Moed Katan Daf 17 - Niduy of a Talmid Chacham, Nazir Metzora Avel and Kohein Shaving on Chol Ha'moed
Summary
- This shiur presents Moed Katan 17 as a sequence of rulings and narratives about the scope and force of a student’s *nidui* for his own honor, the authority of a *talmid chacham* to act on his own judgment, and a detailed case of a scholar with a bad reputation culminating in his *shamta*, illness, a failed bid for release, death, and burial among judges. It articulates standards for whom one may learn Torah from, underscores the weight of a *shifcha* of Beit Rabbi’s *nidui*, and sets procedures when the source of a *nidui* is unknown. It establishes policies for censuring errant leaders and scholars, analyzes the meaning and lingering effects of *shamta* and its shofar rites, and concludes with practical halachot on shaving for Nazir and Metzora on Chol HaMoed, special cases for an Avel and a Kohen, and leniencies for one struck by consecutive *aveilut*.
- The ruling states that a student who pronounces *nidui* for his own honor issues a binding *nidui*. The implication from “*menudeh leRav menudeh leTalmid; menudeh leTalmid eino menudeh leRav*” is that while the Rav is not bound, others are bound, indicating the *nidui* is valid even from a student. The inference excludes a case of *mili d’shamaya*, since for matters of Heaven there is no exemption for a Rav from observing the *nidui*, showing the case is the student’s personal honor.
- Rav Yosef states that a “*tzurva merabbanan*” may be “*avid dina lenafshei*” in a “*milta d’pasika*”. The Rosh questions how personal adjudication can stand given the possibility of contrary views in a panel and the prohibition of judging oneself, and the Nimukei Yosef notes that “*avid inish dina lenafshei*” in Bava Kamma applies to everyone only in limited circumstances. The Ra’avad explains this sugya addresses honor-based censure rather than monetary law, and the Rosh suggests that when it is a clear-cut case, the *nidui* takes effect on all Israel as if issued by a *beit din*.
- The account presents a *talmid chacham* with a bad reputation and Rav Yehuda’s dilemma between the need for his Torah and the risk of a severe *chilul* Hashem. Rabba bar bar Chana relates Rav Yochanan’s teaching on “כי שפתי כהן ישמרו דעת... כי מלאך ה' צבאות הוא,” directing that one should seek Torah only from a Rav comparable to a malach and not from one with a corrupt reputation. Rav Yehuda places him in *shamta* and, when later ill, smiles at the man only from satisfaction that he had not engaged in flattery and had acted correctly. After Rav Yehuda’s death, the man seeks release, is referred to Yehuda Nesi’a and then to R’ Ami, but Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani objects by invoking the *nidui* of the shifcha of Beit Rabbi; R’ Zeira treats the elder’s presence as providential and they do not release him, after which a bee sting kills him and he is buried among judges because he followed Rabbi Ilai’s counsel to hide sin to avoid public *chilul* Hashem.
- Rav Yochanan’s standard states that one should learn Torah only from a teacher who is like a malach Hashem and not from one with a corrupt reputation. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe Yoreh De’ah 2:108) rules not to invite for a shiur one tied to a Conservative institution even in a non-ritual role, invoking this sugya’s standard for a teacher’s stature. Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De’ah 246 rules that if a Rav does not walk a good path, even if he is a great scholar needed by the public, one must not learn from him until he repents. The Bad Kodesh (cited in Peninei Halacha) explains two dinim: a safeguard lest one learn from the teacher’s deeds, and the integrity of mesorah, in which Torah learned from an unworthy “Rav” lacks the standing of a *limud mekayem* connecting back to Har Sinai.
- The shifcha of Beit Rabbi saw a man striking his older son and placed him in *shamta* for violating “לפני עור לא תתן מכשול,” which a baraita applies to hitting one’s *ben gadol*. Rashi explains the risk that the grown child might strike back or curse, thus the father causes the sin, and the Ritva defines “gadol” by the child’s nature, not strictly by age. The acharonim raise the chakira whether *lifnei iver* requires the induced sin to occur or is an independent prohibition akin to bad counsel, with an attempted proof from the immediate *nidui* here and the Pri Yitzchak rejecting the proof by framing the *nidui* as addressing wrongful conduct with high risk even absent the outcome. Contemporary writers note that in our times even very young children may react negatively, rendering such hitting improper and potentially falling under *lifnei iver*.
