Chulin 81
Summary
- Today’s שיעור on מסכת חולין דף פ עמוד א, beginning on דף פ עמוד ב at ולילקי נמי, explains why a case of *oto ve’et beno* in קדשים seems to generate an additional *lav* of *mechusar zeman* yet the משנה does not count it, and it develops multiple resolutions including a view that *mechusar zeman* carries no מלקות because it is treated as *lav ha’ba michlal aseh* or as *lav hanitak la’aseh*. The שיעור then revisits רבי שמעון’s principle that שחיטה שאינה ראויה לא שמה שחיטה and applies it to קדשים, reworking רב המנונא’s claim through רבא’s reinterpretation and the role of התראת ספק, and it contrasts cases involving שלמים and עולה with a dispute over whether *akhilat mizbe’ach shmah akhilah*. The סוף moves to the משנה’s cases of טרפה, עבודה זרה, פרה אדומה, שור הנסקל, and עגלה ערופה, distinguishes invalid acts that are not שחיטה at all, and concludes with ריש לקיש and רבי יוחנן debating *kim lei b’drabah minei* when the greater liability is only potential because of missing התראה or שוגג status.
- Today’s learning assumes the *lav* of *oto ve’et beno*, forbidding שחיטה of a parent and offspring on the same day, and treats a קדשים case where the first animal is slaughtered improperly בחוץ and the offspring is then slaughtered even though it cannot be slaughtered that day yet remains *over* *oto ve’et beno*. The שיעור defines *mechusar zeman* from מיום השמיני והלאה ירצה and extends it beyond “less than eight days old” to any time-based barrier to bringing a קרבן, so an offspring barred today by *oto ve’et beno* should also be categorized as *mechusar zeman*. The גמרא asks ולילקי נמי משום לאו דמחוסר זמן and supports malkot for time-based פסולים through the פסוק ושור ושה שרוע וקלוט נדבה תעשה אתו ולנדר לא ירצה, understood as a general *lav* for bringing פסולים, because the repetition of ושור ושה expands liability.
- The גמרא first answers that the משנה counts *oto ve’et beno* and does not count unrelated *lavin*, but this is challenged from the משנה’s case of קדשים בחוץ where the first animal is liable for שחוטי חוץ and still gets counted. The גמרא resolves that when there is no *lav* of *oto ve’et beno* it counts another *lav*, but when *oto ve’et beno* applies it does not add the accompanying *lav* of *mechusar zeman* because they “travel together” for קדשים. רב זירא offers a different answer that *mechusar zeman* has no מלקות because it is treated as *lav hanitak la’aseh* or, by the logic of the פסוק שור או כשב או עז כי יולד והיה שבעת ימים תחת אמו ומיום השמיני והלאה ירצה, as *lav ha’ba michlal aseh* and thus only an עשה.
- The שיעור presents תוספות as reading the גמרא that “before the eighth day” is prohibited only by implication from the עשה, making it *lav ha’ba michlal aseh* with no מלקות, and it addresses the difficulty that another פסוק appears to supply an independent *lav* via ולנדר לא ירצה. The defense of תוספות states that the “שרוע וקלוט” פסוק addresses other פסולים such as בעלי מומין rather than *mechusar zeman*, because the approach of assigning both a separate לאו and an עשה to the same דין is avoided when a cleaner division exists. רש״י’s approach labels it *lav hanitak la’aseh*, and the standard objection is that a classic *lav hanitak la’aseh* is correctable while an early הקרבה is not correctable.
- The שיעור defends רש״י by citing a correctable instance: being מקדיש too early can be “fixed” by waiting until the proper time and then offering it, so *mechusar zeman* as a unified category can be treated as *lav hanitak la’aseh* even when a specific act is not practically reversible. A רמב״ן is brought to support viewing *mechusar zeman* as one general category rather than splitting “eight days” and *oto ve’et beno* into separate subcategories, allowing the corrective model in one case to define the larger דין.
- The גמרא challenges using the פסוק as the source for “no מלקות” because it is needed for רבי פרכי’s teaching that והיה שבעת ימים תחת אמו implies permissibility at the night boundary while מיום השמיני והלאה ירצה excludes the preceding night from הקרבה. רבי פרכי resolves this by stating לילה לקדושה and יום להרצאה, allowing הקדשה at the night after the seventh day but requiring day for acceptance on the מזבח, and the גמרא then says this distinction is derived instead from כן תעשה לשורך לצאנך. The שיעור records a מחלוקת ראשונים whether הקדשה done earlier than permitted is still חל with an עבירה or is not חל at all.
- The שיעור addresses why night matters when קרבנות are not brought at night by invoking *im alu lo yerd*u: הקדשה at the night boundary affects whether something placed on the מזבח improperly must be removed or may remain. It then cites an אחרונים debate on counting the eighth day, and the נודע ביהודה reads רבי פרכי as evidence that halakhah counts days rather than seven twenty-four-hour periods from birth. It further raises the comparison to a זבחים teaching that one may be מקדיש a fetus in utero and answers either that it is הקדשה *agav imo* or that the post-birth restriction is a safeguard because a born animal might be mistakenly offered too early.
