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Summary
  • Today’s *shiur* learns מסכת בכורות דף י"ח beginning from דף י"ז עמוד ב׳ four lines from the bottom, builds from the מחלוקת of רבי יוסי הגלילי and the חכמים about *efshar l’tzamtzem* versus *i efshar l’tzamtzem*, and uses the laws of עגלה ערופה to prove that the חכמים hold *i efshar l’tzamtzem* even בידי אדם. The *shiur* then returns to the משנה’s cases of ספק בכור and explains רבי טרפון’s and רבי עקיבא’s rulings, the meaning of משמנים ביניהם through רבי יוחנן’s critique of רב חייא בר אבא, and how המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה controls רבי עקיבא’s approach. The *shiur* explains רבי מאיר’s חיוב מתנות because the כהן comes “משני צדדים,” רבי יוסי’s פטור because of חליפין, and רבי אלעזר’s clarification that where אין חליפין ביד כהן רבי יוסי agrees there is a חיוב מתנות, while addressing the *hava amina* of avoiding גיזה ועבודה. The *shiur* concludes with רבי טרפון’s retraction in the case where one animal died, רבי חייא’s parables contrasting רבי טרפון and רבי עקיבא, and רב פפא’s definition of their dispute in חצר בעל הבית with a כהן serving as the owner’s shepherd.
  • Today’s *shiur* begins with the מחלוקת between רבי יוסי הגלילי and the חכמים about two baby boys born from an animal at the exact same moment. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds אפשר לצמצם, so it is possible they emerged at the same moment and therefore both are בכורים, while the רבנן hold אי אפשר לצמצם, so only one is a בכור. Rashi explains the open question as whether the רבנן’s אי אפשר לצמצם applies only בידי שמים, or whether they hold אי אפשר לצמצם even בידי אדם, and the *shiur* says the להלכה implication will be a מחלוקת of רבי עקיבא and רבי טרפון later in the *shiur*.
  • The גמרא brings a *baraisa* of עגלה ערופה in the case where a corpse is found and the murderer is unknown and the closest city must bring an עגלה ערופה. Rabbi Eliezer rules that if the corpse is found exactly between two cities, שתיהם מביאים שתי עגלות, and the *shiur* initially reads this as showing that בידי אדם אפשר לצמצם and that Rabbi Eliezer reads קרובה as אפילו קרובות. The גמרא rejects using this to prove the רבנן’s view by answering that Rabbi Eliezer follows Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who holds אפשר לצמצם בידי שמים and therefore certainly holds it בידי אדם as well.
  • The גמרא then frames the issue as a תנאים dispute by contrasting a תנא קמא who says that if found precisely between two cities לא היו עורפין with Rabbi Eliezer who requires two עגלות. The גמרא rejects explaining the תנא קמא as holding אי אפשר לצמצם, because if it is actually closer to one city then the cities should bring one עגלה בשותפות with a תנאי. The גמרא concludes that everyone agrees אפשר לצמצם here and the real dispute is how to read והעיר הקרובה, with the תנא קמא holding קרובה ולא קרובות and Rabbi Eliezer holding קרובה ואפילו קרובות.
  • The *shiur* quotes the בריסקער רב that even when the closest city is obvious there is still a required measuring procedure because כפרה depends on the prescribed process, and the process requires one city bringing one עגלה without shared participation. The בריסקער רב explains that if the Torah’s procedure cannot be fulfilled as defined, such as when the case yields two cities rather than one, then there is no דין of עגלה ערופה.
  • Rav Chiyya bar Abba quotes Rav Ami’s *tanna* that in the equidistant corpse case Rabbi Eliezer says each city brings its own עגלה, while the חכמים say יביאו עגלה אחת בשותפות and make a תנאי. The גמרא analyzes whether this could mean the חכמים hold אפשר לצמצם and קרובה ואפילו קרובות, or alternatively hold קרובה ולא קרובות, and shows that neither reading fits their ruling of one jointly-owned עגלה. The גמרא concludes that the חכמים must hold אי אפשר לצמצם, so even though it appears equidistant it is actually closer to one city, and the תנאי addresses the inability to determine which one, which proves אי אפשר לצמצם אפילו בידי אדם.
  • The *shiur* notes that later פוסקים discuss cases where ספק obligation would lead to possible בל תשחית, such as uncertain קריעה or uncertain חמץ on פסח, and some say destruction is not required until the status is clarified. The *shiur* suggests a ראיה from the גמרא that one does not kill an עגלה unless obligated, because the גמרא does not allow both cities to bring separate עגלות and treat one as wasted.
  • Returning to the משנה’s case of two male births where the בכור is certain but unidentified, רבי טרפון rules היפה שבהן יטול הכהן. The גמרא explains that רבי טרפון holds הבריא נפיל בראשא, that the healthier one emerges first, so the nicer animal is presumed to be the בכור. The מפרשים limit this presumption to a case where a בכור certainly exists, and they say it does not apply where there may be no בכור at all, such as a boy and a girl where the girl may have emerged first.
  • The משנה states רבי עקיבא says משמנים, and Rav Chiyya bar Abba in the name of רבי יוחנן interprets it that the כהן takes the weaker one, the ישראל keeps the better one, and they split the difference in value. Rav Chiyya bar Abba challenges רבי יוחנן from the wording משמנים ביניהם, and רבי יוחנן answers with the sharp line about “עד דאכלת קובסא בבבל תגנינן מסיפא,” with Rashi treating it as a criticism of poor *pshat* and Tosafos treating the Babylonian dates as good while he was preoccupied. The *shiur* also presents additional explanations that compare not waiting for dates to ripen with not waiting to learn the משנה’s סיפא before deciding *pshat*, and an explanation that dates increase wisdom so he should have avoided the mistake.
