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Summary
  • Today’s שיעור learns מסכת חולין דף קיא starting from דף קי עמוד ב at מאי שנא and completes the סוגיא of כבד, focusing on when liver itself is permitted, when its blood can prohibit other foods, and what preparations are required, while weaving in proofs from a משנה in תרומות and multiple Amoraic stories and challenges. The narrative clarifies that כבד differs from ordinary meat because its substance is blood that the תורה nonetheless permits to eat, yet questions remain about blood that exits the liver and whether it can prohibit other meat in the pot. The סוגיא then broadens into related rules about חליטה, overcooking (שליקה), arteries (סימפון), roasting setups on a spit, and finally moves into new topics of סכין שחיטה, מליח כרותח, tasting with a כפילא, and נ''ט בר נ''ט with דגים שעלו בקערה, before closing with later הלכה language attributed to the מחבר, רמ״א, and ש״ך and a resolution offered from מהרשד"ם.
  • Today’s starting point continues a story where אביי asks רב ספרא to find the practice in ארץ ישראל for preparing כבד, because ordinary meat cooked without preparation releases prohibited blood that renders the meat אסור through absorption. The explanation assumes that in ordinary meat blood is permitted while inside the organ but becomes forbidden once it separates as דם האיברים שפירשו, and cooking causes the meat to be בולע that blood. The question treats liver as potentially different because “the whole essence of liver is blood,” and yet the תורה permits eating liver, with the reason tied to על הארץ תשפכנו כמים, which cannot apply to liver’s hardened blood. The issue becomes whether blood that exits a כבד takes on the same forbidden status as separated blood in other organs or remains permitted because כבד is in a distinct category.
  • Rav Safra initially reports from רב זריקא that he cooked a liver for רב אמי and רב אמי ate it, assuming the question is about cooking a liver alone without preparation. Abaye answers that this does not address the real doubt because even if liver blood would prohibit other foods, a liver cooked alone stays permitted since איידי דפליט לא בלע and cannot reabsorb while it is expelling blood. Rav Safra challenges Abaye with מאי שנא and claims Abaye’s certainty relies on the משנה in תרומות פרק י משנה יא, which states אינה נאסרת, and the same משנה also states הכבד אוסרת, meaning the liver’s blood prohibits other pieces cooked with it when not properly prepared, while the liver itself remains permitted מפני שהיא פולטת ואינה בולעת. The משנה is presented as directly supporting the split outcome that the liver stays permitted while other cooked pieces become prohibited.
  • Abaye responds that the משנה in תרומות may not address blood at all, and instead may concern שמנונייתא, the fat of a טרפה. The proposed reading treats the case as a טרפה liver whose fat prohibits other meats when cooked together, while a כשר liver cooking alongside טרפה meat fat does not become prohibited because it remains engaged in expelling and cannot absorb, paralleling its non-absorption of blood. Abaye returns to his original question about a כשר liver with כשר meat and asks specifically what דין applies to the blood that exits the liver and reaches other pieces.
  • When Rav Safra again ascends to ארץ ישראל and repeats Abaye’s refined question, Rav Zrika answers that it is also not a question and cites a meal where he and ינאי בריה דרב אמי ate קניא בכופייא attached with organs including the ריאה, heart, and liver, implying the liver did not prohibit the others. Rav Ashi, and some say רב שמואל מזרוקניא, rejects this proof by suggesting the פי קנה חוץ לקדירה served as a drain so the blood exited without entering the pot. Rav Ashi offers a second possibility that the liver had been מחלט מעיקרא, meaning it was seared first, preventing blood from exiting during cooking, so the case does not prove what happens when liver blood actually enters the pot.
  • The Gemara records examples of חליטה practices, with רב הונא חלט ליה בחלא and רב נחמן חלט ליה ברותחין. Tosafos asks why these practices are not decisive proof that exiting liver blood would prohibit, and answers that they may have been done only לחומרא out of ספק. Tosafos states that חליטה is relevant when cooking liver together with other meat, while cooking a liver alone remains permitted on the logic that it cannot absorb while expelling. The גאונים are cited as saying that since we are not בקיאין in חליטה, one cannot rely on it to permit cooking liver with other pieces without proper kashering.
