Bechoros 28
Summary
- Today’s שיעור on מסכת בכורות דף כח begins on דף כז עמוד ב and builds two parallel דרשות from the פסוק “לפני ה' אלהיך תאכלנו שנה בשנה,” one about how to count a בכור’s “year” and one about how long a בכור may be eaten, and it traces how each שיטה sources what it does not learn from “שנה בשנה.” The narrative then moves to the משנה and ברייתות about how long one may keep a בכור with a מום, especially בזמן הזה, and it clarifies the competing readings of “לאחר שנתו,” including רבי אלעזר’s positions and the rejection of the version that grants an automatic extra thirty days. The שיעור then turns to the requirement of showing a מום to a מומחה, the מחלוקת רבי יהודה and רבי מאיר about slaughtering before expert inspection, and whether רבי מאיר’s stringency functions as *gezeira* or *knas*, before concluding with the משנה about mistaken judicial and ritual rulings, the liability rules for a non-expert, and the story of רבי טרפון, תודוס הרופא, and רבי עקיבא’s defense of a מומחה לבית דין.
- A *beit* Rav *tana* reads “שנה בשנה” as “יום אחד בשנה זו ויום אחד בשנה זו” and derives that a בכור is נאכל לשני ימים ולילה אחד, understood as being eaten one day in one year and one day in the next. The מפרשים challenge the proof because even if a בכור were only נאכל ליום ולילה it could still be eaten across two years if one eats on the last day of the year and at night when the next year begins, and they answer that by קדשים “לילה הולך אחר היום,” so the night does not create a new halachic “year” for this purpose. A further approach says that although the new year begins at night, *beit din* is not מקדש the year except by day, so the night cannot serve as a known transition, strengthening the need for a two-days-and-one-night framework.
- The אבני נזר and the מקדש דוד object that the משנה teaches שחיטה must be within one year, and they resolve that there are two separate halachot, one for שחיטה that stays within the animal’s first year and another for אכילה that may extend into the next year. The גמרא then asks that if Rav uses “שנה בשנה” to teach counting from birth, where *beit* Rav gets that דין, and it answers that they learn it from other קדשים. The גמרא asks “קדשים גופייהו מנלן,” and Rav Acha bar Yaakov derives it from “כבש בן שנתו,” reading “שנתו שלו” as counting by the animal’s own year rather than by the calendar.
- For Rav, who uses “שנה בשנה” for counting from birth, the דין that a בכור is נאכל לשני ימים ולילה אחד comes from “ובשרם יהיה לך כחזה התנופה וכשוק הימין,” which makes a היקש to חזה ושוק of שלמים and imports the שלמים eating window. The גמרא explains why *beit* Rav does not rely on that alone, because one could instead compare to תודה, which is נאכל ליום ולילה, with רש״י invoking “תפסת מרובה לא תפסת” and תוספות framing it as a preference to be מקיש לחומרא; the מפרשים add that חטאת ואשם are not candidates because unlike בכור/שלמים/תודה they cannot be fed to the כהן’s family. The opposing שיטה prefers שלמים because the פסוק adds “ליהיה,” described as adding an “הויה אחרת בבכור,” and the מפרשים explain that this functions as a preference signal toward שלמים rather than a grant of two nights, with an additional reading that “לך יהיה” indicates two usable eating periods that yield שני ימים ולילה אחד.
- The גמרא then explains why the other side still needs “שנה בשנה,” because without it “לך יהיה” could instead teach that a בכור בעל מום is given to a כהן, described as “שלא מצינו בכל התורה כולה.” רש״י takes that phrase as the lack of another פסוק teaching that grant, while תוספות reads it against the general rule of פסולי המוקדשין being redeemed and sold, making בכור בעל מום a unique exception where the animal itself is given to the כהן, and the Brisker Rav formulates two halachot, a תם בכור as a קרבן and a בעל מום בכור as property given to the כהן. The other שיטה learns the בעל מום inclusion from “בשרם” as לשון רבים, “אחד תם ואחד בעל מום,” while the alternate reading takes “בשרם” as addressing the בכורות of all ישראל.
