Chulin 114
Summary
- The *Gemara* in *Chullin* 114 analyzes cooking *cheilev* in milk through a dispute between Rav Ami and Rav Asi about whether *malkos* applies, and it repeatedly frames the issue around liability and punishability rather than the existence of an underlying *issur*. It presents multiple ways to locate the dispute, including whether it hinges on *issur chal al issur*, whether the disagreement is only about *bishul* versus *achilah*, or whether the two Amoraim are not arguing at all and each addresses a different prohibition. It then brings a *beraisa* about cooking with *mei chalav* (whey) and other substances, uses it to identify a *Tanna* who holds *issur chal al issur*, and distinguishes whey’s status for *bassar b’chalav* from its status for *hechsher* *zera’im* to receive *tum’ah*. The *Gemara* continues with *derashos* from “בחלב אמו,” attempts to derive broader cases through *kal v’chomer* and *tzad ha’shaveh* while rejecting them with *pirchos*, and ends with derivations for *issur achilah* and *issur hana’ah* of *bassar b’chalav*, linking *issur hana’ah* to Rabbi Avahu’s rule and the *pesukim* of *neveilah* and the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah.
- A case arises of one who eats *cheilev* cooked in milk after receiving *hasra’ah* only for *bassar b’chalav*, and Rav Ami and Rav Asi disagree whether he is *lokeh* or *eino lokeh*. Rashi explains that the single expression of *lokeh* fits a scenario where the warning is only for *bassar b’chalav*. The *Gemara* initially proposes that the dispute depends on whether *issur chal al issur*, with the *lokeh* view holding that the added prohibition can take effect and the *eino lokeh* view holding that it cannot.
- The מפרשים ask why the *Gemara* focuses on “המבשל” rather than “הנהנה,” given that *bassar b’chalav* is *assur b’hana’ah*. The answer given is that *issur hana’ah* applies only where there is an *issur achilah*, and the *Gemara* is moving toward a model where the operative prohibition here is only *bishul* and not *achilah*, so *hana’ah* does not arise. The מפרשים also ask why *bassar b’chalav* is not an *issur mosif* over *cheilev* based on the Rambam’s position that *cheilev* is prohibited only *k’derech hana’aso* while *bassar b’chalav* is prohibited even *shelo k’derech hana’ah*. The אחרונים answer that this Rambam feature is a technical detail of *bassar b’chalav* and does not create a new prohibition that qualifies as *issur mosif*.
- The *Gemara* rejects the initial framing and says it can be that everyone agrees *ein issur chal al issur*, so all agree there is no *malkos* for *achilah* of *cheilev* cooked in milk. The dispute becomes limited to *bishul*, where one view says *lokeh* because *bishul* is a distinct prohibition not previously applicable to *cheilev*. The other view says *eino lokeh* because the Torah expresses *achilah* in the language of *bishul*, so when *achilah* cannot generate *malkos* here, *bishul* cannot generate *malkos* either.
- The Rosh Yosef explains that the *Gemara* consistently speaks about *malkos* rather than the basic *issur* because even according to *ein issur chal al issur*, the limitation is on punishment. The Rosh Yosef states that the underlying *issur* remains even where *malkos* does not apply, so the sugya’s vocabulary tracks liability for lashes rather than the existence of prohibition.
- An alternative version states that everyone agrees one is *lokeh* for *bishul* because there was no prior *issur bishul* on *cheilev*, and the disagreement concerns *achilah*. The *eino lokeh* view applies *ein issur chal al issur* to *achilah* because *cheilev* was already prohibited. The *lokeh* view relies on “להכי אפקיה רחמנא לאכילה בלשון בשול” to form a *hekesh* that since *bishul* yields *malkos*, *achilah* yields *malkos* as well.
- The Ritva asks why the *hekesh* is not taken *l’chumra* given the general preference to interpret *hekesh* stringently. The Ritva answers that adopting the stringent *hekesh* would effectively force *issur chal al issur*, and the view that holds *ein issur chal al issur* treats it as an unassailable rule that cannot be overridden here. The Lev Aryeh explains that *bassar b’chalav* is a *chidush* because two permitted items combine to create prohibition, so the usual cross-Torah rules do not necessarily apply. Another explanation presented says one view refuses to derive *achilah* from *bishul* because *bishul* exists to prevent coming to eat, making *bishul* dependent on *achilah* rather than the reverse, while the other view treats them as two independent prohibitions.
- A further resolution says “דמר אמר חדא ומר אמר חדא,” with one Amora addressing *bishul* and the other addressing *achilah*. This reading sets *bishul* of *cheilev* in milk as prohibited and sets *achilah* as non-lashable due to *ein issur chal al issur*, removing any actual dispute between Rav Ami and Rav Asi.
- A *beraisa* teaches that one who cooks with *mei chalav* is *patur*, and the Rishonim dispute the definition of *mei chalav*. Rashi defines it as נסיובי דחלבא, whey, while the Rosh defines it as the residue left after cooking the whey-water. The *beraisa* also states that blood cooked in milk is *patur*, and bones, sinews, horns, and hooves cooked in milk are *patur*, while *pigul*, *nosar*, and *tamei* cooked in milk are *chayav*.
- The *Gemara* answers that the *beraisa* follows a *Tanna* who holds *issur chal al issur*. The Toras Chaim explains that this is necessary because the earlier resolution implied that by *bassar b’chalav* one might not apply *issur chal al issur*, so the *beraisa* shows a *Tanna* who applies it even here. The Toras Chaim adds that the *Gemara* does not use the usual language of “כתנאי” because even a view that generally holds *issur chal al issur* might treat *bassar b’chalav* differently.