  • Rav Papa in front of Rava suggests that vinegar used for searing becomes אסור because blood exits into it, even if the liver stays permitted. Rava rejects this by arguing that if blood exits enough to prohibit the vinegar, then the liver should also become אסור through reabsorption, since כהיכא דפלט הדר בלע would apply once the searing reduces active expulsion. Rava concludes that if the liver is permitted, that indicates no blood left the liver in a way that would prohibit, and therefore both the liver and the vinegar remain permitted.
  • Rav bar Shava visits רב נחמן and refuses to eat כבדא שלוקא, and Rav Nachman reacts sharply with גמוהו לשבא. The Gemara frames their dispute as כתנאי between רבי אליעזר and רבי ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקא. Rabbi Eliezer holds הכבד אוסרת ואינה נאסרת מפני שפולטת ואינה בולעת, while Rabbi Yishmael holds that מבושלת אוסרת ונאסרת, מטובלת אוסרת ונאסרת, and שלוקא אוסרת ונאסרת. The explanation attributes to spices and overcooking a softening that enables reabsorption, making the liver itself forbidden and prohibiting others.
  • The narrative explains in the name of the רשב"א that Rabbi Yishmael splits מטובלת and שלוקא into separate clauses to signal that in מטובלת even Rabbi Eliezer agrees the liver can reabsorb and become prohibited, while the real disagreement is in שלוקא. Rabbi Eliezer treats even overcooked liver as always expelling and never absorbing, while Rabbi Yishmael holds that at some point it stops expelling and begins reabsorbing. Rav bar Shava aligns with Rabbi Yishmael by refusing the שלוקא liver, while Rav Nachman aligns with Rabbi Eliezer by treating it as permitted.
  • Rabbah bar Huna visits the house of Rabbah bar Rav Nachman and is told the abundance of fine cake is for כבוד שבת based on וקראת לשבת עונג. During the visit they find a liver with a סימפונא דבליע דמא, and the ר"ן and רשב"א read it as דהוה מלי דמא. He rebukes the preparation and instructs קרוע שתי וערב וחתוכיה לתחת so the blood drains, and presents the artery blood as being like blood in a separate receptacle that is certainly prohibited. The episode implies earlier permissions assume removal or opening of this artery.
  • Tosafos בשם בה"ג explains that the sharp rebuke is about לכתחילה procedure to avoid forgetting, not about declaring the liver טרפה with no remedy. The approach allows that even if one failed initially, cutting שתי וערב after cooking can still allow the blood in the artery to exit and the liver to remain כשר. The phrasing אמאי עבידיתו הכי is treated as indicating improper practice rather than an irreversible איסור.
  • The Gemara limits the strict preparation to כבדא and contrasts טחולא as שומנא בעלמא הוא, treating its redness as fat rather than liver-like blood content. Tosafos notes that blood that exits the spleen is אסור, yet the spleen does not require the same שתי וערב preparation and can be handled with standard salting. A story follows where they made שמואל תבשילא דטחלי on the day of bloodletting, with salting presented as sufficient.
  • A fundamental מחלוקת ראשונים is stated where רבנו תם holds the whole liver sugya concerns unsalted liver, and that מליחה works for liver like ordinary meat. Most ראשונים reject this and claim salting is ineffective for liver because of its heavy blood content, requiring cutting שתי וערב and roasting with the cut facing down for draining. The narrative sets this dispute as pivotal for later הלכה.
  • An איתמר rules כבדא עילוי בישרא שרי because דמא מיסרק סריך and slides off, while כחלא עילוי בישרא אסור because milk sticks, סרוכי מסרך, creating בשר בחלב. Rav Dimi of Nehardea teaches the reverse, permitting udder above meat because חלב שחוטה is דרבנן but prohibiting liver above meat because דם is דאורייתא. Amimar publicly rules that whether liver or udder, placing them beneath meat is permitted, while placing them above meat is permitted only בדיעבד and not לכתחילה. Rashi adds that with horizontal roasting one cannot reliably know which item is above or below.
  • Rav Ashi visits and sees a son of Rami bar Abba placing כבדא עילוי בשרא and calls it presumptuous, asserting the permissibility applies only בדיעבד. The Gemara adds that if there is a בי דוגי receptacle collecting drippings, then even meat above liver becomes problematic for the collected fat because it mixes with liver blood. The distinction is that דמא דבשרא sinks and can be separated from fat by scraping until red appears, while דמא דכבדא is קפי and floats, joining with the fat and making it prohibited.
