Zevachim 46
Summary
- Today's *shiur* on Zevachim 46a begins from "חוץ מן הדם" and explains why *dam* is excluded from *notar* and *tumah* even though *ein issur chal al issur* would seemingly make that exclusion unnecessary, with answers such as cooked blood not being under the usual blood prohibition and a case where *dam* and *notar/tamei* arrive simultaneously at *bar/bat mitzvah*. The *Gemara* then derives that there is no *me’ilah* in blood from multiple *pesukim* and from the principle that once a *mitzvah* is completed there is no *me’ilah*, while addressing the apparent counterexample of *terumat ha-deshen* and resolving it through rules of *shnei ketuvim ha-ba’im ke-echad* and special limiting exclusions. The sugya then allocates the multiple *pesukim* about blood to exclude *me’ilah*, *notar*, and *tumah*, explains why *piggul* does not apply to blood because blood is a *matir*, and analyzes the three *karet* verses about eating *kodashim* in *tumah* to derive scope disputes, including a *machloket* between Rabbi Shimon and the *Chachamim* about inedible parts and inner-altar offerings. The section closes with the foundational *Mishnah* of “לשם ששה דברים הזבח נזבח,” its core versus secondary *machshavot*, Rabbi Yosi’s view that lack of explicit intention still leaves the offering *kasher* due to a *tenai beit din*, and subsequent *Gemara* applications to improper intentions such as roasting limbs or slaughtering a *chatat* for an *olah* versus for *chullin*.
- Today's text states that the *Mishnah* excludes *dam* from the prohibitions of *notar* and *tamei*, and *mefarshim* ask why *dam* would ever be included given *ein issur chal al issur* because blood is already prohibited. One answer says that cooked blood, *dam she-bishlo*, is not included in the blood prohibition, so the *Mishnah* teaches that even then *notar* and *tumah* do not apply to *dam*. Another answer presents a case where a boy or girl becomes *bar/bat mitzvah* on a day when the blood is already *notar* or *tamei*, so both prohibitions would arrive together, and the *Mishnah* teaches that *notar* and *tumah* still do not apply to *dam*.
- The *Gemara* returns to a *Mishnah* in Me’ilah that teaches *me’ilah* does not apply to *dam*, and it records that many *Rishonim* limit that to the *de’oraita* level while still holding a *derabbanan* prohibition of benefit from blood of *kodashim*, while other *Rishonim* understand the *Gemara* to remove even a *derabbanan* *me’ilah*. Ulla derives the exclusion from “ואני נתתיו לכם,” reading “שלכם יהא” so there is no prohibition of benefit and no *me’ilah* in the blood. The school of Rabbi Yishmael derives it from “לכפר,” teaching that blood is given for *kapparah* and not for *me’ilah*.
- Rabbi Yoḥanan derives from “כי הדם הוא בנפש יכפר” that the extra “הוא” equates blood before *kapparah* and after *kapparah*, so just as after *zerikah* there is no *me’ilah*, so too before *zerikah* there is no *me’ilah*. The *Gemara* challenges that the *hekesh* could be learned the other way to impose *me’ilah* even after *kapparah*, and it rejects that because “אין לך דבר שנעשית מצותו ומעלים בו.” The *Gemara* challenges from *terumat ha-deshen*, where the ash remains prohibited in benefit after removal and placement near the ramp before absorption, and many *Rishonim* explain that the term *me’ilah* there means *assur be-hana’ah* rather than actual *me’ilah*. Tosafot limits this continuing prohibition to the *terumat ha-deshen* of the outer altar, while ash removed from the inner altar is subject to the rule that once the *mitzvah* is completed there is no *me’ilah*.
- The *Gemara* answers that *terumat ha-deshen* and the Yom Kippur *bigdei kohen gadol* are *shnei ketuvim ha-ba’im ke-echad*, and the rule is “אין מלמדין,” so the continuing prohibition after completion is confined to those places. It frames this as working for the *Rabbanan* who learn from “והניחם שם” that the garments require *genizah*, are prohibited in benefit, and may not be reused, but it challenges how this works for Rav Dosa who permits them for a regular priest and only forbids using them again for Yom Kippur. It then maintains the *shnei ketuvim* framework by pairing *terumat ha-deshen* with *eglah arufah*, whose calf remains prohibited in benefit after the procedure. It further asks how the exclusion works for the opinion that *shnei ketuvim ha-ba’im ke-echad* do teach, and it answers that “לתרי מיעוטי כתיבי,” using “הערופה” by *eglah arufah* and “ושמו” by *terumat ha-deshen* as limiting terms that restrict the rule to those cases alone.
- The *Gemara* asks why there are three verses about blood and answers that one excludes blood from *me’ilah* while the other two exclude blood from *me’ilah*, *notar*, and *tumah*. It states that no verse is needed to exclude blood from *piggul* because *piggul* applies only where there are *matirin*, and “ודם גופא מתיר,” so blood is a *matir* and not subject to *piggul*.
- The sugya presents three verses teaching *karet* for eating *kodashim* in *tumah*, including one general verse and two verses focused on *shelamim*. Rabbi Yoḥanan asks why there are three *karet* verses in *shelamim*, and the answer is “אחת לכלל ואחת לפרט,” applying “כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ללמד” so that *shelamim* teach that the *tumah* eating liability applies to *kodshei mizbe’aḥ* and not to *kodshei bedek ha-bayit*. Tosafot notes that when verses are adjacent the method is *klal u-ferat u-khlal*, but when they are not adjacent the method is “כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל.”
