Bechoros 36
Summary
- Today’s *shiur* on Bechoros 36a begins at “איבעיא להו” and frames *edus bechor* around whether a *bechor*’s *mum* was made intentionally, asking if *ed mi’pi ed* is valid in this context and presenting approaches of the Rashash Bechor, Rav Shach in Avi Ezri, and the Sfas Emes on how much this resembles formal *edus* versus rabbinic procedural restrictions. The *Gemara* contrasts the usual invalidity of *ed mi’pi ed* with the special case of *edus isha*, develops the scope of that exception, and records that the halacha accepts *ed mi’pi ed* for *edus bechor* while limiting combined leniencies. The *Gemara* then applies *ha’peh she’asar hu ha’peh she’hitir* to a *kohen* who newly identifies an animal as a *bechor* while asserting its *mum* was not intentional, distinguishes *chashash* from *anan sahadei*, and ties the attribution to Rav Ila to his view about *matanos kehunah* in *chutz la’aretz*. The sugya continues with the episode of Rav Tzadok, Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabban Gamliel about trusting a *chaver* versus an *am ha’aretz* and the dynamics of *kavod ha’nasi*, moves to a *Mishnah* about a *kohen* claiming he showed a *bechor* to a *chacham*, and develops the credibility principle “כל מילתא דעבידא לאגלויי לא משקר בה אינשי” through comparisons in *Demai* and additional cases. The *Gemara* ends with rules about examining a *bechor* brought by a *Yisrael*, and with the *Mishnah* that everyone is trusted regarding *mumei maaser*, explained by the ability to preemptively create a *mum* before designation, including by doing so across the whole herd.
- An initial *Gemara* question asks, “איבעיא להו, עד מפי עד מהו לעדות בכור,” and it is framed against the general rule that testimony normally requires firsthand witnessing. One explanation understands the doubt as whether the rabbinic disqualifications and rules in *edus bechor* make it formal *edus* so that *ed mi’pi ed* is invalid, or whether it remains outside formal *edus* so that *ed mi’pi ed* is acceptable, and this is presented as the Rashash Bechor’s approach. Rav Shach in Avi Ezri states that everyone agrees *edus bechor* does not truly require *edus*, and the question is whether *Chazal* added an additional restriction barring *ed mi’pi ed*.
- The Sfas Emes states that the sugya about *ed mi’pi ed* is not proven from “עד אחד נאמן באיסורין,” because that case is not *edus* at all and *ed mi’pi ed* works there, while here an element of *edus* is required. Rav Asi rules *ed mi’pi ed* is unacceptable and Rav Ashi rules it is acceptable. Rav Asi challenges Rav Ashi from a *beraisa* of “תנא דבי מנשה” that *ed mi’pi ed* is never valid “אלא לעדות האשה,” and the *Gemara* answers by reading it as “כל אשה כשרה בלבד,” meaning that wherever a woman is accepted, *ed mi’pi ed* is accepted.
- The Ranach observes that if a woman is a valid witness then *ed mi’pi ed* works, but not the reverse, because there can be cases where *ed mi’pi ed* is acceptable and a woman is not. Rav Yeimar validates *ed mi’pi ed* for *bechor*, he is nicknamed “יימר שרי בכרי,” and the *Gemara* concludes “והלכתא דהלכה is עד מפי עד כשר לעדות בכור.” The Ranach adds that a woman presenting *ed mi’pi ed* about a *bechor*’s *mum* is not accepted because it combines two leniencies, while the *Gemara* accepts only one leniency at a time.
- The *beraisa* limits *ed mi’pi ed* to *edus isha* where a woman testifies her husband died, and the sugya cites two explanations for accepting her statement. One explanation is “אשה דייקא ומינסבא” because if she remarries and the husband returns, “תצא מזה ומזה,” so she is careful. Another explanation is that under “הרי את מקודשת לי כדת משה וישראל” the marriage is tied to rabbinic authority, and in such cases “אפקינהו רבנן לקידושין מיניה.”
- The text presents a connected question about a reverse case where a husband says his wife died in the era of *cherem d’Rabbeinu Gershom* and whether he is believed as an *ed echad*. It cites a major dispute, with the Beis Shmuel and the Chasam Sofer being *machmir* that the husband lacks this *ne’emanus*, and the Noda B’Yehuda, quoted by the Pischei Teshuva, and others holding the husband is *ne’eman* because the *cherem d’Rabbeinu Gershom* does not apply when he testifies that his wife died.