  • The מחבר in סימן ע"ג סעיף א' states הכבד יש בו רבוי דם and rules that לכתחילה there is no תיקון to cook it through מליחה, requiring instead קורעו שתי וערב ומניח חתכו למטה וצולהו until ראוי לאכילה, and afterward it may be cooked. The ש"ך is cited as saying half the normal roasting amount suffices to remove the blood. The מחבר allows בדיעבד that if the liver was cooked alone it is permitted even without roasting, based on the expelling logic, though he records a dissenting view. The רמ"א writes וכן נוהגים לאסור הכל אפילו נמלח הכבד קודם בישול, and the ש"ך explains this stringency based on the concern that שלוק can cause absorption and we are not expert to distinguish מבושל from שלוק, leading to prohibiting even בדיעבד cooking alone and rejecting reliance on Rabbeinu Tam. The רמ"א in סימן ע"ג סעיף ו' is cited as a מנהג not to salt liver at all as a היכר so people do not treat it like regular meat salting.
  • A new sugya begins with רב נחמן אמר שמואל that a סכין ששחט בה absorbs blood due to heat at the בית השחיטה and אסור לחתוך בה רותח, while cutting cold yields a dispute whether it בעי הדחה or not. Shmuel also rules that a קערה שמלח בה בשר is אסור for hot food because מליח הרי הוא כרותח, and Rashi frames the absorbed blood as נותן טעם ראשון like איסור גמור. Ravin בשם רבי יוחנן claims מליח אינו כרותח and כבוש אינו כמבושל, but Abaye rejects this by citing a כלי חרס in Rav Ami’s house that was broken after salting meat in it, implying Rav Ami followed רבי יוחנן and yet treated meliach as rotach. The ר"ן and ריטב"א question why the כלי חרס was not kept for cold use and answer that one may forget and use it for hot, so breaking was required.
  • Rav Kahana states that a plate used for salting meat is forbidden for hot food, yet a sharp radish cut with a meat knife is permitted to eat with כותח. Abaye explains the distinction as the radish absorbing permitted fat while the plate absorbs prohibited blood, but Rava rejects that because permitted taste can become forbidden when mixed with milk. Rava instead distinguishes between cases where one can taste to verify the presence of flavor and cases where one cannot. Rav Papa challenges this by invoking כפילא ארמיא and a teaching that evaluation by taste applies in cases like meat and milk and תרומה, leading Rava to answer that his distinction assumes there is no available כפילא.
  • A prior dispute among ראשונים is stated between the רשב"א, who trusts an expert non-Jew because reputation motivates truthfulness, and the רא"ש, who limits trust to מסיח לפי תומו as Rashi also says. רבי עקיבא איגר is cited as concluding that because each view requires opposite conditions for trust, practical use of a כפילא is effectively impossible. The narrative treats this as the reason the tasting mechanism does not function as a consistent practical tool.
  • The sugya of דגים שעלו בקערה presents Rav as forbidding eating the fish with כותח because it is נותן טעם, while Shmuel permits because it is נותן טעם בר נותן טעם, נ''ט בר נ''ט. Rashi explains that direct cooking with meat is טעם ראשון and forbidden, while here the taste travels from meat to plate and plate to fish, becoming diluted. A deduction from a story about an ointment for Rav’s eye is rejected because the ointment’s bitterness is unusually potent, though Tosafos says the rejection means the story is not conclusive proof.
  • A story shows Shmuel eating such fish with כותח and offering it to R’ Elazar, who refuses, and Shmuel claims he served the same to Rav and Rav ate it. R’ Elazar asks Rav whether he retracted, and Rav denies it strongly with חס ליה לזרעיה דאבא בר אבא דליספי ליה מידי דלא סבירא ליה, asserting that Shmuel would not serve him something Rav considers forbidden. The רא"ש is cited as learning that a host may not serve a guest something the guest holds is not kosher even if the host permits it.
  • The explanation attributed to שאלות ותשובות מהרשד"ם יורה דעה סימן רכ"ז resolves the tension by saying Shmuel assumed Rav knew the fish had been on a meat plate and thus could choose to abstain if he wished, while Rav in fact did not know and therefore ate. The account adds that no מכשול occurred because הלכה למעשה follows Shmuel that נ''ט בר נ''ט is permitted, and thus Rav’s eating did not constitute an איסור even if Rav personally maintained the stricter view. The story ends with Rav denying the incident because he never realized the fish’s meat-plate status, while Shmuel believed Rav had knowingly accepted it.
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