Chulin 69
Summary
- Today's שיעור on מסכת חולין דף ס"ט begins from דף ס"ח עמוד ב' רבא מתני הכי and continues the דין of בן פקועה, where שחיטת האם is effective for the fetus, while clarifying that a limb that extended outside becomes אסור even if it later returned before שחיטה. The sugya presents a מערבא version framing the מחלוקת רב ורבי יוחנן as יש לידה לאיברים versus אין לידה לאיברים and develops multiple נפקא מינות, including majority-versus-minority portions of a limb, repeated partial יציאות that add up to רוב, and cases of cutting off protruding parts. Later questions test whether other halachic מחיצות like עזרה or ירושלים matter, whether שחיטת סימן ראשון and סימן שני combine when the fetus’s status changes between them, and what consequences follow for offspring and for milk, ending with a תיקו. The sugya then derives the permissibility of a cut-off piece of fetus through pesukim like בבהמה בבהמה and אותה שלמה ולא חסורה, challenges that derivation from תמורה and from דמות יונה, and returns to whether the fetus is treated as a בהמה or merely included by a ribui, leaving the conceptual underpinning contested.
- Today's material assumes the משנה’s rule that a fetus found in the womb at the time of שחיטה is permitted through the mother’s שחיטה, and it reiterates רב’s ruling that a limb that extended becomes אסור whether it remained outside or returned inside before שחיטה. The earlier challenges in the גמרא do not overturn רב, and a ברייתא ultimately establishes רב’s position even against the initial implication of עולא and רבי יוחנן. The sugya then shifts to a different presentation of the dispute and uses it to refine how far the איסור of an extended limb reaches.
- The מערבא version states רב אמר יש לידה לאיברים and רבי יוחנן אמר אין לידה לאיברים, treating a protruding limb as either having a דין לידה or not. According to רש"י, מאי בינייהו asks for the practical difference between earlier wording that simply declared the limb אסור and this formulation in terms of לידה, and the answer is a case of מיעוט איבר שבפנים where רוב of the limb protruded and a minority remained inside. The explanation concludes that the “לידה” framing yields following רוב so that even the inside minority becomes אסור when רוב protruded, and the צל"ח suggests the opposite configuration might imply a קולא but calls it להלכה ולא למעשה.
- Most ראשונים reject understanding the sugya as leaving רבי יוחנן with a lenient view that a returned limb is permitted, because the earlier refutation means רבי יוחנן ultimately agrees with רב that the extended limb is אסור. They explain that the remaining מחלוקת is whether only the portion that actually protruded is אסור, as רבי יוחנן holds, or whether the entire limb is drawn into the איסור, as רב holds, including the part that remained inside.
- The sugya asks, according to the view אין להן לאברים, whether repeated events of הוציא והחזירה can be combined עד שהוציא רובו to create a דין of רובו and alter the permissibility of the fetus via the mother’s שחיטה, or whether כיון דהדר הדר resets each event. It notes that applying רוב here is striking because the “רוב” is not present in one continuous emergence, yet the question treats separate episodes as potentially cumulative. The continuation asks, if returning resets, what happens when each protrusion is חתכה until the cut-off parts “complete” רוב, and it asks whether רוב must occur בבת אחת.
- עקיבא איגר explains that the second question, involving חתכה, is not only according to רבי יוחנן but applies even according to רב, because רב treats what went out as definitively out. He argues this makes it more plausible that the משנה’s זה הכלל addresses the second scenario rather than the first, since otherwise the משנה would not resolve a dilemma relevant to רב. He further asserts that once the second case is resolved, the first case where parts were not cut off but returned inside should certainly leave what was never outside as מותר.
- The גמרא rejects using זה הכלל to resolve the cutting-and-רוב scenario and instead says it comes to teach קלוט בן פרה. The sugya positions the משנה as following רבי שמעון, who holds קלוט בן פרה אסור when it יצא לאוויר העולם, but the משנה teaches that while it remains במעי אמו it is שרי even without סימני כשרות. The conclusion ties the כלל to the distinction between birth into the world and remaining in the womb.
- The sugya explains that רב’s strictness is anchored in ובשר בשדה טריפה, treating خروج ממחיצה as generating איסור, and it tests whether alternative halachic מחיצות could alter that. רבי חנניה asks about הוציא עובר את ידו בעזרה and whether the עזרה walls, a מחיצה for קדשים, function as a מחיצה here so that returning before שחיטה would permit it. The framing assumes a קרבן שלמים context, since other offerings do not fit the case, and אביי responds that one should then also ask about קדשים קלים בירושלים, since ירושלים’s walls govern eating, but the גמרא answers that for this sugya מחיצת עובר אמו היא and neither ירושלים nor עזרה changes the דין.