- Rav Ila teaches a case where an animal is not established as a *bechor* and a *kohen* arrives saying it is a *bechor* and “מומו עמו,” and the *Gemara* accepts his credibility because “הפה שאסר הוא הפה שהתיר.” The *Gemara* asks why this is needed given the *Mishnah* in Kesubos where a woman says “אשת איש הייתי וגרושה אני” and is believed for the same reason. The *Gemara* answers that one might have distinguished the *bechor* case because of the need to involve *beis din* due to concerns of *kodashim bachutz* and *shechutei chutz*, but it concludes the principle still applies because the case is one with a visible *mum* where he did not have to volunteer information.
- A famous conceptual question is presented about whether *ha’peh she’asar hu ha’peh she’hitir* works due to “מיגו דאי בעי שתיק” or due to an original *chezkas kashrus*, and the Steipler says this *Gemara* shows the mechanism is “מיגו דאי בעי שתיק” because the *Gemara*’s distinction turns on whether he could have remained silent. A practical ramification is raised about a time gap between the two parts of the statement, and it is stated that if the principle is *migu* then the time lag does not undermine the *ne’emanus*, and the same would apply to the *kohen* and *bechor* case.
- Rav Ashi challenges the application by comparing it to the donkey rental case where Rava would believe the renter based on “מה לי לשקר,” but Abaye rejects it as “מה לי לשקר במקום עדים לא אמרינן” because “אנן סהדי” that the river-route has water. The *Gemara* answers that a general suspicion that *kohanim* may create *mumin* is only “חששא” and not “אנן סהדי,” and “ובמקום חששא אמרינן מה לי לשקר.” Ravina repeats the teaching without attribution and Rav Zuta attributes it specifically to Rav Ila.
- The text explains that naming Rav Ila matters because *ha’peh she’asar* is framed as the speaker having nothing to gain, yet a *bechor* could exempt from *matanos kehunah*, and Rav Ila’s view from Chullin that “בחוץ לארץ אין אנו מחוייבין במתנות כהונה” removes that gain. The sugya records an incident where a *kohen* tried to exploit the rule by falsely claiming a *bechor* came to him already blemished when his benefactor’s eyesight was weak, and Rav Refrum exposed the lie, yet the *Gemara* says the principle stands because “האִי הוא דחציף” and “כולי עלמא לא חציפי.”
- Rav Tzadok, a *kohen*, causes a *mum* when the animal’s lip is injured while eating from a wicker basket, and he asks Rabbi Yehoshua whether there is a distinction between a *chaver* and an *am ha’aretz* regarding trusting a *kohen*. Rabbi Yehoshua answers that a *chaver* is trusted. Rav Tzadok then asks Rabban Gamliel, who answers that there is no distinction, and the text explains that even though the halacha follows Rabban Gamliel, it is limited to cases like feeding from such a basket where deliberate intent is plausible, while in cases where malicious intent is clearly absent even Rabban Gamliel would agree a *talmid chacham* is believed.
- Rav Tzadok reports that Rabbi Yehoshua told him “הן,” and Rabban Gamliel says “המתן עד שיעלו בעלי תריסין לבית המדרש,” after which Rav Tzadok publicly asks the question. Rabbi Yehoshua answers “לאו,” and Rabban Gamliel challenges him and orders “יהושע עמוד על רגליך ויעידו בך,” keeping him standing while he lectures until the people protest and tell Chutzpis the translator to stop, forcing the session to pause. The text offers explanations that Rabban Gamliel intended to enforce *kavod ha’nasi* or to publicize Rabbi Yehoshua’s retraction so that the earlier ruling would not mislead others.
- A Tosafos note is cited that “רב חוצפית המתורגמן מעשרה הרוגי מלכות,” and the text explains it as answering Acher’s difficulty from the end of Chullin by attributing the severe fate to Chutzpis’s silence when *kavod haTorah* was violated. The text connects this episode to later halachic discussion about whether one may consult a second *rav* after receiving a *heter*, contrasting the Rosh’s explanation of “שויה אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא” with the Ran’s explanation based on *kavod*, and it cites the Yaavetz that the status of the *nasi* changes the calculus.
