Summary
  • Today's *shiur* on Maseches Chullin Daf 84 begins from Daf 83b near the end and builds from the *Mishnah* that *kisui hadam* applies to one who *shocht* a *chayah* or *of* but not to *kodshim*, then traces the *Gemara’s* attempts to explain that exclusion through practical impossibility, *shechitah she’einah re’uyah*, and the requirement that *kisui* follow immediately after *shefichah*. The narrative moves through major *Rishonim* disputes about whether scraping blood is needed for *kisui* below and above or only above, then develops how *bedek habayis* and *mizbeach* cases fail because they introduce an intervening act such as *pidyon* or *geridah*. The *Gemara* then offers an additional derivation from “*chayah v’of*,” raises the question why *behemah* is excluded from *kisui*, and uses “*al ha’aretz tishpechenu kamayim*” to distinguish *behemah* blood while also clarifying that it still cannot serve as *mikveh* water. The later section turns to *derach eretz* teachings about eating meat only with preparation and within one’s means, priorities of spending for food and clothing, household responsibility, and practical counsel on wealth, work, supervision, and avoiding waste.
  • Today's text starts from the prior conclusion that *kisui hadam* does not apply to *kodshim* because the requirement of *afar* below and above the blood cannot be met on the *mizbeach*, and when it is impossible to have *afar* below, the entire *din* becomes inapplicable even if *afar* below is not essential in a case where it could have been done. The *Gemara* asks *lig’ror u’lechasof*, proposing that one should do *zerikas hadam* on the *mizbeach*, scrape the blood off, and then do *kisui*, since a *Mishnah* teaches that blood that splatters, or blood on a knife, requires scraping so that one is *chayav lechasos*, proving that *garar mechasei lei*. The Rashba explains the scraping as enabling *kisui* both below and above, while the Ran argues it is only to enable *kisui* on top, creating a *nafka minah* whether the question arises from blood on the floor and on the knife or only from blood on the knife. The text challenges the Rashba from the case of blood of a *chayah* on top of a *behemah* where *kisui* is still done, and presents defenses that either the lower layer counts as if there is *afar* below, or that in theory the Rashba would require separation for below-and-above *kisui* but the mixture makes that impossible, so the *Gemara* focuses on at least doing *kisui* above.
  • The *Gemara* answers that for *kodshei mizbeach* scraping could indeed make *kisui* possible, but the *Mishnah’s* exclusion of *kodshim* refers to *kodshei bedek habayis*, where slaughter before redemption produces *shechitah she’einah re’uyah* and therefore no obligation of *kisui hadam*. The *Gemara* asks *ul’fid’neihu ul’chas’neihu*, arguing that since *bedek habayis* can be redeemed, redemption should convert it into a *shechitah re’uyah* and thus obligate *kisui*, and the *Rishonim* explain that one ultimately must redeem because there is nothing else to do with the animal. The answer hinges on *ha’amadah v’ha’arachah*, stating that after slaughter one cannot redeem because redemption requires the animal to be standing, and the Ramban suggests redemption could work if done immediately while it is still *mefarkes*, whereas Tosafos limits *mefarkes* to other *halachos* and denies it helps for *ha’amadah v’ha’arachah*. The *Gemara* then asks *k’maan*, since the explanation seems to require both *shechitah she’einah re’uyah lav shmah shechitah* and *ha’amadah v’ha’arachah*, and it resolves with Rav Yosef that the *Mishnah* follows Rebbi who aligns with Rebbi Shimon on *shechitah she’einah re’uyah* and with Rebbi Meir on *ha’amadah v’ha’arachah*.
