Bechoros 29
Summary
- The שיעור on מסכת בכורות דף כט begins from the משנה at the bottom of דף כח עמוד ב and frames the practical need, in the absence of a בית המקדש, for a בכור to be declared a בעל מום by an authorized expert so it can be eaten by a כהן. The משנה disqualifies declarations and legal rulings that are tied to payment, then qualifies when limited payment is allowed as שכר בטלה or because of special communal need, and the גמרא derives broader rules about taking money for תורה, דין, עדות, and פרה אדומה procedures. The שיעור presents major interpretive disputes, especially between רש״י and the רמבן about why payment undermines reliability, and it connects the sugya to later הלכה such as payment structures for שוחטים, the permissibility of paid rabbinic roles, and professional fees like doctors. The sugya then shifts to commercial restrictions on people suspected of dishonesty in בכורות, שביעית, and תרומה, explaining when processing changes the suspicion and closing with a story where רבא penalizes a dishonest butcher.
- The משנה rules that one who takes payment to inspect and rule on בכורות cannot be relied upon, and רש״י attributes this to חשד that payment creates an ulterior motive. The רמבן rejects that explanation because the same משנה permits payment for אילא, and the רמבן ties the issue to the rule that one may not take payment to *lifsoḳ she’elah*, treating the בכור ruling as the same category. The משנה allows an exception for an expert like אילא ביבנה, where חכמים permitted him to take ארבע איסרות for בהמה דקה and שישה for גסה, whether he rules תם or בעל מום, with רש״י saying his stature removes חשד and the רמבן saying communal necessity and his being a תלמיד חכם בטל justify payment. The גמרא explains the different rates as reflecting differing טרחה and danger, requires payment even when he rules תם to prevent accusations that he rules בעל מום only for אגרא, and limits payment to חד זימנא per animal so no one suspects he manipulates outcomes to collect twice, with תוספות offering reasons why this still does not create a new חשד.
- The שיעור cites the *pisḳ* of the שולחן ערוך based on a ריב״ש that disallows paying שוחטים only when an animal comes out כשר because that payment model creates a concern they will declare כשר merely to receive payment. The recommended alternatives are a salary or per-animal payment regardless of כשר or לא כשר. The שיעור reports later פוסקים who address a מנהג of giving the שוחט a piece from a כשר animal and give reasons to reduce concern, including the insignificance of the cut, the presence of a רב who decides כשרות rather than the שוחט, and the claim that a שוחט will not risk eating meat he knows is not כשר.
- The משנה rules that one who takes payment to judge has דיניו בטלים and one who takes payment to testify has עדותו בטלה, with the שיעור stressing that this is not שוחד because it is payment for the act rather than to favor a side. The שיעור records disputes among ראשונים about whether the invalidation applies retroactively or only going forward and whether it is מדאורייתא or מדרבנן. The ראשונים allow leniencies when both litigants agree to pay the judges equally and when the parties authorize פשרה rather than strict דין, and the פוסקים debate whether a single instance of paid judging disqualifies or only repeated cases, with most holding even once is enough. The פוסקים say repayment cures the problem for the future, and the שיעור raises whether a judge can truly reopen a case after repayment without being psychologically committed, paralleling a broader question whether prior similar rulings bias a דיין, with differing פוסקים on that concern.
- The ראשונים distinguish an עד disqualified for payment from an עד פסול as a רשע, noting that the latter often requires הכרזה while the former does not, and that the latter remains פסול whereas a paid witness becomes acceptable again upon returning the money. The פוסקים say the rule of עדות שבטלה מקצתה בטלה כולה does not apply here, so if one witness took payment and another did not, the un-paid witness is not automatically invalidated. The רשב״א limits the disqualification to someone who already witnessed an event and then conditions testimony on payment, but validates payment for serving as an עד in contexts like גט and קידושין where one is not obligated to attend and testify. The שיעור emphasizes that even when payment is allowed, it is always אסור for compensation to depend on whether the testimony benefits the party.
- The משנה states that one paid להזות ולקדש renders the water מימיו מי מערה and the ash אפרו אפר מקלה, and the שיעור notes explanations for why the משנה orders the terms in a way that yields a חידוש that each act alone disqualifies and that even preparatory steps fall under the restriction. The גמרא challenges this from a משנה in מסכת קידושין where המקדש במי חטאת ובאפר חטאת הרי זו מקודשת, implying they have value, and אביי answers by distinguishing between שכר הבאה ומילוי, which may be paid and therefore the materials retain value, and שכר הזיה וקידוש, which may not be paid and therefore disqualifies. The גמרא supports this by noting the differing language between the two mishnayot, aligning “מי חטאת ואפר חטאת” with preparation and “להזות ולקדש” with the core ritual acts.
- The משנה permits compensating a כהן who became טמא through the requested service by feeding, giving drink, and providing oil because he cannot eat תרומה and must rely on costlier חולין. The גמרא explains how the כהן’s טומאה can be permitted, offering the framework of בית הפרס דרבנן and the rule that one may proceed by blowing while walking, and it presents an alternative explanation that the case involves טומאת שרץ rather than טומאת מת so the prohibition is different. The משנה allows providing transport for a זקן and paying שכרו כפועל, and the גמרא defines this as שכר בטלה. אביי defines it as כפועל בטל של אותה מלאכה, with רש״י measuring the compensation by what a person would relinquish to leave his own work for this task and תוספות measuring it by what a person would accept to refrain from his work and take time off.
