Megilah 29
Summary
- Shas Illuminated presents a shiur by Rabbi Aaron Sorscher on Megillah 29a, dedicated by Mr. and Mrs. Yossi Taub *l’zechus* *refuah sheleimah* Moshe Nachman ben Malka Miriam. Rabbi Sorscher explains the *din* of being *mevatlin talmud Torah* for *hotza’as hameis* and *hachnasas kallah*, the measure of *kol tzorko* for a *levayah*, and the special status of one who teaches others. Rabbi Sorscher then presents a dispute among the *Rishonim* whether the *bitul Torah* is optional or obligatory, and a later dispute whether the concept is rooted in *kevod haTorah* or in the general rule of a *mitzvah* that cannot be done by others. Rabbi Sorscher continues with the *Gemara’s* teaching that the *Shechinah* accompanies *Klal Yisrael* in exile through *batei knessiyos* and *batei midrashos*, the halachic status of the *kedushah* of a *beis haknesses*, and the apparent contradiction about Abaye’s practice of where to learn and where to daven and its resolutions. Rabbi Sorscher then explains the Mishnah of the *arba parshiyos*, contrasts approaches to the purpose of Parshas Shekalim and Parshas HaChodesh, and gives an extended analysis of Parshas Zachor as a possible *chiyuv d’Oraisa*, including the question of reading from a *sefer Torah*, the timing of the obligation, village practice, and women’s obligation. Rabbi Sorscher closes with the question of Parshas Parah as *d’Oraisa*, the textual history behind that claim, and suggested sources for such an obligation in later authorities.
- A Baraisa states that one interrupts Torah learning for *hotza’as hameis* and *hachnasas kallah*, and a report says that Rabbi Yehudah bar Ilai did so. A limitation states that this applies when they lack *kol tzorko*, but when *kol tzorko* is present one does not interrupt. A measure for *kol tzorko* at a *levayah* is given as twelve thousand men and six thousand shofaros, and another view states *k’nesinasah kach netilasah*, requiring six hundred thousand like the giving of the Torah. A distinction limits that measure to one who *kari v’tani*, while for one who teaches others there is no fixed measure and everyone should come.
- The Rosh and the Ran, here and in Kesubos, bring a view that interrupting Torah learning here is a *reshus*, allowing one to continue learning instead. They cite as proof that the *Gemara* treats Rabbi Yehudah bar Ilai’s behavior as a *chiddush*, which would be unnecessary if it were obligatory, and they cite the earlier *Gemara* that says *meis mitzvah* is preferable to Torah learning, implying that only *meis mitzvah* clearly overrides Torah learning. They explain that the *Gemara* implies a sliding scale in which permission to interrupt for an ordinary *meis* indicates an obligation for *meis mitzvah*.
- The Rosh and the Ran argue that the *din* is a *chiyuv* and not a *reshus*. The Ran explains that the story of Rabbi Yehudah bar Ilai serves as a *ma’aseh rav* confirming the halachah. The Rosh explains that one might think the obligation applies only to someone who is not *toraso umnaso*, but the report teaches that even Rabbi Yehudah bar Ilai, whose Torah is his full occupation, interrupts for these needs. They answer the *meis mitzvah* proof by saying the earlier passage was focused on *meis mitzvah* but includes other cases as well, and the *poskim* rule that the obligation applies.
- The Tur Even and the Rishon LeTzion of the Or HaChaim explain that interrupting Torah learning for a Torah scholar’s funeral is justified because *kevod haTorah* is greater than Torah learning, and they connect this to the requirement of large attendance for one who *kari v’tani* or has taught others. Rabbi Sorscher asks how *hachnasas kallah* fits this model and suggests, based on Rashi in Kesubos 8a about the berachah *shehakol bara lichvodo*, that a wedding gathering is an *asifah* that constitutes *kevod haMakom* because it recalls Hashem’s *chesed* in giving Chavah to Adam and the crowd comes to do *gemilus chasadim*.