- A *Mishnah* states “נאמן כהן לומר, הראיתי בכור זה לחכם, ובעל מום הוא,” and the text records a major dispute among the *Rishonim* about whether the *kohen* must name the *chacham*. The Rambam holds he need not name the *chacham*, while the Rosh and most *Rishonim* require naming. The text explains an *Acharonim* approach that the Rambam’s position is not necessarily more lenient because, according to the Rambam and also Rashi, the *kohen* must bring *eidim* that he did not create the *mum*, whereas if the *chacham* is named the assumption is that the *chacham* ensured such *eidim*, so the Rosh can require naming without requiring those *eidim*.
- The text reports additional *Acharonim* attempts to distinguish between “מום מובהק” or “מום ניכר” versus “מום שאינו ניכר” as affecting whether naming is required, including proposals in both directions.
- Rav Yehuda quoting Rav says “נאמן הכהן לומר זה בכור נתנו לי ישראל במומו,” and the *Gemara* grounds this in “כל מילתא דעבידא לאגלויי לא משקר בה אינשי.” The text cites Rav Moshe in Dibros Moshe that this establishes a new form of *ne’emanus* and raises that it might even overcome disqualifications like *noge’a b’davar* or *karov*. Rav Ashi claims the principle is already implied by the *Mishnah* about showing the *bechor* to a *chacham*, and the *Gemara* answers that one might have limited that *Mishnah* to fear of *kodashim bachutz*, so Rav Yehuda’s teaching is still needed given that *kohanim* are suspected.
- Rav Shizvi challenges from a *Mishnah* in Demai where one who is not trusted about *maaser* is instructed to buy from someone trustworthy, yet his report is not accepted, and the *Gemara* answers “שאני התם דאית ליה לאשתמוטי” because he can evade by claiming he thought the seller was trustworthy. The *Gemara* then says the *seifa* supports the concept where he specifies “מאיש פלוני” and is believed, but it rejects that as proof and attributes the credibility there to “קים ליה לטובי מרסוס” because the named merchant would sue if bypassed.
- Rav Yehuda bar Abba explains the source through a tradition involving “גידל כביתיה,” and the sugya states “נאמן ישראל לומר בזה נתתי לכהן במומו,” clarifying that the case is not trivial because of “בקטן והגדיל” with a dispute whether it refers to the animal’s growth or to a witness who was a minor at the time. The text reports that Sura taught the latter formulation emphasizing a *Yisrael*’s *ne’emanus*, Pumbedisa taught the earlier formulation emphasizing the *kohen*’s *ne’emanus*, and the halacha follows even the earlier formulation so both are accepted.
- A case of *sarua* comes before Rav Ashi, and the initial thought is that since the *mum* is obvious there is nothing to fear whether the bringer is a *kohen* or a *Yisrael*. Ravina objects that perhaps the bringer is a *Yisrael* and cites Rav Yehuda that “אין רואין בכור לישראל, אלא אם כן כהן עמו,” because people are more careful about the severe prohibition of *kodashim bachutz* than about monetary wrongdoing against a *kohen*. Rav Ashi answers that in this case the visible nature of *sarua* makes it unnecessary to seek a *chacham*, so the person comes only “משום כבוד חכם,” and someone concerned about *kavod haTorah* is not suspected of the underlying prohibition, so the animal may be examined even without a *kohen* accompanying him.
- A *Mishnah* states “הכל נאמנים על מומי מעשר,” and the text explains Rashi’s reading that it refers to *safek maaser* because credibility by ordinary *maaser* is less novel given people’s caution about offerings. The *Gemara* asks why the owner is believed since *maaser* with a *mum* benefits the owner just as a *bechor* with a *mum* benefits a *kohen*, and it answers “דאי בעי שדי ביה מומא מעיקרא” because he could have created a *mum* before designation.
- The *Gemara* asks “מי ידע הי נפיק” because one does not know which animal will be the tenth, and it rejects manipulating the count because “לא יבקר בין טוב לרע אמר רחמנא.” The *Gemara* answers that he could have put a *mum* in the entire herd, which would avoid *maaser* altogether and supports the *ne’emanus*. The text adds an *Acharonim* discussion about *tza’ar ba’alei chayim*, stating that here there is a purpose in creating *mumin* to remove the obligation of *maaser* and it is therefore permitted, while stressing it is not being recommended in practice. Test in California.
Previous Page
Next Page
Daf Images are property of Vagshal and may not be reproduced.
Suggestions