  • The גמרא proves from the סיפא case where one of the two animals died that Rav Chiyya bar Abba’s reading is wrong, because there רבי עקיבא says המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה and the כהן may get nothing, which would not follow if the rule were to allocate animals and split value. רבי יוחנן’s interpretation becomes that שומן יהא ביניהם means the value advantage stays with the ישראל because the כהן cannot take the better one without proof, and Rabbi Akiva consistently applies המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. The *shiur* explains why רבי עקיבא used the language משמנים as a direct response to רבי טרפון’s “היפה,” and cites Rav Aharon Kotler’s question that the case of two living animals differs from the case where one died, answering that the existence of the חיוב בכורה is the decisive fact while the practical outcome is immaterial.
  • The משנה adds that the second animal must graze until it becomes a בעל מום, and upon slaughter it is obligated in מתנות, while רבי יוסי says פטור, and the *shiur* states the גמרא attributes the חיוב to רבי מאיר. Rashi supports attributing it to רבי מאיר with the rule סתם משנה רבי מאיר, while Tosafos cites a תוספתא that identifies it as רבי מאיר. The מרית אלגזי asks why Tosafos needs a תוספתא when a later משנה explicitly names רבי מאיר, and answers that Tosafos is bothered by why this משנה omits רבי מאיר’s name if it is his, so Tosafos brings the תוספתא to establish the attribution.
  • Rabbi Yochanan explains רבי מאיר’s reasoning that the כהן comes “משני צדדים,” because if the animal is a בכור it all belongs to the כהן, and if it is not a בכור then the כהן is entitled to מתנות, so the ישראל must give the מתנות. Rava explains רבי יוסי’s פטור with “עשו שאינו זוכה כזוכה,” where even though the rights did not literally reach the כהן it is treated as if they did and as if the כהן sold it back to the ישראל “במומיה,” so the animal in the ישראל’s hand is treated as acquired via חליפין and not subject to the כהן’s *migo* claim for מתנות.
  • The *shiur* raises later questions about שינוי at slaughter and about קם דינא after בית דין’s allocation, and answers that קם דינא cannot remove a מצוה obligation such as מתנות, which is why the claim can still arise as a מצוה-based demand. The *shiur* gives two ways to understand רבי יוסי: a simple commercial waiver where each side cedes all rights to the other’s animal, and a מצוה-fulfillment model where full transfer is necessary so that giving a possible בכור can be fulfilled even if the animals’ true statuses are reversed.
  • Rabbi אלעזר rules that in the case where one animal died and the כהן has no חליפין, even רבי יוסי agrees the ישראל must give מתנות. The גמרא first calls this obvious because רבי יוסי’s פטור in the two-animal case depends on חליפין ביד כהן, but then says Rabbi אלעזר teaches that the reason for רבי יוסי is not a general policy to prevent errors of גיזה ועבודה. The גמרא presents a *hava amina* that requiring מתנות might imply the animal is not a בכור and lead the ישראל to do גיזה ועבודה, and Rabbi אלעזר teaches that this is not the basis of רבי יוסי’s פטור and that where the כהן has nothing he can still claim “משני צדדים.”
  • The *shiur* asks why the *hava amina* would prioritize preventing גיזה ועבודה over giving מתנות and offers two answers: גיזה ועבודה is קום ועשה while withholding מתנות is שב ואל תעשה, and גיזה ועבודה can recur many times while failure to give מתנות happens only once. The גמרא then challenges whether the *hava amina* is plausible given the next משנה’s explicit language that רבי יוסי’s פטור is only when חליפיו ביד כהן, and answers that the statement could be רבי יוסי speaking “לדברי רבי מאיר,” claiming that his own view would exempt even without חליפין due to the גיזה ועבודה concern while asking Rabbi Meir to concede at least where there is חליפין.
  • Rav Pappa states that everyone agrees in ספק מעשר that one is פטור מן המתנות, and Rashi defines ספק מעשר as a מעשר בהמה animal that became mixed back among the others so none can be used until they become בעלי מום. The גמרא identifies “everyone” as including Rabbi Meir and initially asks why this needs teaching, since Rabbi Meir’s “משני צדדים” claim exists only in ספק בכור and not in ספק מעשר. The גמרא explains that Rav Pappa is addressing the possibility that Rabbi Meir’s reason is “דלא תשתכח תורת מתנות,” which would extend even to ספק מעשר, and Rav Pappa teaches that Rabbi Meir’s reason is instead “בא לו משני צדדים,” limiting the חיוב to cases like ספק בכור.
  • The משנה says that if one of the two animals died, רבי טרפון and רבי עקיבא split the remaining one, and the גמרא asks why splitting follows Rabbi Tarfon’s earlier presumption that the healthier animal is the בכור by checking which one died. Rav Ami answers that רבי טרפון חזר בו and now rules יחלקו. Rabbi Chiyya gives a parable for רבי טרפון of two people depositing animals with a shepherd, where the shepherd leaves the claimants to resolve it and departs, while the parable for רבי עקיבא is one person depositing with a homeowner, where the rule is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה.
  • The גמרא asks how these parables define the actual dispute, since the two analog cases seem to have accepted rules, and Rav Pappa answers that everyone agrees both in the shepherd deposit case and in the homeowner deposit case. Rav Pappa defines the מחלוקת as a case of חצר בעל הבית where the owner has a כהן as his shepherd, with Rabbi Tarfon holding that the owner effectively grants the כהן rights in his courtyard to enable raising the בכור because “ניחא ליה דליעביד מצוה בממונו,” making it akin to shared rights like two depositors with a shepherd. Rabbi Akiva holds that because this would create the owner’s potential loss the owner does not truly grant the כהן anything, so it remains like one depositor with a homeowner and the rule is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה.
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