Chulin 75
Summary
- A שיעור on מסכת חולין דף ע"ה עמוד א opens with the בן פקועה framework and the earlier מחלוקת between ר' מאיר and חכמים about a full-term בן ט' בן פקועה, with ר' מאיר requiring שחיטה and חכמים not requiring it. The גמרא’s case of a live בן פקועה becoming מוכשר לקבל טומאה and then נטמא in a cemetery is attributed by ר' יוחנן to ר' יוסי הגלילי, and the שיעור frames the dispute as hinging on whether “חי” itself blocks טומאה or whether the issue is whether it is “אוכל.” The סוגיא then broadens to בית שמאי and בית הלל on when fish are מקבל טומאה, ties that theme to broader בית שמאי–בית הלל methodology, and continues through questions about טרפה in fish, חלב of a שליל, fetus parts on the מזבח, and the status of a live full-term fetus found in a טרפה mother. The שיעור closes with the scope of ר' שמעון שזורי about generations of בן פקועה, the practical rabbinic שחיטה for מראית עין, and a later halachic reflection that the תורה’s system of שחיטה and בדיקה is not meant to be bypassed by engineering בן פקועה lineages.
- A full-term, live בן ט' בן פקועה remains subject to a תנא’itic מחלוקת, with חכמים treating it like any other בן פקועה and ר' מאיר requiring שחיטה. A case is recalled in which a live בן פקועה becomes מוכשר לקבל טומאה by walking through a river and then becomes טמא by entering a cemetery, even though a live animal is ordinarily not מקבל טומאה.
- A גמרא question of מן תנא identifies the view that “עבר בנהרא” renders the live בן פקועה מוכשר לקבל טומאה as the position of ר' יוסי הגלילי, via ר' שמעון בן אלעזר משום ר' יוסי הגלילי that it מטמא טומאת אוכלין and needs הכשר. Chכמים respond that it אינו מטמא טומאת אוכלין מפני שהוא חי. Two explanatory models are offered in the ראשונים: one that the תורה excludes living animals from טומאה, and another that living animals are not “אוכל,” with the מחלוקת cast as whether the edible status of בן פקועה makes it “food” despite being alive.
- A רש"י-driven analysis explains why the טומאה dispute is not tied to the earlier ר' מאיר–חכמים dispute about full-term בן פקועה, because ר' יוחנן aligns the sugya within חכמים’ framework and then asks whether, even under חכמים’ permissibility without שחיטה, the בן פקועה is susceptible to טומאה. R' יוחנן states “ר' יוסי הגלילי בית שמאי דבר אחד,” connecting r' יוסי הגלילי’s food-status logic to בית שמאי’s view that fish become מקבל טומאה once captured, while בית הלל require actual death and ר' עקיבא defines a threshold of inability to live.
- בית שמאי hold fish are susceptible “משיתצודו,” בית הלל hold “משמוסו,” and ר' עקיבא holds “משעה שאינו יכול לחיות,” with ר' יוחנן distinguishing cases like דג מקורט. A question from מסכת שבת about liability for killing a fish when a סלע-sized area dries is answered by separating שבת’s focus on the act of killing from טומאה’s focus on the reality of whether it is dead. A teaching attributed to the Lubavitcher Rebbe reads בית שמאי as treating potential as determinative and בית הלל as treating present reality as determinative, and it connects this theme to the first משנה of ש"ס, “מאימתי קורין שמע בערבית,” through רבי אליעזר as a שמותי-aligned figure reading “בשכבך” as the moment of going to sleep.
- רב חסדא raises whether fish have “סימני טרפה,” with the question built both for the view that “טרפה חיה” and the view that “טרפה אינה חיה.” The sugya frames whether fish should be treated as less viable and thus effectively “dead” under טרפה signs, or whether טרפות is linked specifically to species “דיש במינה שחיטה,” making fish outside that framework. The unresolved תיקו is framed as whether the requirement that fish be dead to be eaten makes “מיתה” the functional substitute for שחיטה or whether fish have no analogous “הלכות שחיטה” at all.
- A case of שליל נפל raises whether its חלב is like חלב בהמה or like חלב חיה, with ר' יוחנן saying “חלבו כחלב בהמה” and ריש לקיש saying “כחלב חיה.” The basis is given as “שפירא גרם” for ר' יוחנן, treating emergence as determinative, and “חודשים גרמי” for ריש לקיש, treating full term as determinative. An alternate version shifts the focus to a full-term fetus that has not emerged, “וטלש חלב בן תשעה חי ואכל,” with ריש לקיש requiring “חודשים ואוירא גמרי” for full בהמה status.
- R' Yosef Dov Soloveitchik explains the ר' יוחנן–ריש לקיש dispute via the conceptual question of whether a בן פקועה is permitted because the mother’s שחיטה is effective for it or because it is a category with no intrinsic חיוב שחיטה. R' יוחנן is presented as viewing the fetus as a regular animal whose permissibility flows from the mother’s שחיטה, thereby preserving standard חלב prohibitions. ריש לקיש is presented as viewing בן פקועה as a new category lacking both חיוב שחיטה and corresponding חלב prohibitions.
