Menachos 81
Summary
- Today's *daf* is Menachos 81, beginning near the bottom of 80b, and it centers on the *Korban Todah* as a type of *shelamim* with special rules of eating time and accompanying breads, including *chametz*. The text applies the laws of *temurah* to a *Todah* and develops R' Chiya’s ruling that when a *Todah* and its *temurah* become mixed and one dies, the remaining animal cannot be offered because of the irresolvable uncertainty about bringing *lachmei todah*. The *Gemara* tests multiple proposed workarounds and rejects them for reasons including *ein machnisin chullin la’azarah*, *meivi kodashim l’veis hapesul*, the requirement of *tenufah* *lifnei Hashem*, and the impropriety of creating vows *lechatchilah* under טוב אשר לא תדור משתדור ולא תשלם. The second half moves to the distinction between הרי עלי and הרי זו and its effect on funding a *Todah* and its breads from *chullin* versus *maaser*, and then analyzes Rav Huna’s rule that saying הרי עלי *lachmei todah* obligates bringing both the *Todah* and the breads, alongside *beraisos* about one who says *Todah* without bread and the dispute whether this follows Beis Shammai’s תפס לשון ראשון or can fit Beis Hillel.
- The *Rambam* says there are four *minei shelamim*: one *shalmey tzibbur* and three *shalmey yachid*, and he lists the *Korban Todah* as his second category of *shalmey yachid*. The *Korban Todah* is eaten for *yom valaylah* rather than the standard *kodashim kalim* window of two days and one night. The *Korban Todah* comes with forty *lachmei todah* of four *minim*, ten of each type, with ten *chametz* and thirty *matzah*, despite the general rule against offering *chametz* in the *Beis Hamikdash*. The *Mishnah* on 79b gives cases with *kedushas todah* that still do not bring *lachmei todah*, including *temuras todah*, *mosar todah*, and a *vlad* of a *Korban Todah*.
- The *Torah* states והיה הוא ותמורתו יהיה קדש, so when one attempts *temurah* both the original and the substitute become *kodesh* even though the act violates לא ימירנו ולא יחליפנו. When a person designates a *Korban Todah* and then declares another animal הרי זו תמורת תודה, both animals receive *kedushas todah* as *shelamim* and are eaten *yom valaylah*. The *Mishnah* establishes a *gezeiras hakasuv* that only the original *Todah* brings *lachmei todah* while the *temurah* does not. The result is that a *temuras todah* has the eating-time and offering-status of *Todah* but lacks the bread obligation.
- R' Chiya rules that when a *Todah* becomes mixed with its *temurah* and one of the animals dies, the remaining animal has no remedy and cannot be offered. The remaining animal certainly has *kedushas todah* and is eaten *yom valaylah*, but the owner cannot determine whether it is the original *Todah* that requires bread or the *temurah* that must not be accompanied by bread. The *Gemara* clarifies that R' Chiya’s case is where the person said הרי זו תודה rather than הרי עלי תודה, because a personal obligation of הרי עלי could allow arranging an additional animal and bread with a conditional designation.
- The *Gemara* defines הרי עלי as a *chiyuv* on the *gavra* to bring a *Todah*, so if the designated animal is lost or dies he must bring another. The phrase הרי זו creates only an object-designation without a continuing personal obligation, so if the animal dies nothing further is required. The *Gemara* explains that if the original obligation began with הרי עלי, one could bring another animal with breads and stipulate that if the surviving uncertain animal is a *temurah* then the new animal is the *Todah* with its breads, and if the surviving animal is the *Todah* then the breads attach to it and the new animal serves as *achrayus*. The *Gemara* therefore limits R' Chiya’s “no remedy” to the scenario of הרי זו, where *achrayus* cannot be created.
- Levi asks Rabbi why the owner cannot simply bring breads and stipulate that if the animal is *Todah* they are *lachmei todah* and if not they are *chullin*, and Rabbi answers that the breads must enter the *azarah* and אין מכניסין חולין לעזרה. Levi suggests bringing a second animal and breads and stipulating that if the first is *temurah* then the second is *Todah* with breads and if the first is *Todah* then the second is *shelamim*, and Rabbi rejects this as bringing *kodashim* into a state of ספק that forces shortening the eating window and thereby משום דקא מייתי קדשים לבית הפסול. Levi ties this principle to the practice that one does not say מזמור לתודה on ערב פסח and, per the *Rema* as explained by the Vilna Gaon and attributed to תשובות נודע ביהודה, also not on ערב יום כיפור, because the *Todah* could not be properly eaten and would create forced burning of valid *kodashim*. Levi then proposes stipulating that the second animal be a *mosar todah* if the first is the real *Todah*, and Rabbi responds harshly that one cannot designate *mosar* *lechatchilah* with וכי מפרישים תחילה למותרות.
- R' Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta proposes before Rav Nachman that one can bring another animal and breads and stipulate that if the first animal is a *temurah* the new one is *Todah* and if the first is *Todah* the new one becomes a *temurah*, so both outcomes yield *Todah*-status animals without extra bread. Rav Nachman rejects the proposal because it relies on performing *temurah* intentionally despite its *issur de’oraisa*, expressed as ארבעין בכתפיה וקשי. The response treats solving the practical problem as insufficient justification for recommending an act that the *Torah* forbids.
