Chulin 121
Summary
- Today’s שיעור in מסכת חולין דף קכא עמוד א begins by defining *allel* and explaining how it combines with meat for טומאת אוכלין and sometimes relates to טומאת נבילה, then uses a פסוק in איוב and רבי יהודה’s דין to refine which definitions apply to which contexts. The גמרא develops when leftover meat is treated as significant despite uncertain intent or uncertain detachment, and it compares this to beaks, nails, and horns that combine for טומאה only at the soft, flesh-adjacent parts. The שיעור then moves to cases of partial “valid” components of שחיטה (Jew on non-kosher or non-Jew on kosher) and explains when meat is טמא as אוכלין during *pirkus* and when it becomes נבילה, why מחשבה and הכשר מים are needed, and how “סופו לטמא טומאה חמורה” changes the הכשר requirement. It closes with the intermediate halachic status of an animal that is no longer “alive” for אבר מן החי yet not “dead” for טומאת נבילה, and with questions about defects in שחיטה, swallowed items and טומאה בלועה, and רביעה.
- Today’s teaching opens with the משנה that *allel* combines with the meat of a טמא animal for טומאת אוכלין and at times connects to טומאת נבילה. Rabbi Yoḥanan defines *allel* as *murtaka*, and Rashi explains it as hard, inedible veins around the neck and spine that are not an אוכל by themselves, while Tosafos defines it as dead flesh normally cut away. Rishonim challenge how totally inedible material can combine for טומאת אוכלין, and Tosafos HaRosh defends Rashi by explaining that parts inedible alone can gain חשיבות when combined with the animal’s meat.
- Reish Lakish defines *allel* as בשר שפרטתו הסכין, the scraps of meat left on the hide when the butcher cuts. The גמרא challenges Reish Lakish from the פסוק in איוב, “ואולם אתם טפלי שקר רופאי אלל כולכם,” where *allel* connotes uselessness, and it answers that *allel* of the verse is universally understood as *murtaka* while the dispute concerns *allel* of the משנה.
- The גמרא analyzes Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, “האלל המכונס… אם יש כזית במקום אחד חייבין עליו,” and Rashi and Tosafos disagree about what Rabbi Yehuda teaches. Rashi reads Rabbi Yehuda as teaching both that eating such meat is eating נבילה and that intent to keep it gives it טומאת נבילה, while Tosafos says Rabbi Yehuda is only מחדש the דין טומאה and that the איסור אכילה needs no special teaching. Tosafos explains Rabbi Yehuda’s use of “חייבין” as a way to indicate טומאה דאורייתא and avoid the misreading of “טמאים” as merely דרבנן.
- The גמרא reasons that Rabbi Yehuda’s focus on כזית fits אם אלל is leftover meat, but it is hard to explain if אלל is *murtaka* that is “עץ בעלמא.” The conclusion is that regarding Rabbi Yehuda, all agree אלל means leftover meat on the hide, and the original dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish is only אליבא דרבנן: Rabbi Yoḥanan says Rabbanan include *murtaka* as something that can combine for טומאת אוכלין, while Reish Lakish says Rabbanan only include the leftover meat and exclude *murtaka* as too insignificant. The שיעור emphasizes that the *allel* here is not functioning as a *shomer*, because a *shomer* of meat always combines for טומאת אוכלין, so the case must be where it is not acting as a protective covering.
- The גמרא asks how leftover meat qualifies as *allel* at all: if one intends to eat it, it should be fully מטמא even on its own, and if one does not intend to eat it, it should be בטל. Two answers are presented in the names of Rav Avin and Rav Mesharshiya: one answer is *miktzat chashiv lei*, which Rashi explains as two leftover pieces where one is desired and one is not, but the person no longer remembers which is which, creating a status where it cannot be treated as fully meat nor fully ignored and therefore can combine. Commentators question why uncertainty should change the halacha, and the Maharsha cites an early manuscript understanding that the later מחשבה to eat one piece shows a general valuation of leftover meat and partially undermines the earlier מחשבה not to eat the other, enabling combination without granting full independent status.
- The second answer is that part was detached by an animal and part by a knife, and the person does not know which is which, so the uncertainty gives it enough standing to be מצטרף.
- The גמרא brings a משנה in מסכת טהרות: the beak and nails of a נבלת עוף טהור are מטמאים ומטמאין and מצטרפים to the שיעור of כביצה for טומאת אוכלין when the bird is treated as food. The גמרא challenges how a beak can combine if it is “עץ בעלמא,” and Rabbi Elazar answers that it refers to the lower beak, then Rav Pappa clarifies that it is “תחתון של עליון,” the lower part of the upper beak, which is near flesh and can combine without being meat on its own. The חזון איש is cited as troubled why this is not simply a *shomer* case.
- The גמרא similarly explains nails as the part embedded in flesh, “מקום המובלע בבשר,” and horns as the place near the cut where removing it would bleed, “במקום שחותכים… יוצא דם,” so each case allows combination because the relevant portion is soft and flesh-adjacent rather than fully hard material.
- The שיעור distinguishes full valid שחיטה by a Jew on a kosher animal, which permits eating even while the animal is *mirkeses* and makes the meat subject to טומאת אוכלין, from a non-Jew killing a non-kosher animal where there is no דין *pirkus* for a non-Jew and eating during *pirkus* would be אבר מן החי. The intermediate cases are a Jew slaughtering a non-kosher animal for a non-Jew and a non-Jew slaughtering a kosher animal, each containing one “positive” and one “negative,” and the שיעור states that in those cases the דין *pirkus* applies so the meat is treated as edible during *pirkus* and thus can be subject to טומאת אוכלין, while once the animal fully expires it becomes נבילה and טומאת נבילה begins.
