultaneously supports Shmuel’s separate ruling that one who volunteers oil does *kemitzah* and the remainder is eaten by the *kohanim*, preventing oil from becoming another *mizbeach*-only case. On the *kohanim* side the Gemara asks why *Chatas HaOf* is not listed and answers that its blood goes on the *mizbeach*, and it asks about the *Log Shemen shel Metzora* and answers that its *matanos* prevent it from being a pure “nothing for the *mizbeach*” case.
- The Gemara explains “בזו” in the seifa as excluding the view that *Shtei HaLechem* brought without the accompanying *Kevasim* goes to burning. It ties this to the earlier sugya about whether the *Kevasim* or the *Shtei HaLechem* is the primary *ma’akev*, presenting Rabbi Akiva as allowing a scenario of *Shtei HaLechem* without *Kevasim* and a view that would send such loaves to *sereifah*. The text reads the Mishnah’s “בזה יפה כח הכהנים” as asserting that *Shtei HaLechem* always goes to the *kohanim* and is never diverted away from them.
- The text returns to the sugya of *Ketziras HaOmer* and Rabbi Yishmael’s derash from “בחריש ובקציר תשבות” that only discretionary harvesting is forbidden on Shabbos, while *ketziras mitzvah* like the *Omer* is permitted and overrides Shabbos. It brings the question from Makkos 8b about why plowing cannot be “חריש של מצווה,” suggesting a person could plow to plant barley for the *Omer*. A Rashba responsum (חלק ג' תשובה חמש מאות ושלשים וארבע, תקל"ד) answers that plowing aimed at producing *Omer* barley counts as “חריש של מצווה” because if the crop succeeds it is directly for a mitzvah and if it fails it is still “חשב אדם לעשות מצווה ונאנס ולא עשה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו עשה,” based on Berachos 6a and the pasuk “ולחושבי שמו.” The text frames this as a major *chidush* that intention and thwarted effort can define the act as mitzvah-oriented even if results never materialize.
- The text reports that many *Acharonim* hold “מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו עשה” does not mean literally equal reward to one who actually performed the mitzvah, but it cites a collection in “מגדים חדשים” from Rav Dovid Yoel Weiss that argues the Chasam Sofer repeatedly implies there is no difference in reward. It cites the Chasam Sofer on Chullin 137a questioning why one who “stole” the mitzvah of *kisuy hadam* must pay ten gold coins if the deprived person is already credited fully as if he performed it, and it reads the Chasam Sofer’s analysis as treating the “כאילו” as literal. It cites the Chasam Sofer on Sukkah 31b answering the Ran’s question about “מצוות לאו ליהנות ניתנו” by claiming the reward comes already from the preparatory intent to fulfill the mitzvah, so the act’s fulfillment does not constitute personal benefit from another. It cites a Chasam Sofer responsum (חושן משפט סימן קעו) about a prank where a mohel traveled four hours to perform a bris only to find a baby girl, and it states the Chasam Sofer held that the mohel did not lose *sechar mitzvah* because he was “חשב לעשות מצוה ונאנס ולא עשאה,” even while the prankster violated “אל תונו איש את אחיו” as *onaas devarim* and could be removed from his position as *shochet* after due diligence. The text closes by tying this to the broader question of how far “כאילו” extends in Chazal’s language, paralleling statements like “כל המלמד בן חבירו תורה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו ילדו” and whether “כאילו” is merely honorific reward language or a literal equivalence in *sechar mitzvah*.
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