Answer: This is not because Rava doesn't hold of "Rasha" "Rasha", but because, seeing as we can learn the issue of not dividing the Malkos from the Pasuk itself, it is not needed.

Question #1: And in 'Eilu Na'aros' (Kesuvos, Daf 35a & 35b) , where Resh Lakish, in connection with 'Chayvei Malkiyos plus something else', said that ' "The Torah explicitly equates Chayvei Malkiyos with Chayvei Misos". Where? Abaye says "Rasha" "Rasha", Rava "Makeh" "Makeh" ...

Question #1 (cont.): There it is clear that Rava does not Darshen "Rasha" "Rasha"?

Question #1:And Rebbi Yochanan too argues with Reish Lakish and obligates Chayvei Malkos Shogegin to pay,

Question #3: And similarly, in the same Perek (Daf 37a) where he says, in connection with "Lo Yih'yeh Ason, Anosh Ye'anesh". Do we learn this from here? Surely we learn it from the Pasuk "K'dei Rish'aso", 'one can declare him Chayav on account of one evil deed, but on account of two' ?'

Question #3 (cont.): And the Gemara concludes 'One (we need) for Misah and Mamon, the other, for Malkos and Mamon' - he does not Darshen "Rasha" "Rasha". ...

Answer: The reason of Rava and Rebbi Yochanan and that Sugya is because they hold that we only Darshen "Rasha" "Rasha" with regard to issues that are connected to the actual Malkos itself ...

Answer (cont.): Since the Pasuk of "Rasha" is written in connection with the actual Malkos - "Vehayah im bin Hakos ha'Rasha", but not with regard to Mamon together with Misah and Malkos which are not connected to the actual Malkos.

Answer (cont.): But from "Makeh" ("Makeh") Rava does learn it, since the Pasuk "Makeh Beheimah Yeshalmenah" is written in connection with payment ...

Answer (concl.): Though Abaye holds of "Rasha" "Rasha" even there.

Conclusion: And the Sugya there in connection with "Rish'aso" goes according to Rava

Conclusion: Abaye would establish it like Rebbi Meir by Misah and Malkos; a Pasuk for Malkos and Mamon is not necessary since we learn it from "Rasha" "Rasha".

Question: If so, why does Rebbi Yehudah need to exempt him from Boshes earlier, and why does he need the Gezeirah Shavah of "Einecha" "Einecha"?

Answer #1: The Ri explains that Rebbi Yehudah ultimately retracted from exempting a blind person from Malkos, once he discovered the D'rashah to exempt him from Misah and Galus.

Answer #2: Alternatively, if not for the Gezeirah Shavah of "Einecha" ("Einecha") that exempts him (from Boshes), it would be logical to Darshen the Pasuk by Galus like Rebbi Meir.

Question: In the Mishnah in 'ha'Korei es ha'Megilah' (Megilah, Daf 24a [See Tosfos there, DH 'Mi']) Rebbi Yehudah says that 'Whoever has never seen the light in his life cannot be Poreis al Sh'ma' ...

Question (cont.): But does he not say here that he is Patur from all Mitzvos even if he once saw and became blind, so how can he render others Yotzei their obligation?

Answer: There is no problem according to the Yerushalmi which establishes 'Someone who has never seen the light in his life' by a person who is sitting in a dark house or who was born in a cave - and who is not blind.

Question (cont.): But our Gemara (Megilah, Daf 24b), it seems, establishes it literally by a blind person, seeing as it gives Rebbi Yehudah's reason (that he cannot be Poreis al Sh'ma) as the fact that he derives no benefit from the luminaries ...

The Rabanan: And as for the Rabanan, who maintain that he does, this is because they hold like Rebbi Yossi

The Reason: Who once asked a blind man whom he found holding a torch why he needed a torch, to which he replied that it was so that as long as he was holding it, people would see him and come and save him from falling into a pit ...

Question (concl.): And this reason will only pertain to a person who is actually blind?

Answer: It seems that although Rebbi Yehudah exempts a blind man from all the Mitzvos, he nevertheless obligates him mi'de'Rabanan ...