  • An alternate answer states that the sugya can be entirely Rebbi Shimon, and it derives from *v’shafach v’chisa* that the obligation applies only where one is missing nothing but *shefichah* and *kisui*, excluding a case that is missing *shefichah, pidyon, v’kisui*. The Ritva explains that even though *kol ha’omed lipados k’padui dami*, the actual *pidyon* is a significant act and therefore a *hefsek* between *shefichah* and *kisui*. The *Gemara* then applies this principle retroactively to *kodshei mizbeach*, concluding that scraping would also be a *hefsek* because it introduces *shefichah, geridah, v’kisui*, so *kisui hadam* does not apply there either. The Ritva explains the earlier *hava amina* as either not yet reading the *pasuk* as teaching “no act in between,” or assuming only *pidyon* is significant while *geridah* is not, until the conclusion that both are *hefsek*.
  • Tosafos asks how the earlier source requiring scraping blood off a knife to perform *kisui* can stand if any intervening act cancels the obligation, and answers that the disqualifying *hefsek* is only where the act must occur, such as *pidyon* or required scraping in the *kodshim* framework, whereas in ordinary slaughter the presence of blood on the knife is not inevitable. The text also reports that some *Rishonim* go further and hold that any case where scraping is required would eliminate the *chiyuv* of *kisui hadam*, contrary to the assumed implication of the *beraisa*.
  • Mar bar Rav Ashi derives from the *pasuk* “*chayah v’of*” that just as *chayah* cannot be *kodesh* as a *korban*, so too the relevant *of* for *kisui* is not *kodesh*. The *Gemara* challenges that this might exclude species with a form of *kedushah*, such as *torei u’bnei yonah*, but it answers that one should not differentiate among birds and all *ofos* are included for *kisui*, while noting the *Acharonim* suggest the specific bird offered as a *korban* would still be excluded because it is *kodshim*. The *Rishonim* ask why this derivation would exclude *kodshei bedek habayis*, and the text gives answers that pre-redemption slaughter remains *shechitah she’einah re’uyah*, or that anything that cannot be *kodshei mizbeach* cannot be *kodshei bedek habayis* either, described as a major *chidush*.
  • Yaakov Mini, or according to another *girsa* Yaakov Mitzvah, asks that since it was established earlier that *chayah* is included in *behemah* for *simanim*, perhaps *behemah* should be included in the *chiyuv* of *kisui hadam* as well. Rava answers from “*al ha’aretz tishpechenu kamayim*” that just as water does not require *kisui*, so too the blood of a *behemah* does not require *kisui*. The Ramban is cited that in the *midbar* meat was eaten only as a *korban*, which inherently creates a delay through procedures like *zerikah*, and *kisui* aims to prevent rushing to eat immediately after slaughter, which is a concern for *chayah v’of* that are not brought on the *mizbeach*.
  • The *Gemara* then challenges that if *behemah* blood is likened to water, one might think it could be used for a *mikveh*, and it answers from “*ach ma’ayan u’vor mikveh mayim yihyeh tahor*” that only *mayim* qualify. The *Gemara* considers whether blood “*d’ikari mayim*” could be included, then rejects it through multiple exclusions, first stating *trei mi’utei ksivi* because the word *mayim* appears twice, and then refining to *t’lasa mi’utei ksivi* by counting “*ma’ayan ma’ayan u’vor mayim mikveh mayim*.” The Ritva explains why two exclusions can be needed for other liquids to cover both *zuchlin* and *mechunasin*, and why once blood is classified like other liquids for *mikveh* law, it is disqualified across the board without needing separate exclusions for each subcase.
  • A *beraisa* derives from “*asher yatzud*” that one might think *kisui* applies only to animals actually captured, then includes domesticated but effectively “captured” *chayos* and *ofos* such as geese and chickens by “*tzayid mikol makom*.” The *Gemara* then asks why “*asher yatzud*” is written and answers that the Torah teaches *derech eretz* that a person should not eat meat except with *hazmanah* and preparation, with an additional interpretation that meat is a luxury and one should not spend money on it. Rav Tzadok interprets *hazmanah* as a discipline of eating with prior thought and slowing down to intend eating for strength to serve Hashem.