- The Tur Even raises that *meis mitzvah* overrides Torah learning even when the deceased is not connected to Torah, showing the rule is not limited to *kevod haTorah*. The *Rishonim* also speak of a reduced *k’dei tzorko* for one who is *lo kari v’lo tani*, requiring only a minimal number such as ten, where *kevod haTorah* is not relevant. The Netziv in Meromei Sadeh therefore explains that the rule follows the general principle that if one is learning and a *mitzvah* arises that cannot be done by others, one interrupts learning to perform it, and the *chiddush* is that *hotza’as hameis* and *hachnasas kallah* are established as obligatory *mitzvos* in that framework.
- Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai teaches that *Klal Yisrael* is beloved before the Holy One, blessed be He, because wherever they go into exile the *Shechinah* is with them. A verse in Yechezkel, *v’ahi lahem l’mikdash me’at*, is applied by Rav Yitzchak to the *batei knessiyos* and *batei midrashos* of Bavel, and Rava expounds *Hashem ma’on atah hayisa lanu* as referring to *batei knessiyos* and *batei midrashos*. The Chafetz Chaim cites *Rishonim* such as the סמ״ג, סמ״ק, and יראים that the *kedushah* of a *beis haknesses* is *d’Oraisa* through *mikdashi tira’u* applying to the *mikdash me’at*, while he cites the Pri Megadim as holding it is *d’Rabbanan* and suggests this may align with the Rambam and Ramban not recording it as *d’Oraisa*. The Mishkenos Yaakov argues that one is obligated to daven in a *beis haknesses* even with a minyan at home because it has the quality of a *Beis HaMikdash* and *hashra’as haShechinah*.
- Abaye says that he originally learned at home and davened in the synagogue, and after hearing *Hashem ahavti me’on beisecha* he learned in the synagogue. The Maharsha notes that Berachos 8 presents an opposite description in which Abaye shifted to davening specifically in the place of learning because Hashem loves *sha’arei Tzion* and because “Hashem has only four cubits of halachah.” The Tur Even explains that the two sources reflect differing positions on whether a *beis haknesses* or a *beis midrash* is the primary locus of *hashra’as haShechinah*. The Netziv reconciles both accounts by saying Abaye first had no fixed *beis midrash* and learned in an ordinary home setting, then began learning in the synagogue because it is a place of *hashra’as haShechinah*, and later acquired a proper fixed learning place (*bei amudei d’garsi*), after which he learned there and eventually davened there as well once he accepted that the place of halachah is the preferred place for prayer.
- The Mishnah states that when Rosh Chodesh Adar falls on Shabbos one reads Parshas Shekalim, and when it falls during the week one reads Shekalim the Shabbos before, then pauses the next Shabbos. The second Shabbos is Zachor, the third is Parah Adumah, and the fourth is *hachodesh hazeh lachem*. These are the four special readings instituted during Adar.
- Rashi explains that Parshas Shekalim is read to announce that people should bring their shekalim in Adar so that offerings on 1 Nisan come from the new funds, and the *Gemara* supports this by connecting the need for *terumah chadashah* in Nisan with advancing the reading so that shekalim arrive at the *Beis HaMikdash*. The Meiri describes the reading as an additional public announcement alongside the Beis Din proclamation in Shekalim, and the Abudraham says that Shekalim, Parah, and HaChodesh were primarily relevant to the *zman haMikdash* and continue now only as *zecher l’mikdash*, unlike Zachor which fulfills the ongoing obligation of remembering Amalek near Purim. The Sefer HaChinuch writes that in the absence of a Mikdash and shekalim, all of Israel reads the section of Ki Sisa yearly in synagogue as a remembrance, presenting the reading as *u’nshalmah parim sefasenu* rather than as an announcement mechanism. The Kaftor VaFerach infers from the Rambam that the Rambam treats the four readings as part of the general institution to read each *mo’ed*’s topic, since the Rambam records the announcement in Hilchos Shekalim but records the special Torah readings only in Hilchos Tefillah.
