Bechoros 35
Summary
- The text presents the Mishnah and Gemara in מסכת בכורות דף ל"ה עמוד א' about when a בכור that received a blemish becomes permitted, and it frames the rule around whether the blemish was made *לדעת* or *שלא לדעת*. It explains why a Roman official’s first act of slitting an ear and children’s first act of tearing a tail can permit the animal, while repeated acts become prohibited because they now reflect intention and awareness. It brings practical halachic extensions from the תרומת הדשן and later פוסקים about unintended *ביטול איסור* and unintentional grinding of wormy grain, and it develops sugyot about wording that hints to an עכו״ם, *גרמא*, *מסיח לפי תומו*, self-defense injuries, making a blemish before birth, and what counts as a visible permanent מום. It then turns to testimony about whether a blemish was intentional, presents the dispute of רבי יוחנן and רבי אלעזר on how to read “רועי ישראל נאמנים” and “רועי כהנים אינם נאמנים,” integrates views of רבן שמעון בן גמליאל, רבי מאיר, רבי יהושע בן קפוסיי, רבי יוסי, and later Amoraim, and concludes with limits on disqualifying כהנים as broadly “חשודים” for all Torah matters.
- A Mishnah case describes a בכור sheep left untouched until it becomes a בעל מום, so its hair grows long and dangling. A Roman official asks why it looks that way, is told it is a בכור that cannot be slaughtered unless it has a מום, and he slits its ear with a spear. The ראשונים explain that he assumes only a naturally occurring blemish permits slaughter, so his act is not meant to permit it but to denigrate קדושה, and the חכמים permit the animal because the act is not treated as an intentional מום. Afterward he slits the ears of other בכורות, and the חכמים prohibit those because he now understands the effect and it is treated as done בכוונה. Some ראשונים say the Mishnah’s initial היתר applies specifically to a קסדור, since an official has standing to question the matter, while an ordinary non-Jew would not necessarily receive the same leniency.
- A second Mishnah case has children tying lambs’ tails together in a field, causing one tail to detach, and that animal is a בכור. The case comes before חכמים and they permit it because there was no intent to create a מום. After the children see that the torn tail makes a בכור permitted, they repeat the act with other בכורות, and those are prohibited because the act now reflects intention. The Mishnah states the rule that קשרו לדעת is אסור and שלא לדעת is מותר, with רש"י tying it to whether the actor recognized what the act would accomplish and other ראשונים tying it to whether it was done under the owner’s directive.
- The תרומת הדשן applies the Mishnah’s framework to a case where blood falls into water without שישים, the owner intends to discard the mixture, and another person unknowingly adds more water for practical use until the blood becomes בטל בששים. The תרומת הדשן rules that although there is a general rule of אסור לבטל איסור לכתחילה, here the mixture becomes permitted because the person adding water lacks intent to be מבטל the איסור. The פוסקים extend a similar leniency to wormy wheat or flour that someone grinds without knowing its status, since any worms would be fully ground and the grinding was not done with intent to be מבטל the איסור. The text states that whenever there is no such intent, greater leniency is found.
- The Gemara asks why two cases are needed and answers צריכא by distinguishing concerns of repetition and confusion. It says that with an עכו"ם there is no concern דלא אתי למסרך, and רש"י explains that גזירות are made to prevent repeated עבירה, but עכו"ם are not careful in avoiding עבירות so there is no point in making such a גזירה for them. The אחרונים read רש"י as implying that an עכו"ם making a מום in a בכור is an איסור for him, and one explanation is that a בכור belongs to הקדש so making it a בעל מום causes a loss to הקדש, which falls under the עכו"ם obligation of דינים against theft. Another explanation is that since some קרבנות may be brought by עכו"ם, they are treated as connected to קדשים and thus to the prohibition of making a מום. The Gemara also says that with a קטן who is a ישראל there is concern that if he sees effectiveness he may continue into adulthood, while with עובדי כוכבים there is concern of confusion with a גדול, so both cases are necessary. Rav Akiva is cited as inferring from the Gemara’s framing that אמירה לעכו"ם is a very strong איסור because the Gemara does not attribute the leniency to it being “only” that kind of prohibition.