- A ברייתא explains why the תורה repeats that “חלב ושתי כליות” go on the מזבח by אשם, using it as a מוציא מכלל שליל to teach that fetal חלב is excluded, and extending that exclusion across קרבנות. A *Meshech Chochmah* explains why עולה is only a זכר: since עולה is “כולו כליל,” a female could create a dilemma of burning everything while fetal components are excluded, and restricting it to males avoids that. Two versions of the ר' יוחנן–ריש לקיש exchange appear, with one reading ריש לקיש as deriving his view from the verse itself and another having ר' יוחנן answer that exclusion from the מזבח can be like “מחוסר זמן,” a rule that withholds offering despite full ontological status.
- רב אמי rules that if one slaughters a טרפה and finds a live בן תשע, then according to “דברי האוסר” it is permitted by slaughtering the fetus, while according to “דברי המתיר” it is forbidden because the mother’s שחיטה cannot serve as a basis. Later explanations include a dispute among אחרונים whether the fetus’s prohibition is נבלה or אבר מן החי when the mother’s שחיטה is ineffective for eating. A question is raised from the principle that “שחיטת טרפה” is a שחיטה for טהרה, and ר' עקיבא איגר answers that relying on the mother’s שחיטה implies fetus–mother unity that would render the fetus a טרפה, while the Brisker framework distinguishes a שחיטה that achieves טהרה from a שחיטה that achieves אכילה.
- רבא states that even “לדברי המתיר” the fetus is permitted because “שתי סימנים אכשר ביה רחמנא,” allowing slaughter either of the mother or the child, so where the mother’s שחיטה is ineffective for eating one may slaughter the fetus. רב חסדא adds that such a fetus “טעון שחיטה” and is “חייב בזרוע ולחיים וקיבה,” treating it as an independent animal, and if it dies without שחיטה it is “טמא לטמא במשא.” A challenge is raised that “טעון שחיטה” seems like ר' מאיר while exemption from טומאת נבלה via the mother’s שחיטה seems like רבנן, and a reconciliation is offered that the ברייתא can be read as speaking when the fetus was found dead or can be aligned with חכמים through the “ארבעה סימנים אכשיר בהו רחמנא” logic; the חידוש is framed as applying even when the mother is a טרפה.
- When רב זירא comes to ארץ ישראל he relays the teaching to רב אסי, who confirms “הכי אמר רב יוחנן,” and the גמרא asks whether this implies ריש לקיש disagrees. The answer “משתיה שוי ושתיק ליה” is explained as either that ריש לקיש would withhold immediate response to absorb the teaching or, in an alternate reading, that he was literally drinking in the בית מדרש and therefore silent, yielding no proof of agreement or disagreement. The narrative is used to support a permissive stance about eating or drinking in a בית מדרש to avoid missing תורה.
- A question is posed about the difference between ת"ק and ר' שמעון שזורי when both accept בן פקועה permissibility, and רב כהנא answers that “הפריס על גבי קרקע” distinguishes them. Chכמים impose a גזירה that once the animal emerges it requires שחיטה מדרבנן for מראית עין, while ר' שמעון שזורי does not. A related halachic question is raised whether one recites a ברכה on such a rabbinic שחיטה, with a comparison to lighting a second חנוכה menorah for suspicion at another window, and a distinction is offered between *mar’it ayin* and *chashad* as well as between a continuous act of lighting and an independent act of שחיטה.
- Rav Meshisha states that according to the view “חוששין לזרע האב,” a בן פקועה from a mixed pairing with a regular animal yields a child “אין לו תקנה.” רש"י is read as treating it like a שחיטה defect akin to שהייה, and the חת"ם סופר explains this through a *Niddah* tradition that קנה derives from the father and ושט from the mother, producing a split-status anatomy. תוספות compares it to a case where each סימן is only half-slaughtered, which is not a valid שחיטה.
- אביי rules that even those who usually require שחיטה for מראית עין concede that a קלוט בן פקועה is permitted without שחיטה because its abnormality makes people remember its special status. An alternate formulation requires a double abnormality, “קלוט בן קלוטה,” to remove the concern, and ראשונים debate whether the two versions disagree or apply to different cases. The אור זרוע is cited as being lenient at a wedding with multiple בן פקועות because the unusual context enhances recognition, and a teaching is attached that excitement and novelty strengthen memory, with “פלאות עדותיך על כן נצרתם נפשי” and a report that R' Chaim Kanievsky advises being מחדש חידושי תורה to retain learning.
- R' Zeira בשם רב חנינא rules “הלכה כר' שמעון בן שזורי,” allowing generations of בן פקועה “עד סוף כל הדורות,” while ר' יוחנן says “הוא מותר, בנו אסור” and is interpreted as reporting ר' שמעון שזורי’s view without accepting it. A story is told in which Ada bar Chava’s בן פקועה is attacked by a bear and Rav Ashi says “זיל שחטיה,” and the sugya treats this as evidence in the debate whether a perfunctory שחיטה suffices when the entire practice is for מראית עין, with alternative readings that the animal may not have become a true דרוסה or that טרפות are not publicly visible while שחיטה is. A challenge from a statement that “כל מקום ששנה רבי שמעון השזורי במשנתנו הלכה כמותו” is answered by limiting his authority to two areas: “במסוכן” in גיטין and “תרומת מעשר של דמאי,” and the practical note is added that even when one can rely on an עם הארץ on שבת, one must separate properly מוצאי שבת.
- A final halachic question is raised in later responsa, including שבט הלוי and משנה הלכות, asking why communities do not create generations of בני פקועה to avoid the many uncertainties of שחיטה and בדיקה. The shared answer is that the תורה’s command structure intends שחיטה and בדיקה to be performed rather than circumvented through engineered פתרונות.
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