Chulin 71
Summary
- Today's *shiur* on Maseches Chullin daf 71 begins from daf 70b and explains why a dead *ubar* inside its living mother can be treated differently from an ordinary *neveilah* for *tumah*, how רבי יוסי הגלילי distinguishes between a *behemah temeiah* and a *behemah tehorah*, and how the Gemara tests and refines the scriptural sources and *kal vachomer* used for that distinction. The *shiur* then moves to the Mishnah about a dead fetus inside a woman, establishing the rule of *tumah beluah* and *taharah beluah*, deriving the sources and *kal vachomerim* for how swallowed/embedded *tumah* behaves in a person and in an animal. It closes with aggadic and *mussar* material on בן עזאי and רבי ישמעאל, a teaching of Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz on Rashi’s “הפסד וחבלה היא בעולם,” and practical applications raised by later *poskim* about *bal teshaktzu*, a כהן’s pregnant wife entering a cemetery, and the custom for pregnant women to avoid cemeteries, with the Minchas Yitzchak connecting it to hopes for the future *parah adumah* service.
- Today's *shiur* restates the Mishnah that although a *neveilah* is *metamei*, a *ro’eh* who inserts his hand into the womb of a live animal containing a dead *ubar* does not become *tamei tum’as neveilah* according to the תנא קמא. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili distinguishes between species, holding that with a *behemah temeiah* he becomes *tamei*, while with a *behemah tehorah* he does not. The Gemara attributes the תנא קמא to Rav Chisda’s *kal vachomer* that if the mother’s *shechitah* can exempt the *ubar* from *shechitah*, then the mother’s being alive can certainly prevent the *ubar* from being *metamei*, and it applies this through a *hekesh* to both *behemah tehorah* and *behemah temeiah*.
- Today's *shiur* defines the סימן of split hooves as *mafrases parsah* and describes it as *holech al shemoneh*, while lack of split hooves is described as *kalut*, *holech al arba*, and *mahalechei kapayim*. Rav Yitzchak derives Rabbi Yosi HaGelili from the pasuk “וכל הולך על כפיו בכל החיה ההלכת על ארבע טמאים הם לכם,” reading it to teach that *mahalechei kapayim* are *tamei* even while in the womb. The Gemara challenges this with cases like *kalut ben parah* and explores reading the pasuk as requiring both fetus and mother to be “*holech al arba*,” then tests the opposite case of an animal with split-hoof fetus inside a non-split-hoof mother, and uses “וכל הולך” to include “לרבות פרה במי גמל” as *tamei*. The Gemara then challenges the remaining case “קלוט במי קלוטה” and answers that even Rabbi Yosi HaGelili relies on Rav Chisda’s *kal vachomer* to keep a *min tehorah* from being *metamei*.
- Rav Shivi bar Ami challenges the framework from the case “חזיר במי חזירתא,” since a pig has split hooves and would not fit *mahalechei kapayim*, yet Rabbi Yosi HaGelili says any *min tamei* fetus-*neveilah* is *metamei*. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak brings a different pasuk, “נפש אשר תגע בכל דבר טמא או בנבלת חיה טמאה או בנבלת בהמה טמאה או בנבלת שרץ טמא,” and the Gemara reads it as teaching specifically an *ubar*: in a *temeiah* species the *ubar* is *metamei tum’as neveilah*, while in a *tehorah* species it is *tahor*. The Gemara asks why Rav Yitzchak is still needed and answers that without Rav Yitzchak one would interpret Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s pasuk entirely as “כולה כדרבי,” and Rav Yitzchak enables using the pasuk for this additional distinction alongside Rabbi’s *derashah*.
- A *baraisa* has Rabbi Yonasan challenge Ben Azzai on how to know that *nevelas chayah tehorah* is *metamei* when the Torah explicitly teaches *nevelas behemah tehorah* and *nevelas behemah/chayah temeiah*. Ben Azzai answers from “בכל הולך על כפיו בכל החיה ההולכת,” and Rabbi Yonasan responds that the wording is “בכל החיה” rather than “ובכל חיה,” tying it instead to another *din* and leaving the question open until Rabbi Yishmael’s method is cited from “וכי ימות מן הבהמה… אשר היא לכם לאכלה,” with “זו בהמה טמאה” and “זו בהמה טהורה,” and the principle that *chayah* and *behemah* are included in each other for *halachic* purposes. Ben Azzai concludes, “חבל על בן עזאי שלא שימש את רבי ישמעאל,” and the *shiur* notes the change from calling him “ישמעאל” to “רבי ישמעאל” after hearing his teaching. Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz, based on Rashi’s “הפסד וחבלה היא בעולם,” teaches that missing words of Torah is a loss not only for the individual but “לעולם,” and in another version that the world benefits from every word a great *talmid chacham* learns and teaches, so a missing *dvar Torah* from such a person is a global loss.
- The *shiur* records the מפרשים’ question why the Torah says both *chayos* and *behemos* left the *teivah* if they are included in each other, and answers that the inclusion is for *halachah* while the *teivah* narrative reports events precisely. The Gemara derives *chayah* included in *behemah* from “זאת הבהמה אשר תאכלו” followed by איל וצבי ויחמור, and *behemah* included in *chayah* from “זאת החיה אשר תאכלו מכל הבהמה אשר על הארץ.” The Gemara applies “חיה טהורה בכלל בהמה טהורה” to the סימנים, “חיה טמאה בכלל בהמה טמאה” to *kilayim*, “בהמה טמאה בכלל חיה טמאה” to Rabbi’s *gezeirah shavah* about *korban oleh v’yored* and *tum’as mikdash v’kodashav*, and “בהמה טהורה בכלל חיה טהורה” to *yetzirah* as used by R’ Meir for the דין of *tum’as leidah* when a woman miscarries a form resembling *behemah chayah v’of*.