- The Rosh cites a Rambam (not found in *Mishneh Torah*) that the heter of milk excludes *mei chalav*, leaving *mei chalav* in the category of *eiver min hachai*, and the Beis Yosef suggests this may depend on how *mei chalav* is defined given the Rosh–Rashi disagreement. The Shulchan Aruch (סימן פ"א סעיף ה') rules “מי חלב מותר, והוא הדין למימי חלב, ויש מי שאוסר בהם,” and the Rema writes that the practice follows the first view. The Kaf HaChaim says that because the Shulchan Aruch records “ויש מי שאוסר,” one might try to avoid whey. Rav Wosner in *Shevet HaLevi* adds a concern that whey may absorb taste from *gevinat akum* processes if the mixture was heated above *yad soledes*, making the whey prohibited due to the *issur* of *gevinat akum*.
- The Rishonim state that even if whey is excluded from the *de’oraisa* of *bassar b’chalav*, there remains a *derabbanan* prohibition. A question arises whether that *derabbanan* includes only *achilah* or also *bishul*, and the Rema in סימן פ"ז סעיף ז' states an *issur bishul* of whey and meat. Some אחרונים explain that the Rema’s concern may be *mar’is ayin*, analogizing to the Rema’s requirement to place almonds on the table when eating meat with almond milk. Contemporary אחרונים debate whether widely used pareve products like non-dairy creamer or margarine still require a table *heker*, with the *Badei HaShulchan* affirming the requirement and others being more lenient because the practice has become common.
- The *Gemara* supports Reish Lakish from a teaching that *mei chalav* is like milk and olive runoff liquid is like oil. Reish Lakish limits this to “להכשיר זרעים,” meaning whey counts among liquids that render foods susceptible to *tum’ah* under “וכל משקה.” The Chasam Sofer explains this because whey is a drinkable liquid, and he adds that even if whey is not milk it is at least like water, which also is *machshir*. Reish Lakish states that for *bishul bassar b’chalav* *de’oraisa*, whey “אינו כחלב.”
- A *beraisa* derives that the prohibition applies not only with goat milk but also “בחלב פרה ורחל,” and it initially offers a *kal v’chomer* based on separation concepts tied to *kil’ayim*. Rashi says this sugya does not agree with the earlier *beraisa* about “גדי עזים,” while Tosafos says the earlier derivation resolves the meat side and this *beraisa* addresses the milk side. The *Gemara* asks why a verse is needed if a *kal v’chomer* suffices, and Rav Ashi answers that the *kal v’chomer* is refuted “מעיקרא דדינא” because the mother case has the added stringency of “אותו ואת בנו” in *shechitah*, which other animals do not.
- Another *beraisa* derives the prohibition for “בחלב אחותו הגדולה” via a *kal v’chomer* from *ma’aser behemah* grouping, and Rav Ashi again refutes it from the mother’s *shechitah* restriction of “אותו ואת בנו.” The *Gemara* then seeks the source for “אחותו הקטנה” and derives it through a *tzad ha’shaveh* between the mother and the older sister. The *Gemara* asks why the older sister case could not itself be derived from a *binyan av* and concludes “אין הכי נמי,” so the verse is needed for a different teaching.
- A teaching uses “בחלב אמו” to include “היא עצמה בחלבה,” cooking an animal in its own milk, and it proposes a *kal v’chomer* from distinctions in “פרי עם פרי” and “פרי עם אם” drawn from *shechitah* and cooking. The *Gemara* attempts refutations from animal hybrids, from an *eved ben shifchah* with a freed sister, and from *kil’ei zera’im*, and it rejects each as hinging on external factors like “זרע אב,” “גט שחרור,” or the planting condition. Rav Ashi finally refutes the *kal v’chomer* by distinguishing that “פרי ופרי” are “שני גופים,” while “פרי עם אמו” comes from “גוף אחד,” so a verse is required to include the latter.
- Rav Ashi derives *issur achilah* for *bassar b’chalav* from “לא תאכל כל תועבה,” stating “כל שתעבתי לך הרי הוא בבל תאכל.” The text notes the Rishonim’s question why this is needed given the *Tanna d’vei Rabbi Yishmael* derivation from “לא תבשל” three times, and it records answers including that “לא תאכל כל תועבה” is a *lav shebichlalus* without *malkos*, that this is Rav Ashi’s view, and that Rabbi Yishmael is needed for a case of half-*kezayis* meat with half-*kezayis* milk. The *beraisa* then derives *issur hana’ah* through Rabbi Avahu in the name of Rabbi Elazar that “לא יאכל/לא תאכל/לא תאכלו” implies both *issur achilah* and *issur hana’ah* unless the Torah specifies otherwise as with *neveilah*.
- A *beraisa* expounds “לגר אשר בשעריך תתננה ואכלה או מכור לנכרי” to allow both giving and selling to both the *ger* and the *nochri* according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah reads it “דברים ככתבם,” limiting the *ger* to *nesinah* and the *nochri* to *mechirah*, and the *Gemara* explains Rabbi Yehudah’s proof from the necessity of “או.” Rabbi Meir interprets “או” as establishing priority, preferring giving to the *ger* over selling to the *nochri*, while Rabbi Yehudah says that priority is *sevara* because “זו אתה מצווה להחיותו” and “וזו אי אתה מצווה להחיותו.”
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