Chulin 68
Summary
- Today's *shiur* on Maseches Chullin Daf 68 begins the new *perek* with the core law of a Ben Pekuah, a fetus found in its mother after the mother is slaughtered, which is edible without its own *shechitah* *m’De’oraisa*. The *shiur* frames a key question in the *Acharonim* about whether the fetus is exempt from *shechitah* or is considered to have received *shechitah* via the mother, and it explains why the *perek* still connects to *hilchos treifos* because there are cases where part of the fetus is permitted and part is forbidden. The *Mishnah* and *Gemara* analyze a fetus that extends a limb or its head from the womb, the status of the limb and the fetus, the meaning of “ובשר בשדה טרפה לא תאכלו,” and the ramifications for *tum’ah*, with a major dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan that ends with Rabbi Yochanan’s view being refuted. The *shiur* then uses the Gemara’s rule “מה טריפה כיון שנטרפה שוב אין לה היתר” to raise broader questions about whether a *treifah* can ever be “healed,” and it closes with how *poskim* distinguish animal *treifos* from human cases, including a practical question of *yibum* and *chalitzah* after a tragedy.
- A Ben Pekuah is a fetus found in the womb after the mother is slaughtered, and it is permitted without its own *shechitah* at least *m’De’oraisa*. A dispute appears in the background about when there is a *chiyuv shechitah*, but the baseline presented is that a Ben Pekuah has no *chiyuv shechitah*. The *shiur* raises an issue discussed by the *Acharonim* about whether “no *shechitah* needed” means an exemption from the Torah’s requirement or that the mother’s *shechitah* counts as the fetus’s *shechitah*.
- The Meiri asks why this *perek* begins while *hilchos treifos* still continue, and he answers that when a fetus extends a limb, that limb loses the Ben Pekuah *heter* and a situation emerges where part is permitted and part is forbidden. The *shiur* compares this to the earlier case of meat with worms, where the worms are treated as *eiver min hachai* and the *heter shechitah* does not permit them. The continuation of the *Mishnah* is presented as fitting because it teaches cases where the *heter* applies to one part but not another.
- The *Mishnah* opens with “בהמה המקשה לילד,” and the *shiur* offers explanations that labor is when limbs typically protrude, that protrusion indicates labor is imminent, and that even if protrusion occurs during labor and is retracted it is still halachically significant. The *Mishnah* rules that if the fetus extends its hand and retracts it, “מותר באכילה,” while if it extends its head, even if it retracts it, “הרי זה כילוד.” The *shiur* states that most *Rishonim* hold that full emergence of the head is not required, the forehead is enough, and many say even most of the forehead suffices.
- The Rosh Yosef infers significance from the wording shift between “מותר באכילה” and “הרי זה כילוד,” explaining that when the head emerges the fetus is permitted via its own *shechitah* because it is treated as independently born. The *shiur* adds that when only a limb emerges, part of the fetus is permitted but that limb is not, so the *Mishnah* avoids language that could imply the fetus is treated as a normal born animal. The *shiur* states that doing *shechitah* on such a fetus cannot permit the protruded limb because the *shechitah* is meaningless where there is no obligation and cannot fix a limb that requires *shechitah* while the rest does not.
- The *Mishnah* rules that if part of the fetus is cut while still in the womb, it is permitted to eat both the fetus and the cut piece. The *Mishnah* contrasts this with cutting off the spleen or kidneys of the mother, which makes those parts forbidden even after *shechitah*, though the animal itself remains permitted because these specific organs do not render it a *treifah*. The *Mishnah* formulates a rule that something “שבגופה” that is removed without making the animal a *treifah* leaves the remaining animal permitted but the removed organ forbidden, while something “אינו שבגופה” in the fetus context allows even the removed fetal part if it never emerged.
- Rav Yehudah says in the name of Rav that the limb itself is forbidden, so once a limb exits the womb it remains permanently forbidden even if retracted before the mother’s *shechitah*. The Gemara grounds this in “ובשר בשדה טרפה לא תאכלו,” explaining that once flesh exits its boundary it becomes forbidden. The *shiur* gives one approach that “בשדה” is extra and teaches this law beyond ordinary *treifah*, and it cites Sefer *Haksav VeHakabbalah* that *treifah* denotes an abnormal condition, and partial emergence is abnormal because the offspring should emerge all at once.
- The *shiur* connects this to the rule that *kodshim* taken outside their proper boundaries become disqualified, explaining that both laws share the idea of something being out of its proper place. Divrei Moshe presents a dispute among *Rishonim* about why the protruded limb remains forbidden, with some classifying it as *eiver min hachai* and others as *treifah*. The *shiur* explains that the *eiver min hachai* approach fits the view that the mother’s *shechitah* helps the fetus but not the limb, while the *treifah* approach treats the mother’s *shechitah* as effective for the limb too and introduces a new disqualification labeling it *treifah*.
