Bechoros 34
Summary
- Today’s shiur learns מסכת בכורות דף לד from הכא and explains that the earlier attempt to connect the מחלוקת of בכור שאחזו דם with the מחלוקת about guarding תרומה תלויה fails because the תרומה dispute stands on its own פסוקים. The shiur builds the דרשות from “ואני הנה נתתי לך את משמרת תרומותי,” clarifies why רבי יהושע and רב אלעזר disagree about שמירה for תרומה תלויה, and then returns to the בכור sugya with שמואל’s פסיקה like רבי שמעון דברייתא. The shiur continues into the next משנה about קנסות for making a מום in a בכור, compares it to קנסות in נגעים, and concludes with the principle that קנסות generally apply to the offender and not to his son, supported from שביעית and from the case of טימא טהרות.
- Today’s shiur begins in the sugya that started on דף לג where the גמרא tried to link two הלכות, the מחלוקת in the משנה of בכור שאחזו דם about being מקיז and possibly making a מום, and the מחלוקת about תרומה תלויה and whether it must be protected from הפסד. The גמרא establishes that the בכור מחלוקת depends on פסוקים, and then says הכא about תרומה תלויה that they also argue from independent פסוקים, so the two disputes are not linked. The shiur frames תרומה תלויה as a ספק טהור or טמא and explains that the question is whether there is a חיוב שמירה to prevent its destruction.
- Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel, and likewise Reish Lakish and Rav Nachman אמר רבה בר אבוה, tie the תרומה תלויה dispute to במדבר פרק יח פסוק ח, “ואני הנה נתתי לך את משמרת תרומותי.” The shiur states that “נתתי לך” teaches permission of use, as learned in שבת דף כה עמוד א, so a כהן may eat תרומה טהורה and may have הנאה from תרומה טמאה such as using it for fire or using טמא wine for a good smell. The shiur states that “משמרת” teaches an obligation to guard תרומה so it should not become טמא and thereby be lost from being eaten.
- Rav אלעזר initially is presented as holding that the תורה speaks of שתי תרומות, תרומה טהורה and תרומה תלויה, and the word משמרת requires שמירה even for תלויה so it should not become טמא and be lost. רבי יהושע is presented as rejecting שמירה for תלויה and treating the פסוק as singular תרומתי כתיב, so only תרומה טהורה is guarded. The shiur brings the earlier ruling on ל״ג עמוד ב׳ that Rav אלעזר says if it is exposed it must be placed or covered to protect it, while רבי יהושע says if it is hidden it should be exposed and if covered it should be uncovered so that it becomes ודאי טמא and then can be used, because תלויה cannot be eaten and also cannot be used for הנאה.
- The shiur then brings the challenge from שמות פרק כא פסוק ח, “לעם נכרי לא ימשול למכרה בבגדו בו,” where רבי עקיבא reads *bevigdo* as a garment and derives אין אדם מוכר בתו לשפחות אחר אישות, while Rav אלעזר reads *bevgado* as betrayal and derives אין שפחות אחר שפחות. The גמרא rejects the claim that Rav אלעזר and רבי יהושע are arguing on *yesh em la-mikra* versus *yesh em la-masoret* and instead says they argue about whether שמירה applies only to what is “ראוי לך.”
- Rabbi Yehoshua holds הראוי לך שמור and says only תרומה that is usable requires שמירה, while what is not ראוי לך, namely תרומה תלויה, has no חיוב שמירה. Rav אלעזר says תרומה תלויה is also considered ראוי because שמא יבוא אליהו וייטהרנה, and once clarified it may become definite תרומה טהורה that can be eaten, so it must be guarded. The shiur adds the Rambam’s view that ספק דאורייתא לחומרא is only מדרבנן and is מן התורה לקולא, and reports in the name of הרב בלסקי שליט״א that a case of תלויה can exist for the Rambam where טומאה is הוחזק, such as knowing a שרץ touched one of two items but not knowing which, so the ספק is treated stringently and can require שמירה.
- Tosafos דיבור המתחיל אחת טמאה ואחת טהורה asks how שבת דף כה derives permission to use תרומה טמאה from the same פסוק if תרומותי in plural yields only two. Tosafos answers that there are two distinct דרשות, where “לך” and plural תרומותי refer to תרומה טהורה and תרומה טמאה for usage, while “משמרת” refers to guarding תרומה טהורה and guarding תרומה תלויה from becoming טמא. Tosafos then asks how רבי יהושע, reading the word as singular, knows the היתר הנאה for תרומה טמאה, and answers that שבת דף כה brings other sources for that היתר and רבי יהושע relies on those.
- Rav Yehuda אמר שמואל rules הלכה כרבי שמעון regarding the case of הקזת הדם for a בכור whose life is in danger, where one intends only to let out blood and not to make a מום, and the shiur identifies this as דבר שאינו מתכוין when it is not פסיק רישא. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak asks which רבי שמעון is intended, since the ברייתא states רבי שמעון אומר אף נשחט על אותו המום, allowing שחיטה based on a מום that resulted from life-saving bloodletting because there is no קנס when the intent was not to make a מום. The shiur explains that the general dispute of רב and שמואל about דבר שאינו מתכוין is already known, so the intended ruling is that הלכה כרבי שמעון דברייתא, and Rav Shisha brei d’Rav Idi teaches explicitly that Shmuel’s ruling targets that ברייתא.
