Chulin 73
Summary
- Today's *shiur* on Chullin daf 73 (beginning from daf 72b near the end at “Ravina אמר”) returns to the Mishnah’s dispute about a fetus’s limb that protrudes before the mother’s *shechitah*, where all agree the limb is *tamei* but רבי מאיר assigns it *tum’as eiver min hachai* and *tum’as neveilah* while חכמים assign it *tum’as treifah* and the Gemara explains how *tum’ah* can apply despite *tum’as beis hasesarim*. Ravina answers with the rule *kol ha’omed lachtuch kachtuch dami* and the Gemara limits, expands, and redirects that rule, bringing proofs from Mikva’os and later concluding that even for חכמים, “*chiburei ochlin*” are treated as separated. The *sugya* then reframes the meaning of “*treifah shechutah*” as *metamei* in *kodashim* based on אבוה דשמואל, develops a long dialogue between רבי מאיר and חכמים about whether the mother’s *shechitah* can remove *tum’as neveilah* without permitting eating, and uses that dispute to set up a broader debate about an *eiver meduldal* (a dangling limb) and whether death or *shechitah* makes it “fall off” for *tum’ah* purposes.
- Today's *shiur* restates that when a fetus protrudes its hand before the mother is slaughtered, everyone agrees the protruding limb is *tamei*, and the only dispute is the level of *tum’ah*. Rabbi Meir says the limb has *tum’as eiver min hachai* and *tum’as neveilah*, while the Rabbanan say it has *tum’as treifah*. The Gemara raises the difficulty that *tum’as beis hasesarim* does not transmit *tum’ah* because *tum’ah* transmission requires two distinct objects touching, and here the limb is still connected under the skin of the fetus.
- Ravina answers that a garment is not “standing to be cut,” but a fetus’s limb is “standing to be cut,” so the halachah treats it as already separated under *kol ha’omed lachtuch kachtuch dami*. Acharonim compare this to *kol ha’omed lisrof k’saruf dami* from Zevachim but distinguish it by saying that burning is framed as a *mitzvah* status question while cutting here is a physical inevitability. The Gemara asks “*k’maan*” because this principle appears to align only with רבי מאיר, and the Gemara brings the Mishnah in Mikva’os about long utensil handles that will be shortened, where רבי מאיר allows immersion only up to what will remain while חכמים require immersing the entire handle.
- Tosafos asks how immersion works if the intended cut point is not exposed, and answers that the handle is made of rings so water passes through without *chatzitzah*. The Ran says the unexposed area is a *mi’ut she’eino makpid* and therefore not a *chatzitzah*. Other מפרשים say *beis hasesarim* requirements apply to people in that the water must be able to reach hidden areas even if it does not enter, but this דין does not apply to keilim, so the concealed connection area in a handle is not an immersion problem for utensils.
- The text cites a famous תשובה of the טשיבינער רב about someone going to the mikvah who is destined to have a tooth extracted. The תשובה says the Torah requires water accessibility only where water normally reaches, and under a tooth water normally does not reach because people have teeth. The tooth’s present presence therefore is not a *chatzitzah* even if it is temporary.
- The Gemara answers “*afilu teima Rabbanan*” that for food connections, “*chiburei ochlin*” are treated “*k’maan d’mifreshei damu*,” so even the Rabbanan treat the limb and fetus as separated and touching rather than as one hidden connected unit. Rishonim limit this to food that is intended to be separated and do not apply it to food with no intent to separate. The text returns to the Mishnah’s “*chat’chah*” wording and explains that according to Ravina physical cutting is not necessary and “*chat’chah*” is used because the Mishnah’s *reisha* uses that language.
- The Chasam Sofer asks how *lechem mishneh* can be considered *shalem* if by food one says *kol ha’omed lachtuch kachtuch dami* since one intends to cut the bread. He answers that Chazal required the most *shalem* possible even knowing this principle, and he also gives a second approach that the rule applies only once one has started cutting, not with mere intention. The text ties this to Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim *hilchos b’tzi’as hapas* and the Mishnah Berurah’s distinction that during the week one should begin cutting to avoid delay after *hamotzi*, while on Shabbos one should only mark the loaf because beginning to cut would undermine *shalem* through *kol ha’omed lachtuch kachtuch dami*.
- The text raises whether a challah with truly burnt parts can serve for *lechem mishneh* when one certainly intends to scrape them off, making it a practical and *shalom bayis* question. It presents an approach that since some people eat burnt bread and it still has use, one does not apply *kol ha’omed lachtuch kachtuch dami* to disqualify the loaf.
- The text asks why a woman who intends to cut her hair tomorrow does not have a *chatzitzah* concern under *kol ha’omed lachtuch kachtuch dami* and offers that the rule applies only after beginning the cut, or that one cannot build strict timeframes before the act occurs. The Rema rules that a woman who did not cut her nails before *tevilah* must immerse again, and some explain this as nails being a *chatzitzah* because the accepted practice is to cut them, making them “standing to be cut.” The Taz disagrees and says the Rema’s stringency is due to concern for dirt under the nails rather than the nails themselves as a *chatzitzah*, and the text notes a modern scenario of a woman immersing Friday night and only afterward realizing she did not cut nails, with discussion of relying *b’di’eved* if cleanliness under the nails is certain while emphasizing the need to ask a rav.