- Rav Asi states that in these intermediate cases the meat requires מחשבה and requires הכשר מים ממקום אחר. The שיעור explains that the blood from these cases does not act as מכשיר because blood is מכשיר only when it comes from a valid שחיטה or when it is *dam chalalim* from killing via the back, while these cases involve invalidating circumstances and front-neck slaughtering.
- The גמרא asks why הכשר is needed if the animal will soon have טומאה חמורה of נבילה, invoking the rule that “כל שסופו לטמא טומאה חמורה פטור מהכשר.” A teaching of the school of Rabbi Yishmael derives הכשר specifically from “וכי יותן מים על זרע,” applying to seeds that have no destiny of טומאה חמורה, and it concludes that what will end in טומאה חמורה needs no הכשר.
- A ברייתא quotes Rabbi Yosi that נבלת עוף טהור needs מחשבה but not הכשר because it will ultimately have the חמורה טומאה of בית הבליעה. Rashi asks why a dead bird would require מחשבה at all and answers that in חז״ל’s time poultry was a delicacy mainly eaten in cities, so villagers did not treat it as food without explicit intent. The שיעור then cites later discussion that uses this Rashi to argue that poultry can be a greater delicacy than meat, brings a מדרש תנחומא pattern of serving poultry first, fish second, and meat third, and records a ruling that one fulfills *simḥas yom tov* with what one enjoys.
- The גמרא answers the hechsher question through Ḥizkiyah: the animal during *pirkus* can be scraped or reduced to less than כזית, so it is not necessarily destined to reach טומאה חמורה of נבילה. Rashi explains this as reducing pieces below כזית, the Ramban challenges feasibility given the short time of *pirkus*, and Tosafos and other approaches answer that one need not cut everything, that “לגרדו” implies scraping rather than full cutting, or that reducing some pieces suffices.
- Rabbi Yirmiyah challenges whether Ḥizkiyah can say the animal is not yet destined for טומאת נבילה during *pirkus*, given an earlier dispute where Ḥizkiyah says an animal after two simanim or רוב is considered dead for the laws of אבר מן החי while Rabbi Yoḥanan says it is still considered in the category of living for איברים. The גמרא reconciles Ḥizkiyah with a new category: “יצאה מכלל חיה ולכלל מתה לא באה,” so it is not alive for אבר מן החי yet not dead for טומאת נבילה.
- Rabbi Elazar rules to hold Rabbi Yoḥanan’s position and brings Rav Oshaya’s ברייתא that a Jew slaughtering a non-kosher animal for a non-Jew with proper two simanim while it is *mirkeses* makes it מטמאה טומאת אוכלין but not טומאת נבילה, and that a limb removed then is treated as from the living and is אסור לבני נח with the added דין that אבר is מטמא כנבלה. The ברייתא parallels this for a non-Jew slaughtering a kosher animal for a Jew and sets out that invalid one-siman slaughter does not produce טומאת אוכלין, and it states that where a non-Jew begins in a non-treifah-making place and a Jew finishes the שחיטה it is כשרה, but where a Jew begins in a treifah-making place and a non-Jew finishes it becomes פסולה.
- The גמרא states that one who wants to eat from an animal before it fully dies cuts a כזית from the בית שחיטה, salts it well or rinses it well, waits until the animal’s soul departs, and then eats. Rishonim explain the extra salting as necessary because immediate cutting does not allow the animal’s natural post-shechitah movements to expel blood, leaving more blood absorbed in the meat. Rashi explains the waiting as connected to “לא תאכלו על הדם,” understood by most Rishonim in Rashi as a דרבנן derivation not to eat before the animal fully expires, and the גמרא applies this both to Jews and non-Jews because the meat cannot be permitted to Jews yet forbidden to them in this case. The גמרא supports this practice with the statement of Rabbi Idi bar Avin in the name of Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashian about one who wants *bari* meat doing the same process.
- Rav Elazar asks whether the intermediate rules apply when the slaughter involved *shehiyah* or *derasah*, and the Tzafnas Paneaḥ frames the conceptual question as whether non-Jew slaughter disqualification parallels technical disqualifications in the act of shechitah. An elder reports in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name that it needs “הכשר שחיטה כבהמה טהורה,” and Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak explains this as requiring בדיקת סכין, implying that *shehiyah* or *derasah* would change the halachic framework.
- Rav Zeira asks Rav Sheshes whether the animal in *pirkus* protects a swallowed item from tumah, like the rule that a living body shields what is inside. Rav Sheshes responds that since it is מטמאה טומאת אוכלין it is not treated as a living animal for this protection, and Abaye states explicitly that it does not save what is swallowed because its status as אוכל makes the swallowed item susceptible in an אוהל setting. The גמרא then asks about רביעה during this state and rules it is treated as alive for that prohibition because it is not yet מטמא טומאת נבילה.
- The שיעור notes the difficulty in Rashi’s implication of switching statuses לחומרא and cites an approach that it is alive מדאורייתא for רביעה, while the tumah treatment that removes טומאה בלועה is a דרבנן layer, imposed because being subject to טומאת אוכלין conflicts with granting the protective rule of בלוע.
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