- אילפא asks about הוציא עובר את ידו בין סימן לסימן and whether סימן ראשון and סימן שני combine to remove טומאת נבילה when the fetus’s status changes between the two cuts. The analysis distinguishes between the first סימן accomplishing both אכילה and טהרה for what is inside, while the second cut cannot permit the protruded limb for eating even though it may affect טומאה. רבא answers with a קל וחומר that if the two סימנים combine to permit אכילה, they certainly combine to effect טהרה מידי נבילה, and this logic is linked to the earlier application on דף לג עמוד ב regarding a change occurring between the two סימנים.
- רבי ירמיה asks מה הלכה לזרעו and the גמרא rejects treating it as the standard case of בן פקועה הבא על בהמה מעלייתא because that already yields the known result הולד אין לו תקנה. The sugya attributes to רב משרשיא that in אותו ואת בנו לדברי הכל חוששין לזרע האב, and it presents approaches among ראשונים that view the no-תקנה case through models like שחיטת סימנים failing due to שהייה or due to incomplete שחיטה of each סימן. The discussion rejects framing it as זה וזה גורם by explaining that the issue is not איסור והיתר but whether the animal is of a type מחויב בשחיטה or not, and it links this to the conceptual question whether בן פקועה is permitted because the mother’s שחיטה works for it or because it is not in the category requiring שחיטה.
- The gmarah sets the case as דאזל בן פקועה דכוותיה and asks whether אבר מוליד אבר so that the prohibited limb “reproduces” its counterpart, or whether מבטל זרע and the seed is mixed throughout such that the איסור permeates more broadly. The sugya rejects the limb-to-limb model by arguing it would imply סומא יוליד סומא and קטיע יוליד קטיע, and it concludes פשיטא דמבלבל זרע. The question then shifts to why normal animal generation is not problematic despite contributions from חלב and דם, and it explores whether adding a third “factor” changes the calculus before redirecting the entire inquiry.
- The sugya concludes that the real question becomes מהו למימץ חלבה, whether one may drink the milk of such a בן פקועה that has an אסור limb due to protrusion. It contrasts ordinary milk, which is permitted despite its “live” source, with this case where the problematic limb has no תקנת שחיטה because the animal is not subject to effective שחיטה in the usual way, and it leaves the issue unresolved with a תיקו. The later commentary records disputes about applying ביטול בששים to milk in this scenario, with the ב"ח allowing when the prohibited limb is less than ששים, the פרישה arguing uncertainty about which organs generate milk forces stringency, and the משנה למלך citing a מרדכי that ביטול does not apply when the mixture exists מתחילת ברייתו.
- The sugya derives that if one cuts from the fetus in the womb, the piece is permitted when the mother is slaughtered, from the verse using בבהמה בבהמה לרבות את הולד. It challenges this by arguing that if the fetus is a “בהמה,” then תמורה should apply, yet the משנה in תמורה teaches אין תמורה לא באיברים ולא בעוברים, so the gmarah proposes instead that וכל בהמה is a ribui including the fetus for permissibility without declaring it a full “בהמה” for other laws. It then asks why that ribui would not also permit cut-off spleen or kidneys of the mother and answers with אותה, allowing only the mother when it is whole, שלמה ולא חסורה, leaving detached maternal organs forbidden.
- The gmarah asks why the ribui would not permit a fetus found as דמות יונה, given רבי יוחנן’s ruling that it is אסור באכילה, and it answers that permission requires פרסות וליכא. It then questions why a dog-like fetus in a cow would not be permitted, and it answers with the teaching of the תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל כרבי שמעון בן יוחי from פרסות בבהמה תאכלו. The sugya records that most ראשונים treat appearance as decisive, with “dove-like” appearance forbidding and animal-like appearance permitting regardless of actual hoof details, while other ראשונים make hooves the determinant so that absence of hooves forbids even if animal-like and presence of hooves could permit even if bird-like.
- רב שימי בר אשי restores the original reading that the fetus is considered included via בהמה בבהמה and resolves the תמורה difficulty by assigning that משנה to רבי שמעון, who מקיש תמורה למעשר, and therefore just as מעשר is not נוהג באברים ובעוברים, so too תמורה is not. The sugya attempts to prove the תמורה משנה is רבי שמעון from רבי יוסי’s argument that since one who is מקדיש a limb can render the whole animal קדוש, a limb-substitution should make a valid תמורה, and it ties the underlying dispute to whether the whole becomes קדוש from a limb declaration. The gmarah rejects the proof by stating רבי יוסי טעמא דנפשיה קאמר, leaving unresolved whether lack of תמורה for an עובר proves it is not a “בהמה” or proves only a comparison to מעשר, and it ends by stating that this uncertainty bears directly on why a fetus does not require שחיטה, whether due to בהמה בבהמה treating it as a בהמה or due to a ribui like וכל that grants exemption without redefining its status.
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