- The Kaftor VaFerach notes that the *Gemara’s* wording *kadminan v’karinan ki heichi d’leisu shekalim l’mikdash* implies the reading itself serves to prompt bringing shekalim, and the Rashba and Ritva state this explicitly in line with Rashi, the Meiri, and the Abudraham. He adds that Rabbeinu Chananel’s text omits *karinan* and reads only that Beis Din advances the announcement, which fits the approach that the reading is not itself the announcement but is set at that season as a reading of the topic.
- Rashi identifies the fourth reading, *hachodesh hazeh lachem*, as the section that includes Pesach, and the Abudraham says its function is to remind the people about *aliyah la’regel*. The Ran explains the reading as being because of Rosh Chodesh Nisan, and the Levush frames it as *l’kadesh chodesh Nisan* in a non-literal sense. Rabbi Sorscher presents the same split as with Shekalim, with one approach tying the institution to Mikdash-era practical reminders and another treating it as a reading of the season’s core theme such as *kiddush hachodesh*.
- Many *Rishonim* hold that Parshas Zachor is a *chiyuv d’Oraisa* from the verse *zachor es asher asah lecha Amalek*, and they identify the obligation as reading the parashah. Tosafos in Megillah 17b and in Berachos 13a, the Radbaz, the Rashba, and the Rosh in Berachos state that the fulfillment requires reading from a *sefer Torah*. The *Gemara* in Megillah 18a connects the requirement of reading “in a book” through a *gezeirah shavah* and uses the derashah that *zachor* is with the mouth, which these authorities read as indicating an obligation of verbal reading from a written text for Zachor.
- The Rosh in Berachos is understood by the Terumas HaDeshen as implying that a minyan is required *d’Oraisa* for Zachor. The Bris Yosef challenges that inference and later authorities such as Binyan Shlomo and Toras Chesed reject the Terumas HaDeshen’s reading, explaining that the Rosh means the core obligation is *d’Oraisa* without asserting a *d’Oraisa* minyan requirement. The requirement of a *sefer Torah* remains the point those *Rishonim* emphasize.
- The Rambam records the public reading of Zachor among the general Torah reading practices in Hilchos Tefillah without framing it as a unique *mitzvas aseh d’Oraisa*, and he records the *mitzvah* of remembering Amalek in Hilchos Melachim within the laws of waging war against Amalek. The Netziv and the author of *Emek Berachah* infer that the Rambam does not require a *d’Oraisa* reading from a *sefer Torah* for the *mitzvah* of remembrance. The סמ״ג likewise presents the *mitzvah* as remembrance without specifying Torah-scroll reading, and the Sefer HaChinuch describes the obligation as remembering in the heart and saying it with the mouth, presenting the special Shabbos reading as a Jewish practice tied to that *mitzvah* without defining the *d’Oraisa* fulfillment as reading from a scroll.
- The Terumas HaDeshen treats the Zachor reading as a yearly *d’Oraisa* requirement and instructs villagers who can travel only once to prioritize coming for Parshas Zachor over Purim because Megillah is *d’Rabbanan*. Toras Chesed questions the source for an annual requirement and suggests a model of *masruhu hakasuv la’chachamim* in which the Torah leaves details to Chazal and the *d’Oraisa* fulfillment follows the schedule they establish. Some later authorities connect the yearly practice to the idea that the measure of forgetting is a year, and Rabbi Sorscher cites traditions attributed to the Chasam Sofer about being careful in a leap year not to pass the forgetting threshold, alongside a Chasam Sofer responsum stating that the forgetting measure in a leap year aligns with thirteen months and referencing the practice of Bnei Ma’arava who completed the Torah every three years.