Implied Question: Because even though a woman, who is Patur from Mitzvos Asei that are time-related, we do not obligate even mi'de'Rabanan ...

Answer: That is because there are many Mitzvos which they are still Chayav. A blind man on the other hand, if he is exempt from all Mitzvos even mi'de'Rabanan, he will end up like a Nochri who does live according to Toras Yisrael at all ...

Answer (cont.): Consequently, although someone who has never seen light at all cannot be Poreis al Sh'ma even mi'de'Rabanan, since he derives no benefit ...

Answer (concl.): One who was once able to see but who became blind, is Chayav mi'de'Rabanan, and can therefore also be Motzi others, whose obligation is also only mi'de'Rabanan ..

Source: Since K'ri'as Sh'ma is mi'de'Rabanan, as the Gemara says in 'Mi she'Meiso' (B'rachos, Daf 21a).

A Suma & a Katan: Nor is his Chiyuv comparable to that of a Katan, who has attained the age of Chinuch ... which is only in order to educate him, which is why, even though he is Chayav mi'de'Rabanan, cannot be Poreis al Sh'ma in order to render others Yotzei their obligation (See Mesores ha'Shas).

Question: But is he not Chayav to cure him?

Source: As the Gemara says in the first Perek of Gitin (Daf 12 [See Tosfos DH 'Shevacho']) in connection with 'Someone who severs the hand of his friend's Eved - 'He pays his SHeves and his Refu'ah to his master' ...

Source (cont.): And in reply to the question that he the Refu'ah belongs to the Eved in order to attain a cure, the Gemara replies that it speaks where they assessed him for five days, and he made a sharp ointment that cured him in three.

Answer #1: Here too, 'Patur mi'Kulam' refers to the excess where they assessed him for five days, and he cured him in three.

Question: Why can we not prove from the Mishnah that 'A master can say to his Eved 'Work for me and I will not feed you!' - from the fact that he is Patur from Sheves?

Answer: It speaks here where he feeds the Eved.

Question: What is Rebbi Yochanan coming to teach us when he says that he gives the Refu'ah to his master, which (a we just explained) is the excess after he cured him in three days - that is what the Mishnah says 'Patur mi'Kulam'?

Answer #2: It therefore seems that one needs ton differentiate between others who wound the Eved and the master himself ...

Reason: Who has already acquired everything (See Mesores ha'Shas).

Explanation #1: Rashi cites the Pasuk "bi'Ne'urehah Beis Avihah", 'Kol Sh'vach Ne'urim le'Avihah'.

Explanation #1 (cont.): And in 'Shenayim Ochzin' (Bava Metzi'a, Daf 12a & 12b) too, in connection with 'The findings of one's small son and daughter', he explains that the findings of a daughter belong to her father due to 'Sh'vach Ne'urim le'Avihah'.

Question: At the beginning of the firs Perek of Kidushin (Daf 3b) and in 'Eilu Na'aros' (Kesuvos, Daf 40b) the Gemara says that that ("bi'Ne'urehah Beis Avihah") refers to Hafaras Nedarim, and that we do not anything else from there?

Answer: It therefore seems that wherever the Gemara mentions 'Sh'vach Ne'urim', it does so merely as a 'Siman', but not because we learn it from "Ne'urehah".

Explanation #2: In our Sugya too, at the end of his commentary, Rashi explains that the money of the Kidushin belong to him (the father) since if he wants, he can hand her over to someone who is ugly or to a leper ...

Explanation #2 (cont.): And thar her findings belong to him because of 'Eivah' (discord), as the Gemara explains in Perek Na'arah she'Nispatsah (Ibid, Daf 46b & 47a), because we suspect that perhaps, as a result of the hatred that not giving him her findings fosters, he will hand her over to an ugly person or to a leper.

Explanation #2 (concl.): And Rebbi Elazar asks what the Din will be concerning Chavalah ...

Implied Question: Because even though 'Eivah' is not applicable, since he (the father) is not particular about something that causes them (daughters) pain, as the Gemara will say shortly ...

Answer: It is nevertheless befitting to go to the father, seeing as it detracts from her value.