- The third verse is used to include “דברים שאינן נאכלים,” making one liable for eating inedible parts while *tamei* according to the *Chachamim*. For Rabbi Shimon, who holds “דברים שאינן נאכלים אין חייבין עליהם משום טומאה,” the third verse comes “לסיויי חטאת הפנימיות,” teaching that inner *chatta’ot* are subject to *tumah* laws. The *Gemara* explains that Rabbi Shimon would otherwise analogize from his view that *piggul* is learned from *shelamim* and therefore limited to outer-altar offerings, and would likewise think *tumah* liability is limited, so the verse teaches that *tumah* applies even to offerings brought on the inner altar.
- The *Gemara* records two pairs of *Amoraim* and two formulations of their dispute about how far the Rabbi Shimon versus *Chachamim* disagreement extends. One formulation says the dispute is only about *tum’at basar* of inedible items, while regarding *tum’at ha-guf* everyone agrees there is no *malkot*, and the other says the dispute applies in both *tum’at basar* and *tum’at ha-guf*. Another tradition in the name of Rav Masna through Rav Kahana says everyone agrees the *Chachamim* impose liability in both cases, and the *Amoraim* dispute is only how to read Rabbi Shimon, whether he exempts only in *tum’at ha-guf* or exempts in both cases. Rava sides with the view that Rabbi Shimon exempts in both cases for inedible items because the relevant verses are not read to include them under “וטומאתו עליו ונכרתה” or “והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל.”
- The *Gemara* challenges Rabbi Shimon’s exemption from the teaching “הבשר לרבות עצים ולבונה,” which extends *tumah* to wood and frankincense and supports *ḥibbat ha-kodesh* making *kodashim* susceptible even without *hechsher*. It answers “לפסולה בעלמא,” and most *Rishonim* understand this as an *asmachta* and only *derabbanan*, while others understand that Rabbi Shimon agrees to a *de’oraita* disqualification without punishment such as *malkot* or *karet*.
- The *Mishnah* states “לשם ששה דברים הזבח נזבח” and lists intentions: לשם זבח, לשם זובח, לשם השם, לשם אישים, לשם ריח, and לשם ניחוח, and it distinguishes between bringing to Hashem and bringing for *niḥo’aḥ*. It reiterates that the first two intentions are crucial, that *shinui kodesh* or *shinui ba’alim* affects validity with special severity for *chatat* and *pesach*, and that the other four intentions are not as crucial. It states that לשם זבח applies to all four *avodot*—*shechitah*, *kabbalah*, *holachah*, and *zerikah*—while לשם זובח is primarily by *zerikah*, with Tosafot noting cases where earlier steps are done for the sake of a later *zerikah* for another owner. It attributes to most *Rishonim* that the requirement applies across the core *avodot* and even to *haktarah* though less crucial, and it attributes to the Rambam that these intentions are not needed for *haktarah*.
- Rabbi Yosi rules that even without having intent for any of these, the offering is *kasher* because it is a *tenai beit din* and “אין מחשבה הולכת אלא אחר עובד,” and the explanation given is that reliance is on the *kohen* performing the *avodah* and that avoiding articulated intentions prevents errors. The text presents approaches that distinguish between *mitzvot tzrichot kavvanah* and the deeper requirement of *lishmah*, attributes to R. Baruch Ber the distinction between general intent for a *mitzvah* and *lishmah*, and offers an approach that one should have the proper intent internally while avoiding verbal articulation because, as attributed to Rashi and Tosafot, only expressed improper intent disqualifies. It also brings a teaching from Tiferet Shlomo reading “אין מחשבה הולכת אלא אחר עובר” as describing intrusive thoughts that arise when one begins to pray, and it cites an argument against offering sacrifices nowadays based on the requirement of *niḥo’aḥ* alongside “ולא אריח בריח ניחוחכם,” asserting that in exile the intent of *niḥo’aḥ* cannot be meaningful.
- Rav Yehudah in the name of Rav derives from “עולה” that an *olah* must be offered *lishmah* and not as a *shelamim*. He derives from “אשים” that the intent must be for burning on the altar and not as mere roasting. He derives from “ריח” to exclude bringing limbs that were roasted first, and it cites a dispute where the Tashbetz deems such a case *pasul* and the Ḥazon Ish deems it *kasher*, while the Minḥat Ḥinukh and the Ḥatam Sofer say salting is not treated as roasting here despite “מליח כרותח.” The text reports Rav Yehudah in Rav that “איברים שצלאן והעלן” are not “משום ריח,” and it explains “ניחוח” as “לשם הנחת רוח” and “לשם מי שאמר והיה העולם.”
- Rav Yehudah in the name of Rav rules that a *chatat* slaughtered *shelo lishmah* for an *olah* is disqualified, while slaughtered for *chullin* is *kasher*. Rabbi Elazar explains Rav’s reason from “ולא יחללו את קדשי בני ישראל,” teaching that *kodashim* can profane *kodashim* through an improper sacred designation, but *chullin* intent does not profane *kodesh*. Rava challenges from Rabbi Yosi’s rule that lacking any of the listed intentions is *kasher* due to *tenai beit din*, inferring that an intent *leshem chullin* would be *pasul*. Abaye answers that the *Mishnah* can mean that no intent at all makes the offering *kasher u-meratzeh*, while an intent *leshem chullin* leaves it *kasher* but “אין מרוצה,” and the text leaves open what “אין מרוצה” implies regarding whether the owner must bring another offering or whether doing so would raise *chullin ba-azarah* concerns.
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