- The Gemara challenges the Rabbanan’s phrase *tum’as treifah shechutah* by asking how a slaughtered *treifah* can be *metamei* if slaughter normally prevents *tum’ah*. The Gemara answers that it is true in the realm of *kodashim* based on אבוה דשמואל who says *treifah she’shachtah metamei b’kodashim*. The text cites a רב האי גאון explanation that אבוה דשמואל is identified that way throughout Shas because of a rumor about Shmuel’s paternity, so the title emphasizes certainty.
- A baraisa presents רבי מאיר asking that if the limb is saved from *tum’as neveilah* by the mother’s *shechitah*, then it should also be permitted to eat, which contradicts the first Mishnah of the chapter. The Rabbanan respond with *treifah tochiach* that *shechitah* can remove *tum’as neveilah* without permitting eating, since a slaughtered *treifah* is not *neveilah* but remains forbidden to eat. Rabbi Meir objects that *shechitah* is effective for something that is the animal itself (*davar she’gufo*) but questions why it should purify something that is not its body, and the Rabbanan answer with the principle “הא בו מציל על שאינו גופו יותר מגופו” from the earlier Mishnah where cutting from the fetus in the womb becomes permitted after the mother’s *shechitah* while cutting the spleen or kidneys of the mother before *shechitah* leaves them forbidden.
- The אמרי משה infers from the Mishnah’s *limud* comparing *treifah* and fetus that the mother’s *shechitah* is treated as if it slaughters the fetus, not merely as an exemption from *shechitah* for the fetus. The text suggests this may underlie the debate between רבי מאיר and חכמים in how to frame the *lamdus* of the fetus’s status.
- Reish Lakish says the same dispute as by fetus limbs applies to dangling limbs of an animal, with רבי מאיר giving *tum’as neveilah* and the Rabbanan giving *tum’as treifah*. רבי יוחנן initially is presented as distinguishing that the Mishnah’s dispute is only about the fetus’s limb, while for an animal’s dangling limb everyone agrees that *shechitah oseh nippul* and therefore the limb is treated as detached and has *eiver min hachai*/*neveilah* status, and the text reports a major difficulty because the Gemara’s reasoning depends on a claimed “*takanta b’chazarah*” for the fetus limb returning inside that conflicts with an earlier refutation. Rishonim resolve that רבי יוחנן can hold the returned limb remains forbidden to eat yet loses *tum’as neveilah*, making “*takanta*” refer to *tum’ah* rather than permissibility.
- The Gemara challenges רבי יוחנן from a baraisa that explicitly includes *eiver meduldal* and then concludes “*ela i itmar*” to rephrase רבי יוחנן’s statement. The revised version says the dispute remains only for the fetus limb, but for the dangling limb of the animal everyone agrees *ein shechitah oseh nippul*, so proper *shechitah* prevents *tum’as neveilah* and leaves only *tum’as treifah*. Rav Yitzchak bar Chanina explains this within רבי מאיר that the fetus limb is not part of the slaughtered body while the dangling limb is part of it, matching רבי מאיר’s repeated distinction between *davar she’gufo* and *davar she’eino gufo*.
- The text cites a “*gevaldige vort*” from the Rishonim that the Gemara’s question about רבי מאיר’s reasoning shows that not all Amoraim are expected to know all Mishnayos and Baraisos. The point is that even if רבי מאיר’s distinction appears clearly in a baraisa, an Amora can still ask for the reason because the baraisa may not have been known to him.
- Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef quoting רבי יוחנן teaches that everyone agrees *misah oseh nippul* so if the animal dies the dangling limb is treated as *eiver min hachai*, while *shechitah* does not do so and yields *basar min hachai* which is forbidden to eat but not *metamei*. The Gemara anchors these laws in upcoming Mishnayos, citing that when the animal dies the meat needs *hechsher* for *tum’as ochlin* while the limb is *metamei* without *hechsher* according to רבי מאיר, and when slaughtered the question becomes whether it is *huchshar b’dameha* which indicates *tum’as ochlin* rather than *eiver min hachai*. The Gemara explains that without Rav Yitzchak one could have thought the *hechsher* language refers only to meat that separated, but Rav Yitzchak teaches that even the dangling limb after *shechitah* has only *tum’as ochlin* and requires *hechsher*.
- The Gemara brings a teaching from רבה בר בר חנה that *ובשר בשדה טרפה לא תאכלו* includes the dangling limb and meat of an animal, bird, or wild animal that were slaughtered and remain forbidden. Rav Yochanan explains “אין בהן אלא מצות פרוש בלבד,” and Rashi explains this as an איסור דרבנן, while the Rambam holds it is *eiver min hachai* in a *chatzi shiur* framework with no punishment. The text ends with a Rishonim dispute about whether a non-Jew may eat an *eiver meduldal* if its prohibition is only דרבנן according to Rashi or whether rabbinic extensions apply to non-Jews in this case.
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