- The Magen Avraham defends the village practice by arguing that any Torah reading that recounts Amalek’s attack fulfills *zachor*, including the reading of *vayavo Amalek* in Beshalach. The Mishnah Berurah and Aruch HaShulchan challenge this defense on the ground that Zachor must include the obligation of *timcheh es zecher Amalek*, which is not expressed as Israel’s command in Beshalach but rather as Hashem’s statement *machoh emcheh*. Rabbi Sorscher proposes that if one adopts the model in which the *d’Oraisa* obligation is simply reading the story of Amalek from a scroll, the requirement to include the command of eradication may be part of the rationale rather than the defining content of the reading, leaving room for the Magen Avraham’s approach.
- The Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos defines the remembrance as repeatedly articulating what Amalek did in order to arouse souls to fight him and to strengthen hatred so the command and hatred do not weaken, and he cites the Sifrei that *zachor* is with the mouth and *al tishkach* is in the heart. The Ramban presents an approach that the remembrance is continual national transmission to children and generations so that Amalek is remembered until his name is erased, framing remembrance as bound up with the obligation of eradication. Rabbi Sorscher cites the Brisker Rav that remembrance functions as a component and preparation of the fulfillment of *mechiyas Amalek*, as seen when Shmuel reminds Shaul of Amalek’s deeds before commanding the war. The Sefer HaChinuch exempts women from the *mitzvah* of remembering Amalek because they are not *bnei milchamah*, the Minchas Chinuch challenges that reasoning and questions deriving halachic exemptions from assumed motives, and Rabbi Sorscher suggests the exemption aligns with the view that remembrance is inherently a preparatory element of the war against Amalek, while a model that treats the obligation as a standalone textual reading would more readily imply women’s inclusion. Rabbi Sorscher notes authorities who obligate women in Zachor, including a report in Binyan Tzion בשם Rav Nathan Adler, the responsa of Maharil Diskin, and Toras Chesed’s implications if one assumes an annual *d’Oraisa* reading.
- The Shulchan Aruch records an opinion that both Zachor and Parah are *d’Oraisa*, and the Beis Yosef attributes this to Tosafos in Berachos. Later authorities argue that Parah has no true *d’Oraisa* source and claim the Beis Yosef relied on a mistaken Tosafos text, and they note that standard printed Tosafos mentions only Zachor, leading the Gra, Magen Avraham, Pri Chadash, Sha’arei Ephraim, Maharshal’s gloss, and Lechem Chamudos to reject Parah’s inclusion. Rabbi Sorscher notes that the Parah inclusion appears in multiple *Rishonim* and textual traditions, including the Ritva in Megillah, the Rashba in Berachos, Terumas HaDeshen’s citation of Tosafos, Tosafos of Rabbi Yehudah HeChasid, Tosafos Rabbeinu Peretz, and Tosafos HaRosh, and in recently published manuscript-based versions, making a broad scribal error claim difficult.
- The Aruch HaShulchan derives a continuing obligation from the phrase *chukas olam*, asserting that one instance teaches applicability when ashes exist and a second teaches an obligation even without ashes, fulfilled through reading. The Meshech Chochmah connects Parah to the Yoma derashah from *ka’asher asah bayom hazeh tzivah Hashem la’asos l’chaper aleichem*, where *la’asos* is Parah and *l’chaper* is Yom Kippur, and he links this to the concept that *mikra parashah* is *me’akev* as learned from the Milu’im, implying a *d’Oraisa* requirement of reading for Parah. The Malbim in Artzos HaChayim ties Parah to the verse *zachor al tishkach es asher hiktzafta es Hashem Elokecha bamidbar* and the Sifra pattern of *zachor* being with the mouth, asserting that Parah serves as a remembrance of the sin of the Golden Calf because Parah atones for the Calf and thus provides a vehicle for that verbal remembrance without explicitly recounting the disgrace.
- Shas Illuminated describes itself as a non-profit organization dedicated to broadening *daf* learning worldwide and provides donation and dedication information via shilluminated.org, phone 203-312-SHAS, and email shilluminated@gmail.com.
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