  • Another *beraisa* learns from “*ki yarchiv Hashem Elokecha es gevulecha*” that one should eat meat only *l’te’avon* rather than routinely, and it derives from “*v’zavachta mibkarcha u’mitzoncha*” that meat is appropriate when one has herd resources rather than buying from the market. The text explains “*mibkarcha v’lo kol bekarcha*” and “*mitzoncha v’lo kol tzoncha*” as limiting a person from slaughtering all his animals even when he has only one or two. Rav Elazar ben Azaryah sets a spending ladder of means, assigning vegetables, fish, and meat to increasing wealth levels and daily meat only for one with *me’ah mane*, and the *Rishonim* are cited that living within one’s means emerges here as a *chiyuv d’Oraisa*. The Ramban adds support from the *kohanim* changing garments for removing ashes so as not to ruin clothing, framing the Torah as teaching care with material possessions.
  • The *Gemara* states that those without sufficient income eat meat only from Erev Shabbos to Erev Shabbos, and Rav says *tzrichin anu lachush l’divrei zaken*, understood as Rav Elazar ben Azaryah, with explanations why he is called *zaken* including “*hareini k’ven shivim shanah*” and the Chasam Sofer’s idea that his intense learning weakened him and made him need meat more often. Rabbi Yochanan says Rav came from a family of healthy people and ate meat infrequently, but people “like us” should buy meat when they have money for proper nourishment, and Rav Nachman says “like us” borrow and eat. The Chozeh interprets “*loוין ואוכלין*” as borrowing strength through eating so one can learn Torah and do *mitzvos* even if the act of eating itself is not fully on the ideal level.
  • The *Gemara* reads “*kvasim lilvushcha*” and “*u’mechir sadeh atudim*” to advise selling a field to buy animals rather than selling animals to buy a field, because one can live off the milk of goats and lambs at home. The text derives “*lachmecha kodem l’lechem beisecha*” that one’s own nourishment comes first because he bears responsibility for earning *parnassah* for the household. Mar Zutra brei d’Rav Nachman derives *derech eretz* not to accustom one’s child to meat and wine, explained as training the family away from expensive habits and building modest expectations from youth.
  • Rabbi Yochanan says one who wants to become wealthy should engage in *behemah dakah*, with Tosafos qualifying that “*osher b’behemah dakah ein ro’in bo siman brachah*” applies when the flock is in town due to *ayin hara* but not when it is outside town. Rav Pinchas of Koritz connects this to Pesach being judgment for *tevuah* and *parnassah* and frames matzah as a model of simple eating that makes one worthy of *ashirus*, reading “*ya’asok b’behemah dakah*” as choosing a modest diet that draws divine decree of wealth. Rav Chisda interprets “*ash’tos tzonecha*” as sheep that enrich their owners.
  • Rav Yochanan advises “*kasa d’charcha v’lo kasa d’pashcha*,” preferring a certain cup over lukewarm water, and the *Gemara* limits this through conditions about metal vessels, earthenware, adding *tzuba*, and whether the vessel had been boiled. Rav Yitzchak teaches that one who wants to lose inherited money should wear linen garments of the type associated with Baktana Dromita, use expensive white glass, and hire workers without sitting with them, and it explains this as goods that break or wear quickly and labor that ruins property when unsupervised, especially with ox-drivers or non-Jews. The text adds a *vort* that watching workers improperly can cost not only money but also health through *agmas nefesh*.
  • Rav Uvira, sometimes citing Rabbi Ami and sometimes Rabbi Asi, expounds “*tov ish chonen u’malveh yechalkel devarav b’mishpat*” as a life rule that one should eat and drink less than his means, dress according to his means, and honor his wife and children more than his means because they depend on him while he depends on the Creator. The *mefarshim* explain that treating dependents well leads Hashem to treat us well, and Ben Yehoyada clarifies that honoring one’s wife “more than his means” does not mean living beyond one’s means but rather cutting other expenses to give proper support and respect, aligning one’s household conduct with reliance on Hashem.
Previous Page
Next Page