- The משנה states הצורם אוזן בבכור, and the shiur records that Rashi explains it as making a slit and the Rambam פירוש המשניות explains it as puncturing the ear, both constituting a מום. רבי אליעזר says הרי זה לא ישחוט עולמית, and the shiur notes the נוסח “לא ישחט” meaning neither he nor anyone else may ever slaughter based on that blemish. חכמים say נולד בו מום אחר ישחוט עליו, meaning he may slaughter only once a different blemish appears.
- Rashi says ובכהן קא מיירי, and the shiur presents the מהרי״ט אלגאזי as reading Rashi that the קנס applies when the כהן himself made the מום, while if a ישראל made it before giving it to the כהן there is no קנס on the כהן. The shiur reports that the Rambam disagrees and applies the קנס even when a ישראל made the מום before transfer, and it brings the שאגת אריה and פנים מאירות who distinguish between רבי אליעזר’s punitive קנס and the חכמים’ rule as avoiding הנאה from עבירה, comparing it to the prohibition to benefit from intentional בישול on שבת even for others.
- The גמרא asks whether רבי אליעזר really imposes a forever-kens, and Tosafos infers from the language ומי קנס that this is a קנס and notes that later the gemara says explicitly בהאי מומא קנסו רבנן. Tosafos brings a ספרי in פרשת ראה quoting רבי אליעזר deriving from “לא תאכל כל תועבה” that המטיל מום בבכור ואוכלו violates a דין דאורייתא, and Tosafos offers answers including that the ספרי is אסמכתא בעלמא.
- The גמרא brings a ברייתא about בהרת where accidental removal results in טהור, while intentional cutting triggers a קנס. רבי אליעזר says לכשיולד נגע אחר יטהר ממנו, and חכמים say he remains without purification unless שתפרח בכולו or unless at the time of cutting it was already less than כגריס, with Rashi stating that otherwise אין לו טהרה עולמית. The shiur sets up the apparent contradictions between רבי אליעזר and himself, and between חכמים and themselves, since the בכור case and the נגע case yield different durations of restriction.
- Rabba and Rav Yosef answer that רבי אליעזר is stringent forever only in ממונו like the בכור, because there is motivation to rationalize making a מום to gain היתר, while in גופו by נגע there is no such incentive since cutting it off risks indefinite טומאה and gains nothing. Rava objects that there is also a contradiction within חכמים, and the גמרא resolves that in both cases חכמים penalize the specific act the person tried to use to permit himself. The shiur states that in the בכור case the person intended to permit slaughter through that blemish, so the קנס blocks היתר from that blemish but allows a later blemish, while in the נגע case the person intended to become טהור through the cutting, so the קנס blocks purification via that cutting and does not treat later events as retroactively validating the first removal.
- Rav Pappa asks whether the text is יטהר or ויטהר, and Rashi explains the difference as whether the first-kens ends immediately upon appearance of a second נגע or only after the second is healed. The גמרא asks the practical difference and answers that it matters for a חתן שנראה בו נגע, since the משנה in נגעים gives him שבעה ימים and similarly delays inspection during the רגל, so if יטהר is immediate there can be a window where the first ends and the second is deferred. If ויטהר requires the second’s healing to clear the first, then deferring the second does not create relief because he remains טמא from the first. The gemara concludes תיקו.
- Rav Yirmiyah asks Rav Zeira whether a person who made a מום in a בכור and died passes the קנס to his son, with Rashi framing the question as whether the son is barred from eating it forever. The shiur notes that the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch rule like the חכמים and still conclude the son is not penalized, implying the question applies even under the חכמים that the son might otherwise need to wait for a later מום.
- The גמרא compares to the questions in גיטין about מוכר עבדו לעובד כוכבים and in מועד קטן about מכוין מלאכתו במועד, distinguishing those cases by ongoing harm or by whether the father actually did an עבירה. The גמרא formulates the core issue as whether the קנס is on the person, which ends with his death, or on the property, which would bind the heir.
- Rav Zeira answers from שביעית פרק ד׳ משנה ב׳ that a field improved in שמיטה by a significant act is penalized from being planted after שמיטה, yet Rav Yosef bar Chanina states נקיטינן that if he improved it and died, בנו זורעה, proving that לדידיה קנסו רבנן and לבריה לא קנסו רבנן. Tosafos asks how a שמיטה דרבנן-type labor can prove a case of making a מום in a בכור which is an איסור דאורייתא, and answers that it is fitting to be stricter in שביעית, “כמה קשה אבקה של שביעית,” so leniency to the son there supports leniency here as well.
- Abaye states נקיטינן that if someone made his friend’s טהרות טמא and died, לא קנסו בנו אחריו. The shiur explains that the lack of תורה-level damages rests on היזק שאינו ניכר לא שמיה היזק, while any payment obligation is a קנס דרבנן, and the pattern remains that the קנס is imposed on the offender and not transferred to his son.
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