- The משנה states that if a מום appears within the year one may keep the animal for twelve months, and it adds “לאחר שנתו אין רשאי לקיימו אלא שלושים יום,” prompting the גמרא’s question whether the thirty days extend a within-year מום case past the year or instead apply only when the מום arises after the year. A ברייתא about בכור בזמן הזה says that before it is “נראה להראות לחכם” one may keep it two or three years, and after it is “נראה להראות לחכם” one follows the twelve-month rule for a within-year מום and applies a stringent “אחר שנתו אין רשאי לקיימו אפילו יום אחד אפילו שעה אחת,” with a thirty-day allowance “מפני השבת אבידה לבעלים.”
- רש״י explains “עד שלא נראה להראות לחכם” as before a מום exists there is no point in showing it, while תוספות explains it as the absence of an available qualified חכם. רש״י reads “השבת אבידה לבעלים” as the ישראל not finding a כהן to receive the animal and therefore being allowed thirty days to wait before slaughtering and preserving as best as possible, while תוספות reads the case as the בכור already being with a כהן who needs time to find an occasion and consume the meat despite the lack of preservation methods. The מהריט אלגזי infers from the willingness to extend time for השבת אבידה that the “eat within a year” framework is only דרבנן, while the מנחת חינוך argues that חז״ל can enact *shev v’al ta’aseh* even against a דאורייתא structure, leaving room for a דאורייתא year rule.
- The גמרא initially treats the thirty days as applying even when the מום arose within the year, then retracts the proof by allowing that the thirty days refer only to a post-year מום case. A decisive ברייתא says that if a מום appears “בחמישה עשר יום בתוך שנתו,” understood by רש״י as fifteen days before year-end, one completes only those fifteen days after the year, and the גמרא concludes that the extra days merely complete a missing thirty-day window rather than granting a new thirty-day extension beyond the year. The גמרא supports רבי אלעזר in the version that gives thirty days only “משנולד בו מום” when the מום arises after the year, and it rejects the *ika de’amrei* that רבי אלעזר derives an automatic year-plus-thirty-days from “שנה בשנה” via “שלושים יום בשנה חשוב שנה,” since the fifteen-day case yields only השלמה and not a fresh grant, producing תיובתא to that version.
- The שיעור states that בזמן הזה a בכור must develop a מום and then be given to a כהן, and it emphasizes that only individuals with special authorization and expertise may declare a מום, and only a מום קבוע that is בגלוי qualifies to render the animal a valid בכור בעל מום. This sets the stage for the later משנה and גמרא where slaughter and reliance hinge on whether proper מומחה inspection occurred before action. The presentation frames the expertise requirement as both תלמיד חכם status and practical animal-evaluation competence, aimed at verifying that the blemish is permanent and visible.
- The משנה rules that one who slaughters a בכור and only afterward shows the מום is permitted according to רבי יהודה if the מומחה can affirm it was a prior מום קבוע, while רבי מאיר forbids any such case “כל שנשחט שלא על פי מומחה.” The שיעור frames a ראשונים dispute whether רבי מאיר’s prohibition is a *gezeira* or a *knas*, with consequences for whether הלכה follows רבי מאיר and whether the penalty attaches even to a different slaughterer than the one who acted improperly.
- Rabba bar bar Chana limits the dispute by saying that with דוקין שבעין everyone agrees the meat is אסור because they change after death, and the מחלוקת applies only to מומין שבגוף. The גמרא explains רבי מאיר as making a *gezeira* on body blemishes because of דוקין שבעין, while רבי יהודה refuses that extension, and a ברייתא supports that cataracts are forbidden due to change while other bodily defects remain permitted because they do not change. The phrase “מפני שהם משתנים” in רבי מאיר is re-read as “מפני המשתנים,” meaning the unchanging cases are forbidden due to the changing category, yet Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak finds that the משנה’s wording “שלא על פי מומחה” points to a punitive element, “קנסא דקניס רבי מאיר,” reviving the *gezeira* versus *knas* tension.