- The שיעור applies the “לילה לקדושה” model to a practical question under the רמב״ם’s view that לילה לאו זמן ציצית: tying ציצית onto a garment at night may still be valid even though the obligation is absent at that time. The analogy asserts that just as one cannot be מקריב at night but can be מקדיש, one can prepare the ציצית at night even if חיוב does not apply then. The שיעור adds support from the halakhah that women are פטור from ציצית yet may wear a garment with ציצית, showing that the act of attaching or having ציצית is not identical to being obligated in the מצוה.
- The שיעור returns to רבי שמעון’s rule that שחיטה שאינה ראויה לא שמה שחיטה and reports רב המנונא’s claim that אין אותו ואת בנו נוהג בקדשים because קדשים require זריקה as well, so the שחיטה alone is not a מתיר for אכילה and is treated as non-שחיטה. רבא challenges this from a ברייתא of אותו ואת בנו קדשים בחוץ where רבי שמעון states the second act is בלא תעשה and explains a category of כל הראוי לבוא לאחר זמן הרי הוא בלא תעשה ואין בו כרת, while חכמים hold כל שאין בכרת אין בלא תעשה. The שיעור explains the resulting difficulty: if the first שחיטה בחוץ is not a שחיטה for רבי שמעון, the second should remain fit and thus carry כרת for שחוטי חוץ, making “only a לאו” inconsistent.
- רבא answers by reconstructing the ברייתא with multiple cases and shows that the “בלא תעשה” applies specifically when the first is done בפנים and the second בחוץ, where the second is only “fit later,” triggering רבי שמעון’s לאו-without-כרת category. This exposes that *oto ve’et beno* must operate in קדשים in some way, so רבא redefines רב המנונא to mean אין מלקות אותו ואת בנו נוהג בקדשים. The reasoning follows תוספות: because קדשים require זריקה to permit the meat, a warning at the time of שחיטה is a התראת ספק, and התראת ספק לא שמה התראה, so malkot cannot be administered; the שיעור notes רש״י’s alternative reading that avoids התראת ספק by disputing the textual version and framing the first act as never constituting שחיטה.
- The שיעור records רבא’s alignment with this approach through cases where the parent is חולין and the offspring is שלמים: שחט חולין ואחר כך שחט שלמים yields פטור, while שחט שלמים ואחר כך חולין yields חייב once זריקה renders the קדשים process effective. It then adds a case with עולה, stating that even שחט עולה ואחר כך שחט חולין can be פטור because an עולה is entirely burned, so even with זריקה it remains שחיטה כמאן דלא שחיטה במקום אכילה. רב יעקב אמר רב יוחנן rejects this and holds אכילת מזבח שמה אכילה, proving it from פיגול’s language ואם האכל יאכל, interpreted as two “eatings,” one by אדם and one by מזבח.
- The משנה states that if one slaughters and the animal is found to be טרפה, or slaughters לשם עבודה זרה, or slaughters a פרת חטאת, שור הנסקל, or עגלה ערופה, רבי שמעון פוטר because these are שחיטה שאינה ראויה and thus do not constitute שחיטה for *oto ve’et beno*. The שיעור notes that in פרת חטאת and עגלה ערופה the offspring must be the designated animal because פרה אדומה requires לא עלה עליה עול and includes never having been pregnant, and עגלה ערופה similarly requires no work, so the mother cannot be such an animal. It raises תוספות’ question why שחיטה לעבודה זרה is treated as relevant when a מומר’s שחיטה is invalid, and it gives answers that the first act does not instantly create מומר status, or that mumer status is determined only upon completion, or that even a disqualified שחיטה may still remove טומאת נבילה and therefore retains enough halakhic effect for *oto ve’et beno* under חכמים.
- The משנה then states that if the animal became a נבילה in one’s hand, or one performed נוחר or מעקר, one is פטור משום אותו ואת בנו because there was no מעשה שחיטה at all. The שיעור explains that the משנה includes both inadvertent failure and intentional improper killing to show neither creates the שחיטה trigger for *oto ve’et beno*. It preserves the annotation that the phrase פטור משום אותו ואת בנו is understood as excluding even a rabbinic concern according to one approach, while another approach says the exemption is only from *oto ve’et beno* but a separate עבירה of צער בעלי חיים remains, and it cites the נודע ביהודה’s responsum discouraging hunting as not the Jewish way even when technical prohibitions may be avoided.
- ריש לקיש limits the משנה’s liability in the עבודה זרה case to where the first animal is slaughtered לעבודה זרה and the second is for one’s table, but he exempts where the first is for one’s table and the second is slaughtered לעבודה זרה because קים ליה בדרבה מיניה makes the lesser liability fall away. רבי יוחנן argues that this is obvious in general and introduces a case where one remains חייב even when the second is for עבודה זרה, namely when the warning was only for *oto ve’et beno* and not for עבודה זרה, so the greater punishment cannot be imposed and the lesser remains. ריש לקיש asserts that even without the warning, since with warning the greater punishment would have exempted the lesser, the exemption still applies.
- The גמרא ties this to their broader dispute reported with רב דימי about cases where the major offense is done בשוגג or without effective התראה alongside another liability, with רבי יוחנן holding חייב because the major penalty is not being executed, and ריש לקיש holding פטור because potential applicability of קים ליה controls. The גמרא explains the need for both presentations by distinguishing scenarios involving monetary obligations from those involving punishments, and it concludes that both formulations are necessary to establish the scope of their disagreement.
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