- The גמרא derives the rule against taking payment for תורה from משה רבינו’s statement “ראה למדתי אתכם חקים ומשפטים כאשר צוני ה' אלהי,” reading it as “מה אני בחנם אף אתם בחנם,” and it brings a ברייתא that repeats the same formulation. The שיעור records two ways ראשונים understand the derivation, either as an explicit command from Hashem to prohibit payment or as an analogy to Hashem teaching משה without payment. תוספות explains why teachers are paid in practice by citing survival needs when teaching is the person’s livelihood, compensation for טרחה such as supervising children, and payment for items not obligated מדאורייתא such as *pisuḳ te‘amim*. The רמב״ם condemns taking payment for תורה as חילול השם, while the שולחן ערוך and רמ״א allow paid rabbinic roles, the מהרש״ל says רבנים should be paid to create value and respect, and the חתם סופר, משנה ברורה, and רב משה argue that community needs and the realities of sustained learning justify payment.
- The שיעור explains payment to a בעל תוקע as tied to blowing additional תקיעות beyond the דאורייתא minimum, framing the compensation as attached to דרבנן elements or to שכר בטלה and טרחה. The פוסקים allow a מוהל to be paid because the חיוב rests on the father, so the mohel is not personally obligated, and payment can also be framed as compensation for interruption of work or effort. The שיעור reports that רב חיים קנייבסקי validates the ברכה of a כהן who demands payment to come for נשיאת כפיים by stating that the ברכה comes from Hashem and Hashem is not getting paid. The חתם סופר permits earning from ספרים one wrote and reports he left printing rights to descendants for פרנסה, and it notes that the חפץ חיים’s פרנסה came from selling ספרים.
- The שיעור cites disputes among ראשונים whether a doctor may be paid to teach medicine and whether a doctor may be paid to treat patients, with one view classifying healing as a מצוה that should not be monetized and another view reading “ורפא ירפא” as granting permission that includes payment. The רמב״ן permits a unique specialist to charge even a very serious fee because his abilities cannot be duplicated, and the רמ״א cites the רמב״ן להלכה. The תשב״ץ rules that excessive charges for medicine need not be paid beyond the medicine’s real market value, but a doctor’s professional fee that the patient agreed to must be paid because the service is not merely a commodity and the patient voluntarily contracted for the doctor’s unique expertise.
- The שיעור offers an explanation that comprehension of תורה depends on סיעתא דשמיא rather than purely human ability, so payment cannot be claimed for what is fundamentally granted by Hashem. It records דרשות on why the פסוק adds “בקרב הארץ,” including that the obligation to teach for free persists even in ארץ ישראל where normal economic life requires expenses, and that משה taught מצוות התלויות בארץ despite not entering ארץ ישראל to model that a רבי teaches what benefits תלמידים even when it does not benefit himself. It connects משלי’s אשת חיל to the sugya by interpreting “סדין עשתה ותמכר” as monetizable דרבננ’ס and “וחגור נתנה לכנעני” as the basic core given for free, and it reads “תורת חסד על לשונה” as תורה taught בחינם. It interprets “עשה לך רב וקנה לך חבר” with “עשה” aligning to free acquisition of a רב and “קנה” indicating payment may be needed for a חבר.
- The גמרא teaches that if one cannot find free instruction one should learn בשכר from “אמת קנה,” but the learner may not then claim entitlement to charge others, as “אמת קנה ואל תמכור” prohibits turning it into a business model. The שיעור quotes the פאפאטשער רב’s challenge that paying a רבי seems to cause the רבי to sin and raises a *lifnei iver* concern, then reports his answer in the name of a son who perished in the Holocaust that the חיוב to learn תורה remains even when it requires payment and therefore overrides that concern from the student’s side.
- The משנה rules that one חשוד על הבכורות cannot be trusted as a seller, with רש״י defining the suspicion as one who inflicts a מום in a בכור and the רמב״ם defining it as one who lies that a תם בכור is a בעל מום. The משנה forbids buying בשר צבאים from him because the גמרא says it can be confused with calf meat, and it forbids buying עורות שאינן עבודים while permitting processed hides because the גמרא reasons that someone acting illegally will not invest heavy effort when the item might be confiscated. רבי אליעזר permits buying עורות של נקבה because male and female hides are distinguishable, while the תנא קמא fears the seller may remove identifying male parts and claim “עכבר אכלה,” and רבי אליעזר answers that such tampering would be detectable. The גמרא resolves the wool clause by reading “צמר מולבן וצבוע” as a single unit that forbids merely whitened wool but permits dyed wool as sufficiently processed, and it explains “טווי ובגדים” as permitting even “נמטי” felt where the processing is meaningful enough to reduce suspicion.
- The משנה rules that one חשוד על השביעית cannot be sold פשתן, even סרוק, but may be sold טווי ואריג. The גמרא questions why both are needed and interprets “אריג” as תיקי, chains made of linen, so the clause permits items whose form and processing change the concern and clarify the product’s status.
- The משנה states that one suspected of selling תרומה under the name חולין cannot be purchased from even for מים ומלח according to ר' יהודה, while ר' שמעון forbids only items with זיקת תרומה ומעשר. The גמרא explains זיקת תרומה as including קרבי דגים where oil is mixed in, and the ראשונים explain the חידוש as extending the ban even to similar fish products not yet mixed with oil. The גמרא tells of a butcher suspected of selling non-kosher fat as kosher, and רבא penalizes him by forbidding purchases even of nuts; רב פפא challenges this as seeming like ר' יהודה, and the גמרא answers it follows ר' שמעון because the nuts functioned as a tool in the fraud when he used them to entice children connected to the trade to bring him forbidden fat.
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