- The גמרא then asks whether all cataracts change or only some, and it makes the נפקא מינה “לחושי סהדי,” where witnesses claim the cataract did not change and the issue becomes whether they are proven liars and פסול לעדות. A report that Rav Oshaya said “בא ואראך דוקין שבעין שמשתנים” implies that only some change, since he needs to show a case, and it supports the conclusion “איכא דמשתני ואיכא דלא משתני.” The גמרא also rejects reading the non-expert burial-and-payment clause as necessarily siding with רבי מאיר by suggesting the case may involve דוקין שבעין where even רבי יהודה agrees.
- The גמרא teaches that when a non-expert’s ruling leads to slaughter and burial, payment is “רביע דקה” and “מחצה דגסה,” with רש״י explaining the half as “ממון המוטל בספק חולקין” and תוספות rejecting that as the view of Sumchus and instead treating it as a חז״ל enactment. The גמרא first ties the differing rates to “הפסד מרובה” versus “הפסד מועט,” then rejects proportionality as sufficient and attributes the rule to “גזירת מגדלי בהמה דקה בנגב.” רש״י offers one explanation that raising small animals is burdensome so the כהן’s loss is effectively smaller, and another explanation that “אין מגדלים בהמה דקה בארץ ישראל,” creating a reduced entitlement, with the שיעור noting the difficulty that the כהן is penalized for another’s violation.
- The משנה then generalizes liability to broader פסיקה mistakes: a דיין who rules incorrectly in money cases or declares טומאה/טהרה incorrectly produces a binding outcome “מה שעשה עשוי” yet must pay “ישלם מביתו,” while a מומחה לבית דין is פטור. The שיעור raises the problem of היזק שאינו ניכר and reports explanations that it is treated as היזק in מזיד, or that the disclosure-concern that drives leniency in other cases does not apply to a חכם. The פטור of a מומחה is explained in several ways, including רש״י’s “מזל” framing, an אונס framing, and תוספות’ idea that a מומחה לרבים is accepted by both sides to follow his ruling.
- The גמרא asks whether the משנה is a סתם support for רבי מאיר’s דינא דגרמי and answers that it refers to “נשא ונתן ביד,” where the דיין actively took and transferred property, and it fills in cases like “זיכה את החייב” via a משכון that the דיין physically removed and returned. It similarly explains טומאה/טהרה cases as involving direct action, such as touching with a שרץ or mixing to create טומאה.
- A case involves a cow whose womb was removed, where רבי טרפון ruled it טריפה and “האכילה לכלבים,” but the matter came before חכמים in יבנה who permitted it based on תודוס הרופא’s testimony that cows and pigs from Alexandria had their wombs cut to prevent breeding. רבי טרפון responds “הלכה חמורך טרפון,” understood as concern over payment liability, and רבי עקיבא answers that רבי טרפון is a מומחה לבית דין and therefore פטור מן התשלומים. The שיעור records explanations of “הלכה חמורך,” including jest, pedagogy about real liability, and the פני מנחם’s linkage to משה רבינו’s “לא חמור אחד מהם נשאתי,” casting it as loss of the משה paradigm.
- The presentation adds questions about why pigs are not listed in the פסוק of מכת דבר and offers explanations about divine intent to strike animals and not humans and about differentiating Egyptian livestock loss from ישראל where Jews do not raise pigs. The שיעור addresses how רבי טרפון could be “טועה בדבר משנה” before formal compilation by רבי, answering that teachings existed pre-compilation or that reliance on medical testimony can count as such. It also asks why תודוס is needed if a משנה in חולין already permits a missing womb, answering with the organ-whole versus organ-part distinction and concluding that תודוס teaches that even partial removal does not render טריפה, and it notes an inference that one can rely on a non-Jewish doctor for general medical facts.
- The גמרא finally answers why רבי עקיבא did not simply say “טעה בדבר משנה חוזר” by explaining “חדא ועוד קאמר,” first that a דבר משנה error is reversible, and additionally that even if it were only שיקול הדעת, a מומחה לבית דין is still פטור from payment.
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