- Rav Chisda in the name of Rav Katina says the Mishnah’s leniency applies only when the official heard wording like “אם לא כן היה בו מום,” implying a naturally occurring blemish, so he assumes his act will not permit the animal. Rav Chisda says that if he heard “אם נעשה בו מום,” it is treated as if they explicitly told him “זיל עביד ביה מומא,” and then the animal would be אסור. Rava challenges this by arguing that since the officer does not know the halachic distinction, the wording should not matter and the act remains treated as unintentional. The חזון איש explains that Rav Chisda assumes an average non-Jew understands that making a מום permits, so only “היה” removes that assumption, while Rava assumes the non-Jew knows there is no היתר to make a מום and therefore assumes his act will not help.
- The Gemara interprets “זה הכלל… לדעת אסור” as coming to include גרמא, teaching that even causing a מום indirectly is treated like intentional action and leaves the animal אסור. It interprets “שלא לדעת מותר” as coming to include מסיח לפי תומו. Rashi explains מסיח לפי תומו as Jews speaking among themselves without hinting to the עכו"ם that making the מום will permit the animal, while speech intended to tip him off makes it אסור. Some ראשונים are more lenient and permit whenever the Jews are speaking among themselves, even if a hint could be inferred. The שפת אמת interprets מסיח לפי תומו as the non-Jew stating innocently that he made the מום without intending to permit the animal, and the text says this statement can be believed to permit it.
- The Mishnah rules that if a בכור chases someone and he kicks it to remove it and thereby causes a מום, it is not considered an intentional blemish and it may be slaughtered upon that מום. Rav Pappa first states that this applies only when he kicks during the chase and not afterward, and the Gemara explains a possible thought that even afterward it may still be non-intentional due to lingering pain and frustration, which Rav Pappa rejects. An alternative version says Rav Pappa rules that even after the chase it can still be treated as non-intentional because the kick can be attributed to צעריה דמקתא rather than intent to blemish.
- Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav rules that it is permitted to inflict a מום on a בכור before it emerges into the world. Rava comments “גדיא באודניה” and explains that a goat’s long ears can emerge before most of the head, allowing an ear blemish to occur before birth-status attaches, and the פוסקים infer that cutting anywhere on the ear suffices as a מום. For a lamb with smaller ears, the text presents that one should make the blemish on the lips because they emerge before most of the head, following Rashi’s explanation. Tosafot explains a different concern that an animal can protrude its head and retract it, so ear visibility may come after a prior “birth” event, and Rava’s distinction is framed as a probabilistic concern about what normally emerges first. Another version states “אמרא נמי באודניה” because “אימא דרך צדופנא נפק,” allowing reliance that ears can precede the head even for a lamb.
- The Gemara briefly introduces a topic that will be expanded later on דף ל"ט, requiring a permanent visible blemish to permit slaughter and transfer to the כהן. Rava teaches that a mouth-area blemish that is not visible while eating but becomes visible when the animal cries is still a valid מום. The Gemara explains that Rava is clarifying the reason for the Mishnah’s ruling on דף ל"ט about notched front gums and uprooted back gums being blemishes, because when the animal cries the condition is visible.
- The Mishnah states that for all blemishes that are feasible to be caused by people, רועי ישראל are trusted but רועי כהנים are not, and רבן שמעון בן גמליאל says one is trusted about another’s animal but not his own. רבי מאיר says החשוד על הדבר לא דנו ולא מעידו. The Gemara records a dispute between רבי יוחנן and רבי אלעזר over how to map these categories onto cases of a כהן owner with a ישראל shepherd versus a ישראל owner with a כהן shepherd. One view says a ישראל shepherd working for a כהן is believed because “ללוגמא לא חיישינן,” but a כהן shepherd working for a ישראל is not believed because he assumes the ישראל will give him the animal, and it extends this to כהן-to-כהן testimony due to concern for mutual favors, with רבן שמעון בן גמליאל limiting suspicion to one’s own animal and רבי מאיר disqualifying any suspected party. The other view says a כהן shepherd for a ישראל is believed because he assumes the ישראל will prefer a prestigious כהן, “לא שביק צורבא מרבנן ויהיב לדידי,” while a ישראל shepherd for a כהן is not believed due to concern he lies to receive meat, and it frames רבי מאיר as rejecting the תנא קמא’s trust in כהנים by asserting that כהנים are called חשודים in this area.