Clarification: The Gemara uses this expression merely as a Siman, as Tosfos explained on Amud Alef ...

Clarification (cont.): And even if he wounded her in the face, and detracted from her value, Rav holds that her father does not receive anything, and so does Resh Lakish later (in the Sugya).

Clarification (concl.): But Rebbi Yochanan disagrees, and holds that if he wounded her in the face, the Chavalah goes to the father.

Question: Hoe can Rav and Resh Lakish argue with Rebbi Yochanan, when, at the beginning of Na'arah she'Nispatsah (Kesuvos, Daf 43b [See Tosfos DH 'she'Patz'ah']) the Beraisa implies that the Chavalah of wounding a girl's face belongs to the father?

Answer #1: It speaks there about the girl's devaluation up to the time that she becomes a Na'arah, when she leaves her father's jurisdiction. This constitutes a small drop in price should he would want to sell her; that small amount, it is unanimously agreed, goes to the father, as that is genuine 'Sh'vach Ne'urim'.

Answer #1 (cont.): Whereas here they are arguing over a full devaluation, where the devaluation is permanent, and lasts even beyond the period of Na'arus ...

Answer #1 (concl.): That is where Rav and Resh Lakish hold that it belongs to her, and Rebbi Yochanan, that it all goes to her father.

Answer #2: Alternatively, they are arguing here where she is devalued with regard to Kidushin, and Rav and Resh Lakish maintain that the father only acquires the actual Kidushin; whereas there it is speaking about the loss of her work, as a result of which nobody will want to purchase her.

Opinion #1: The Ri explains that according to the opinion in the first Perek of Bava Metzi'a (Daf 12b & 13a) in connection with the findings of a small son and daughter go to the father - 'Neither Gadol nor Katan are meant literally, but a Gadol who eats at his father's table is considered a Katan, and a Katn who does not is considered a Gadol' ...

Opinion #1 (cont.): There is no difference between a father who wounds his son and the son's findings ...

Opinion #1 (concl.): But there where others wound them, the Chavalah belongs to them, even where they are eating at their father's table, as will be explained later ...

Reason: Because, since they feel pain and he does not lose anything, he does not object.

Opinion #2: According to Shmuel however, who says there that 'Katan' means literally what it says, the findings of a Katan belong to his father even where he does not eat at his father's table, as the Gemara explains there (Daf 12a) ...

Reason: Because when he finds something, he instinctively takes it straight to his father.

Opinion #2 (cont.): And a Gadol may keep what he finds even if he eats at his father's table, because a. since the father does not lose anything, he does not object, and moreover b., the son does not take it straight to his father ...

Opinion #2 (cont.): Whereas here, where it is the father who wounded him, if he eats at his father's table, it goes to the father, even if he is a Gadol, because, since he (the father) will lose, he objects ...

Opinion #2 (cont.): And if he does not eat at his father's table, it goes to him, even if he is a Katan, because, since he suffers pain, he will not take it to his father ...

Opinion #2 (concl.): But if others wound him, even if he is a Katan who eats at his father's table, it goes to him, since a. he (the father) does not lose anything and b. he does not take it straight to him.

Alternative Text: ha'Rav R. Avraham ben ha'Rav Yehudah had the text "ke'Sachir ke'Toshav yihyeh Imach" (Vayikra, 25) ...

Reason: Since it is from this Pasuk that the Sifri Darshens it.

Proof: And so it would seem, seeing as that Pasuk is written in the format of a command ...

Proof (cont.): Whereas "ki Tov lo Imach" (in Devarim, 15) is merely in the format of relaying speech, as the Torah writes "Vehayah ki Yomar ha'Eved Lo Eitzei me'imach, ki Aheivcha ve'es Beisecha, ki Tov lo Imach".

Reinstating Original Text: But the Ri explains that the Gemara is in order even if we have the text "ki Tov lo Imach" ...

Reason: Because since he says "ki Tov lo Imach", it is a proof that this is how it ought to be.

Explanation #1: This Pircha is confined to the opinion that 'Gadol is not meant literally' ...