- During Rav Ila’s illness, Abaye and the *rabbanan* suggest that if one accepts R' Yochanan’s view that breads can become sanctified outside the *azarah*, then one could keep the breads outside and stipulate that they become *lachmei todah* only if the animal is the *Todah*. Rav Ila answers that *terumas lachmei todah* requires *tenufah* before Hashem in the *azarah*, so the breads must ultimately enter and the same *chullin ba’azarah* concern returns. Rav Shesh bar Rav Idi proposes using Chizkiyah’s rule of קדשו ארבעים מתוך שמונים by bringing a second animal and eighty breads and making a condition that either the breads split forty-and-forty between two *todaos* or forty sanctify out of eighty for one *Todah*, and *Rashi* explains the remaining forty function as *achrayus* and can therefore enter the *azarah*. The *Gemara* rejects this because of משום דקא ממעיט באכילה דארבעין, since the uncertainty forces eating all breads within the shorter *Todah* time and risks creating *nosar* that would not have existed with only forty.
- Rav Ashi suggests applying R' Yochanan’s rule about הפרש חטאת מעוברת וילדה, רצה בה מתכפר רצה בולדה מתכפר, by bringing a pregnant animal as *Todah*, waiting for birth, bringing eighty breads, and stipulating outcomes so that breads attach only to the actual *todaos* while any extra becomes *mosar todah*. Rav Kahana rejects this by challenging the reading of R' Yochanan and suggesting that the case may depend on אם שייורא משייורא and on treating the offspring as שבח הקדש rather than an independent entity that can be designated in parallel. The rejection concludes that the proposed structure rests on an unproven assumption that both mother and offspring can simultaneously function as the primary atonement-animal analogue.
- Rav Dimi bar Rav Huna of Demehorya proposes a solution by creating a new הרי עלי obligation, bringing additional animals and eighty breads, and stipulating outcomes so that whichever animal is the true *Todah* receives breads and any additional animal serves as *achrayus* without generating *chullin ba’azarah* or diminishing eating-time. Ravina rejects the solution because it instructs creating a *neder* *lechatchilah*, invoking טוב אשר לא תדור משתדור ולא תשלם as a principle discouraging vows even to resolve a stuck situation. The text reinforces this theme with sources from *Nedarim*, including כנדרי רשעים versus כנדרי כשרים and Rav Nosson’s statement that הנודר כאילו בנה במה והמקימו כאילו מקריב עליו קרבן. The text brings Tosafos in *Chullin* 2b that permits vows בשעת צרה and elaborates with the introduction of אם הבנים שמחה by Rav Yissachar Shlomo Teichtal, who frames his wartime vow as נודרים בעת צרה and interprets ושבתי בשלום אל בית אבי והיה ה' לי לאלקים as a commitment to return to *Eretz Yisrael* and thereby have an *Elokim*, alongside a broader presentation from בית אלקים בשם המבי"ט about Yaakov’s *tefillos* as the blueprint for the final *galus*.
- The *Mishnah* states that one who says הרי עלי תודה must bring both the animal and its breads מן החולין, because כל דבר שבחובה אינה באה אלא מן החולין and הרי עלי creates a personal obligation. If he says תודה עלי מן החולין ולחמה מן המעשר, he still brings both from *chullin* because the breads are ancillary to the obligatory offering. If he says תודה מן המעשר ולחמה מן החולין, he brings as vowed, and if he says היא ולחמה מן המעשר he also brings as vowed, with the limitation that he does not bring from *chitei maaser sheni* but may use *maos maaser sheni*, which is deferred to the next *daf*.
- Rav Huna rules that one who says הרי עלי *lachmei todah* must bring a *Todah* and its breads because לחם בלא תודה לא איקרי and the speaker is assumed to intend the full required package, with סוף מלתא נקט as his phrasing. The *Gemara* challenges Rav Huna from the *Mishnah* case of תודה מן המעשר ולחמה מן החולין by asking why the mention of bread-from-*chullin* does not force the *Todah* itself to be from *chullin* as well. The *Gemara* answers that once he explicitly says תודה מן המעשר, the follow-up about breads functions as a specification akin to הנעשה כאומר הרי עלי לחם לפטור תודתו של פלוני, rather than redefining the original designation. The *Gemara* rejects applying the reverse in the case of תודה מן החולין ולחמה מן המעשר because לחם is subordinate to *Todah* and not vice versa, expressed as בשלמא לחם לפטור תודתו אתי, תודה לפטור לחם יאתי?
- A *beraisa* teaches that one who says הרי עלי תודה בלא לחם or זבח בלא נסכים is compelled to bring תודה ולחמה and זבח ונסכיו, and the *Gemara* rejects the inference that only explicit mention of *Todah* triggers obligation by stating that the parallel *nesachim* case necessitates the formulation. The *Gemara* asks why the statement is not treated as an attempted retraction within *toch kedei dibbur*, and Chizkiyah answers that the teaching follows Beis Shammai’s rule תפס לשון ראשון, analogized to הריני נזיר מן הגרוגרות ומן הדבילה where Beis Shammai validates the first clause. R' Yochanan says the earlier case can fit Beis Hillel when the speaker clarifies that he would have vowed differently had he known the correct form, with the compulsion applying only after he later tries to back out. A later *beraisa* presents a case where the person insists אילו הייתי יודע שכן, לא הייתי נודר and the court still compels him with שמור ושמעת, and the *Gemara* concludes that this source is difficult for R' Yochanan’s Beis Hillel framing, leading to the resolution that this later *beraisa* is Beis Shammai. Abaye interprets שמור as obligating the *Todah* and ושמעת as obligating the breads, while Rava interprets שמור as obligating both *Todah* and breads and ושמעת as an instruction not to become accustomed to making vows in that manner.
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