- The *shiur* quotes the Mishnah in Niddah that R’ Meir rules a woman who miscarries a form of *behemah chayah v’of* sits *tumas leidah* like a boy or girl if the sex is known, or both if unknown, while the Rabbis say anything lacking *tzuras adam* is not a *vlad*. R’ Meir ties this to the Torah’s use of *yetzirah* by animals and humans, reading it as equating these forms for *tum’as leidah*. The *shiur* brings Rashi’s explanation that “ולרבנן האי קרא למה לי?” refers back to Rabbi Yosi HaGelili’s pasuk and has the Rabbis use it entirely like Rabbi Chama bar Oshaya for Rabbi’s *gezeirah shavah*. The *shiur* brings Tosafos’ objection that the question would have appeared earlier, and Tosafos’ reading that the question is instead about what the Rabbis do with the inclusion “בהמה טהורה בכלל חיה טהורה” given that they reject R’ Meir’s *yetzirah* derivation.
- The Mishnah states that when a woman has a dead fetus in her womb and a midwife inserts her hand and touches it, the midwife becomes *tamei tum’as shivah* like *tum’as meis*, while the woman remains *tehorah* until the fetus exits. Rava explains that just as *tumah beluah* does not transmit *tumah*, so *taharah beluah* does not become *tamei*. The *shiur* cites Rashi describing *tumah beluah* as “כמוכלת,” the Noda BiYehudah reinterpreting Rashi as a rule like digestion rather than factual digestion, the Rosh explaining *bitul* to the person, and the Chazon Ish explaining that *tumah* transmission reflects a כוח that does not operate when the item is *beluah*.
- The Gemara seeks a source for *tumah beluah* from the law of one who eats *nevelas of tahor* becoming *tamei*, with Rashi explaining a case of swallowing without chewing near sunset, immersing, and becoming *tahor* at nightfall despite the undigested piece inside. The Gemara suggests the reason could be “דלא חזי לגר,” and the discussion depends on Rabbi Yochanan’s view that *tumah* remains until it is not fit for a dog, versus Bar Pada’s framework distinguishing *tumah chamurah* and *tumah kalah*. The Gemara answers that although it is not fit for a *ger* in front of him, it can be fit when unseen, so the lack of transmission comes from *tumah beluah*. The *shiur* connects this to the subjectivity of *bal teshaktzu* and cites the Shu”t Machzeh Avraham that once something is established as *ma’us* to people, an individual’s claim that it is not disgusting is “בטלה דעתו אצל כל אדם,” while the Gemara’s case is one where it is not established as *ma’us*.
- The Gemara asks for the source of *taharah beluah* and derives it via *kal vachomer* from a sealed earthenware vessel, *kli cheres mukaf tzamid pasil*, which protects its pure contents from becoming *tamei* even though it does not protect *tumah* inside it from spreading, as in *tumah retzutzah* where it “בוקע ועולה לרקיע.” The Gemara argues that since a person protects against *tumah beluah* from spreading, he should certainly protect *taharah beluah* from becoming *tamei*. The Gemara challenges the comparison because *kli cheres* is not *metamei* from its outside, while a person can become *tamei* from outside, and answers that the discussion is about “מתוכו,” where *kli cheres* is more stringent because it is *metamei b’aviro*.
- The Gemara distinguishes *beluah* “דלמעלה” from *beluah* “דלמטה” and uses *kal vachomer* reasoning tied to digestion, then concludes “אפילו הכי עיכול דלמטה רב,” treating the lower area as a stronger digestion domain. The *shiur* cites the Maharshal (as presented as מהרש״ם in the *shiur*) applying this to the question of whether intravenous feeding is considered eating on Yom Kippur, using the Gemara’s framing that only normal eating is “אכילה.” The Gemara then asks for *beluah* in animals and derives it by *kal vachomer* that if אדם, who can become *tamei* while alive, is protected by *beluah*, then *behemah*, which does not generate *tumah* while alive, should certainly be protected.
- The Gemara challenges the animal *kal vachomer* by arguing that אדם requires *shehiyah* in a *bayis hamenuga* for his clothing to become *tamei*, while a בהמה would render carried items *tamei* immediately, and answers that the immediacy applies to items carried, and the Mishnah teaches that a person carrying כליּם becomes *tamei* immediately as well, while clothing worn stays *tahor* until “כדי אכילת פרס.” The *shiur* explains that an animal’s coverings retain independent status like carrying, whereas a person’s worn clothing becomes *batel* to him. The *shiur* brings the Beis HaLevi’s question about who should enter first when one carries *tallis u’tefillin* and one wears them, and presents the reasoning that carried items retain חשיבות, alongside the distinction that active *mitzvah* performance like carrying *bikkurim* differs from merely wearing *tzitzis*. The *shiur* cites the Rokeach permitting a כהן’s pregnant wife to enter a cemetery based on a *safek sefeika*, brings questions raised from *tumah beluah*, and offers explanations including a near-birth case, the distinction between the prohibition of becoming *tamei* and the prohibition to enter *ohel hameis*, and a view that *tumah beluah* could be *tamei mid’rabbanan*. The *shiur* notes a common custom for pregnant women to avoid cemeteries and cites the Minchas Yitzchak tying it to the preparations for the *parah adumah* service and the hope that a child might merit participating when *Mashiach* comes.
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