Explanation #1 (cont.): But according to Shmuel, there is good reason by Metzi'ah - 'because he takes it straight to his father, and this reason is not applicable by Chavalah.

Explanation #2: Alternatively, even on Shmuel the Gemara asks why it does not say that he takes it straight to his father?

Explanation #2 (cont.): And it answers 'Because Since he has pain, neither does the father object, nor does the Katan take it to his father.

Question: What is the problem? We established the first Beraisa with regard to Sheves, and perhaps the second Beraisa, which says, in connection with the small daughters of others 'Ye'aseh lahem Segulah', is speaking about other things, such as Nezek and Tza'ar?

Answer #1: Presumably, the case will be equivalent to that of the sons, by whom 'Ye'aseh lahem Segulah applies even to Sheves, seeing as the work that they produce does not go to their father.

Answer #2: Furthermore, one can say that when the Tana says 'be'Banav u'bi'Venosav Patur' speaks exclusively with regard to Sheves ...

Reason: And it is logical to say that one can only exempt him (the father) because they eat at his table by Sheves, but not by the other Chiyuvim.

Reason (cont.): Because we always find that the produce goes to the father in lieu of sustenance ...

Source: Since by a woman, an Eved Ivri, an Eved Cana'ani and a daughter it discusses a case of 'Asei imi ve'Eini Zancha!'

Answer #2 (concl.): According to this, it becomes clear as to why we cannot establish the second Beraisa by the other Chiyuvim besides Sheves, since by the other Chiyuvim, he is Chayav to pay even if it is his own sons and daughters.

Support: And it is implied that the reason of 'Semuchim' will only exempt the father from Sheves, since it asked earlier 'If it is speaking about grown-up Semuchim, 'He gives them immediately? It is to the father that he ought to give it?' ...

Support (cont.): This implies that because the Gemara established it by Semuchim, it asks that he ought to give it to the father. Why is that? If it is because it is compared to Metzi'ah, Shmuel holds that the Metzi'ah of a Gadol does not go to the father?

Support (cont.): But if it is speaking about Sheves, the question is justified - because of the S'vara that since he feeds them, their Sheves belongs to him, as Tosfos just explained.

Clarification: And the Maksheh thought that even if the produce of the Gedolim does not go to the father (See Hagahos ve'Tziyunim) even though he feeds them, still, there where it comes from the an outside source, such as Sheves, it is logical to say that it does.

Question: And when the Gemara asks 've'Ha Metzi'ah' - implying that if the Sheves would go to the father, it would be justified, and there would not be a Kashya from Metzi'ah as to why Nezek, Tza'ar, Ripuy and Boshes does not go to the father ...

Answer: That is because Metzi'ah is more similar to Ma'aseh Yadayim

Source: As the Gemara says at the beginning of Metzi'as ha'Ishah (Kesuvos, Daf 66a & 66b) 'Her findings are similar to the extras that she produces with exertion ...

Refutation of Support: One can however, explain that when the Gemara asks 'I bi'Semuchim', it is according to the opinion that 'Gadol' is not meant literally, and it is comparable to Metzi'ah.

Question: Since min ha'Din, the Sheves goes to the father, as the Gemara says - that by a man who is fussy, they are Chayav to give Sheves to the father even where they are not Semuchim, at least as far as far as the excess is concerned ...

Question (cont.): And what's more, it belongs to the father min ha'Torah ...

Source: As the Gemara Darshens at the beginning of Kidushin (Daf 3b) at the end of Eilu Na'aros (Kesuvos, Daf 40b) and in 'Na'arah sh'Nispatsah' (Ibid, Daf 46b) from "Ki Yimkor Ish es Bito le'Amah" - that 'Just as the Ma'aseh Yadayim of a maidservant goes to her master, so too, does that of a daughter go to her father' ...

Question (concl.): If so, what did the Chachamim see to say that b y a father who is not fussy, with regard to somebody else's daughter, 'Ye'aseh lah Segulah' even by Sheves?

Answer: It seems that the Chachamim assessed the mind of the father, and they concluded that he is Mochel his children with regard to something that a. they suffered pain, b. he does not lose anything and c. it comes from an an outside source source.