- Reish Lakish places a fig thief in *shamta*, the thief retorts that theft incurs monetary liability rather than *nidui*, and the beit midrash validates the thief’s *nidui* of Reish Lakish while invalidating Reish Lakish’s *nidui*. The remedy for one under *nidui* without knowing the issuer is to go to the Nasi, who may release it, establishing that route of annulment when the source is unknown. The Rambam (Hilchot Talmud Torah 6) rules that one who *menadeh* someone not liable for *nidui* becomes liable to *nidui* and a beit din must censure him, while the Ra’avad denies a duty for beit din to act though the *nidui* may be binding. The Nimukei Yosef reports an opinion that liability for wrongful *nidui* applies when targeting a *talmid chacham*, with the story possibly involving a scholar, though the sugya itself grounds the principle in Reish Lakish’s case.
- Rav Huna reports a takkanah of Usha that when an Av Beit Din sins, he is told “hachbed v’shev beveitecha,” and if he repeats the offense they *menadeh* him because of *chilul* Hashem. Reish Lakish states that a *talmid chacham* who sinned is not *menudeh* publicly, learned from “וכשלת היום... וכשל גם נביא עמך לילה,” meaning to cover as the night. Mar Zutra Chasida first placed himself in *shamta* before placing another scholar in *shamta*, and later released both in order. Rav Gidel in the name of Rav states that a *talmid chacham* may impose and annul *nidui* upon himself, and Rav Papa praises himself for never placing a scholar in *shamta*, while in Eretz Yisrael they administered lashes to a scholar rather than *shamta*. Rav Schachter explains that *shamta* is a curse implicating additional prohibitions when the target has *semicha*, so lashes avoid the compounded issue, whereas curses risk “אלוהים לא תקלל” on top of the general ban.
- Rav defines *shamta* as “shem mita,” and Shmuel as “shemama yihyeh,” with a lasting taint like fat in an oven, while Reish Lakish contends it penetrates all 248 limbs and departs from all 248 limbs, derived from the gematria of “cherem” and “rachem.” Rav Yosef illustrates the *shamta*’s force by directing a generic *shamta* at a shoe-destroying dog’s tail that leads to the dog’s destruction. A strongman who tormented a scholar is neutralized when Rav Yosef advises inscribing the *shamta*, placing it in a jug in a cemetery, and sounding shofar one thousand times for forty days, after which the aggressor dies. The shofar signifies “shenifra’in mimennu,” the shevarim indicate “tavrei batei ramei,” and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel affirms that where the Sages set their eyes, the result is either death or poverty.
- The halacha permits a Nazir and a Metzora to shave on Chol HaMoed even when they had time before Yom Tov so as not to delay their korbanot, since the offerings follow the shaving. A baraita generalizes that other allowances to shave on Chol HaMoed depend on lacking prior opportunity, but excludes Nazir and Metzora from that limitation to expedite their rites. This ruling distinguishes their case from others on the mishnah’s list who are forbidden if they had prior opportunity.
- The baraita that permits a Kohen and an Avel to shave is limited by timing details that avoid prior opportunities. For the Avel, the cases turn on whether the seventh or eighth day coincides with Shabbat erev regel, whether we say “*miktzat hayom kekulo*,” and whether the regel breaks sheloshim, with Abba Shaul permitting broader use of “*miktzat hayom kekulo*” and the chachamim generally rejecting it except in specific constrained scenarios. For the Kohen, when his *mishmar* finishes on the regel, one tana treats the ongoing egalitarian service of the regel as if his watch has not ended, while another holds that although he participates with all watches, his personal *mishmar* is considered finished, enabling shaving. These analyses reconcile the baraita with the mishnah’s omissions by fine-grained calendrical and service-status distinctions.
- The baraita’s statement that those permitted to shave on Chol HaMoed may also shave during *aveilut* is read with Rav Chisda’s limitation to the case of “*tikfuhu aveilav*,” back-to-back mourning. The general leniency for “*tikfuhu aveilav*” allows light hair reduction with a razor but not scissors, and laundering in water but not with neter or b’ahal, from which Rav Chisda infers that an Avel is generally prohibited in laundering. When a person is both among those normally permitted to shave on Chol HaMoed and is struck by “*tikfuhu aveilav*,” he may receive a normal haircut and do full laundering. These rules balance the dignity of the mourner with the cumulative burden of successive mourning periods.
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