- The *shiur* links the above dispute to a major Rambam–Raavad disagreement about a case where the fetus protrudes a limb, retracts it, and is later born. The Raavad allows slaughtering and eating the born animal, while the Rambam forbids it because the limb’s emergence renders it a *treifah* forever. The *shiur* attributes the disagreement to whether the prohibition is framed as *eiver min hachai* (which would not apply once the animal is properly slaughtered) or as *treifah* (which persists).
- The Gemara challenges Rav from the *Mishnah*’s “מותר באכילה,” and it answers that the permission refers to the fetus, not the protruded limb. The Gemara then asks why the *Mishnah* specifies “והחזירו” if the fetus is permitted regardless, and it initially answers that the wording is carried over because the *seifa* needs it for “הוציא את ראשו אף על פי שהחזירו הרי זה כילוד.” The Gemara then questions why the *seifa* is needed because a *Mishnah* in Bechoros already establishes that emergence of the head constitutes birth, and it explores why one might distinguish humans from animals and rejects that distinction based on earlier teachings about *shilya*.
- The Gemara resolves the need for “והחזירו” by explaining that it is needed for “מקום חתך.” The *shiur* explains that if the limb remains outside, not only is the limb forbidden but the attachment area is forbidden, while if it is retracted the limb remains forbidden but the attachment area becomes permitted. The *shiur* reports explanations that this depends on “בשר בשדה” being visible meat or that it is a *gezeiras hakasuv* without further reasoning.
- A *beraisa* states that if the fetus’s hand is extended and retracted and then the mother is slaughtered, it is permitted, but if the mother is slaughtered and only afterward the limb is retracted it is forbidden. The *beraisa* also rules that if the limb is extended and cut before slaughter, what is outside is *tamei* as *eiver min hachai* that is *metamei k’neveilah*, while what remains inside is *tahor* because a live animal is not yet food and does not receive *tum’ah*. The *beraisa* adds that if the mother is slaughtered and only afterward the limb is cut, the limb becomes *tamei* and transmits *tum’ah* to the mother because once dead it is food and can receive *tum’ah*.
- Rabbi Meir calls the limb’s status “מגע נבלה,” while the Chachamim call it “טמא מן הטרפה,” and the *shiur* states the major difference that *neveilah* is *metamei* *m’De’oraisa* while *treifah* is not *metamei* *m’De’oraisa* and is only *metamei kodshim*. The Gemara again interprets the *beraisa* as speaking about the fetus’s permissibility and locates the practical difference in “מקום חתך.”
- A further *beraisa* derives from the Torah’s language “פרסה” and “פרסותיה” and is initially read as implying that if the hoof is retracted one may eat the hoof, and if not retracted one may only eat the fetus. The Gemara redirects this to “מקום חתך” again, and it asks why two verses are needed. The Gemara answers that one is for “מקום חתך” and the other is for “לקולט במעי פרה,” applying to Rabbi Shimon’s rule that if a kosher mother gives birth to an offspring lacking split hooves it is forbidden when born normally, but Rabbi Shimon agrees that a fetus found in the womb after slaughter is permitted even if it lacks split hooves.
- Rabbi Yochanan rules that the limb itself is permitted if it is retracted before slaughter, and Rav Yehudah challenges this by noting that both Rav and Shmuel prohibit it. The *shiur* cites the Lev Aryeh that Shmuel’s agreement matters here because Rabbi Yochanan is being pressed with the combined weight of both authorities. Rabbi Yochanan responds “מאן יהיב לן מעפר דרב ושמואל ומלינן עיננא,” and the *shiur* offers that this expresses deep respect for them and also conveys that Torah requires open-eyed pursuit of truth rather than closing one’s eyes due to authority.
- Rabbi Yochanan argues that “ובשר בשדה טרפה לא תאכלו” creates a general rule, but only by *chatas* does the Torah specify that once it leaves its boundary and returns it remains forbidden, while other things become permitted upon returning. The Gemara challenges this using a teaching that contrasts *maaser sheini* and *bikkurim*, which become permitted if they return after leaving, and derives from “טרפה” that the case at hand is like a *treifah* that never regains permissibility. Rava states the principle that just as a *treifah* once it becomes *treifah* has no further *heter*, so too flesh that exits its boundary has no further *heter*, and the Gemara concludes “תיובתא דעולא תיובתא,” rejecting Rabbi Yochanan’s permissive ruling.
- The *shiur* highlights the Gemara’s assertion that a *treifah* never regains permissibility and relates it to the Chazon Ish’s position that even if medically an animal could heal, once Chazal categorized it as *treifah* it remains so. The *shiur* raises the problem from the prior *perek* where a lung perforation is *treifah* yet if the ribs close the hole it is kosher, and it records answers that healing by human intervention differs from recovery occurring by itself *min hashamayim*, that closure indicates it was never truly a hole, or that the “no recovery” rule is limited to specific *treifos* such as *derusah* which is the primary model in the verse. The *shiur* adds that *poskim* apply “כיון שנטרפה שוב אין לו רפואה” to animals and not to people, and it recounts a question from a pogrom case about whether a mortally wounded child counts as already dead for purposes of obligating the mother in *yibum* or *chalitzah*, concluding that most *poskim* are lenient.
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