- The text cites a חכם צבי that uses the Gemara’s assumption that a ישראל seeks a greater כהן as proof that a person may switch to a greater individual for a mitzvah role. The חכם צבי applies this to a case where someone used one מוהל for a first ברית and wants a different, greater תלמיד חכם as מוהל for a later bris, and he says the earlier מוהל cannot claim permanent rights. The text notes a פרי צדיק that reads the Gemara as a first-time case without prior track record, while the חכם צבי reads the Gemara as supporting switching even with a prior pattern because the employer remains on the lookout for a greater person.
- The Gemara answers what רבי מאיר adds under the first reading by introducing רבי יהושע בן קפוסיי’s rule that a בכור in a כהן’s possession needs two outsiders to testify, with the ראשונים explaining that two outsiders can be even כהנים, and תוספות adding that if the witnesses are ישראל even one would suffice. רבן שמעון בן גמליאל says even a son or daughter is trusted, while רבי יוסי says even ten members of the household cannot testify due to their interest in sharing the meat. Rashi frames the תנא קמא as aligning with רבי יהושע בן קפוסיי so that כהנים are sometimes believed outside their own stake, while רבי מאיר treats a כהן as never trusted in בכורה matters.
- Rav Chisda in the name of Rav Katina rules that a ספק בכור שנולד בישראל needs two outsiders to testify, and the Gemara identifies this as רבי יהושע בן קפוסיי’s view. Rav Nachman disagrees and says “באלימא דמי,” asserting that suspicion targets כהנים and not ישראל. Rav Nachman argues that otherwise מעשר בהמה would become unworkable under רבי מאיר’s logic because everyone would be biased, and the Gemara answers that for מעשר the owner is believed via a מיגו since he could, if he wished, blemish the entire herd, and the text adds that this is not treated as צער בעלי חיים when done for a constructive purpose of avoiding the מעשר issue. The מפרשים ask why the same argument does not apply to בכור via pre-birth blemishing, and the text answers that מעשר remains in the owner’s domain while בכור transfers to a different domain, and it also distinguishes that a ספק בכור is not anticipated in advance whereas מעשר is.
- The Gemara presses how a ספק בכור can ever be permitted under רבי מאיר if no one is qualified to testify, and it cites the earlier dispute on דף י"ח where רבי יוסי exempts the ישראל’s retained animal from מתנות while רבי מאיר obligates him when it becomes a בעל מום. The Gemara infers that even according to רבי מאיר the בעלים can be believed, concluding that only כהנים are חשידי אמומין because it is common for them, while ישראלים are not treated as generally suspect due to the rarity. The Gemara records Rav Nachman ruling הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל and Rav ruling הלכה כרבי יוסי, then reconciles a statement of Rav about household testimony in a case where the owner was outside by reading it as a case where the whole family was outside. The Gemara’s conclusion rules like רבן שמעון בן גמליאל and limits it to “ודווקא בנו ובתו” but not the wife, because “אשתו כגופו דמי,” and the text then brings later observations including a תורה לשמה about בושת and a discussion among פוסקים about נר חנוכה when spouses are away from home, and it cites a teaching attributed to the ליובאוויטשער רבי that grounds women’s exemption from מצוות עשה שהזמן גרמא in “אשתו כגופו.”
- The Gemara cites רמי who says “החשוד על דבר לא דנו ולא מעידו” and that one suspected in one area is “חשוד לכל התורה כולה,” and it challenges this by asking whether כהנים would then be disqualified from judging even though the פסוק states “ועל פיהם יהיה כל ריב וכל נגע.” The Gemara answers that רמי’s principle is applied only “לחששא,” to raise concern in a specific context, but not “לאחזוקיה,” not to establish כהנים as certainly doing wrongdoing so as to disqualify them broadly from being רבנים and דיינים.
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