Question: Why is this reason necessary, seeing as later (on Daf 24:), the Geara rules in the case of a Nochri who brings a gift, that if there is more of that species that is still attached, it is forbidden'. Rashi explains there 'because since it was Muktzah during Bein ha'Shemashos it remains Muktzah the whole of Shabbos'.

Proof: And the fact that the Gemara there cites the case in connection with Safek Muchan implies that the reason is on account of Muktzah.

Conclusion: So why do we now need two reasons?

Answer (Explanation #1): The reason given here is according to Rebbi Shimon, who does not hold of Muktzah, whereas the reason later goes according to Rebbi Yehudah, who does.

Question: Rashi himself explains there however, regarding 'a Nochri who brought a gift, that it is Asur because, seeing as he (the Yisrael) did not pick it yesterday, he was Maktzeh it, and it is like the Muktzah of G'rogros ve'Tzimukim (dried figs and raisins), which even Rebbi Shimon concedes is Muktzah. In that case, the case there too, goes like Rebbi Shimon?

Answer (Explanation #2): The Gemara here speaks in a Chatzer, where the fruit is Muchan for ravens, and 'Whatever is Muchan for ravens is automatically Muchan for people'. Hence the reason of 'Shema Ya'aleh ve'Yislosh' is necessary.

Question: The Gemara in Shabbos (Daf 122.) states that one may place one's animal on Shabbos, beside food that is still attached but not food that is Muktzah (i.e. grass that was picked today).

Question (cont.): Why not, bearing in mind that the animal could have eaten it on its own?

Answer #1: It is speaking where the animal and the food are on two sides of a river.

Answer #2: Furthermore, 'Muchan for ravens only applies to fruit of a tree, which tends to fall off by itself and which one therefore anticipates.

Question: Th question remains however, that now that the Gemara gives the reason here, why does it need to give the reason later?

Answer: Because there it is speaking about something that needs a spade and an adze, such as turnips or radishes, where the fear that he may climb up and pick them does not apply, since it is not so easy to pick them (See also Maharsha & Maharam).

Proof: A proof for this lies in the Mishnah in Shabbos (Daf 122. & 122:) 'A Nochri who kindles a light on behalf of a Yisrael, the latter is forbidden to use. Whereas if he lit it for himself, he may'.

Proof (cont.): Why are we not afraid that the Yisrael will kindle it for himself? Unless we assume that he will remember.

Extrapolated Halachah: And it is for this reason that R. Eliezer from Metz ate a salted fish that his maidservant roasted for herself on Shabbos; since what do we need to worry about?

Reason #1: Firstly, she did not roast it for him.

Reason #2: And if you're worried that he might roast it himself? Since this involves a bother, he will remember.

Reason #3: Whereas if you are worried about Muktzeh? It is fit to eat raw.

Refutation: This is not correct however, since the Gemara in Shabbos (Ibid.) specifically states that if a Nochri brings water (from outside the T'chum) it is forbidden, in case he will therefore draw more on his behalf.

Suggested Answer: Nor can we differentiate and say that 'Shema Yarbeh bi'Shevilo' is confined to water, but that here where the meat has already been roasted, it is not applicable ...

Refutation: Since the Tosefta of Shabbos (Perek 12) specifically rules that 'If he knows him it is forbidden, since he encourages him to do it on his behalf the following week'.

Answer (Explanation #3): It is specifically with regard to fruit and grapes that 'Shema Ya'aleh ve'Yislosh' and 'Shema Yischot' apply, because one has a desire for them, and will swallow them even "whilst they are in one's hands" (See Hagahos ve'Tziyunim).

Question #1: Why are we afraid that one might climb the tree and pick it', seeing as one may do so even Lechatchilah (on Yom-Tov), since it is Ochel Nefesh?

Question #2: And the same Kashya applies later to the Mishnah (Daf 23: and 24.) which forbids catching fish from pools on Yom-Tov. Why, it is Ochel Nefesh?

Refuted Answer: One cannot answer that whatever can be done on Erev Yom-Tov is forbidden on Yom-Tov, if it wasn't ...

Refutation: Since we say later (on Daf 28:) "Hu", 'and not its Machshirin' (preparations), such as preparing a spit-rod with which to roast meat. Rebbi Yehudah says "Lachem", 'for all your needs', whereas "Hu Levado" we need to forbid Machshirin that one could have done before Yom-Tov.

Refutation (cont.): So we see that the difference between whether one could have done it before Tom-Tov or not is confined to Machshirin; whereas Ochel Nefesh itself is unanimously agreed upon, that it is permitted either way.

Suggested Answer: Some attribute the prohibition of not catching fish to the fact that one might catch non-Kasher fish, which is unnecessary.

Refutation: This is not correct however, since that would be a Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah le'Gufah, which is permitted on Yom-Tov.

Answer: Therefore Rabeinu Nesanel from Kinun cites a Yerushalmi which explains that the Torah juxtaposes "u'Sheamartem es ha'Matzos nex to "Ach asher Ye'achel le'Chol Nefesh" to teach us that it is only those Melachos following 'guarding the Matzos (from becoming Chametz) are permitted on Yom-Tov - (i.e. those that come after kneading), but that Melachos that precede kneading are prohibited.

Support: Moreover, the Yerushalmi cites another exclusion "Ach", which precludes reaping (See also Tosfos, Shabbos 95. DH 've'ha'Rodeh').

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that we invert the opinions of the Mishnah 'Ein Sochtin'. This is correct, for it is imperative to say this ...

Refuted Explanation: Since one cannot possibly invert the opinion of the Mishnah of 'Kalkalah' ...

Refutation: Because if one were to do so, the Kashya on Rebbi Yehudah would be even stronger since then (seeing as the Rabbanan who argue with him there hold that the two days have one Kedushah), if we says 'Eipuch', Rebbi Yehudah will forbid even Yom-Tov Sheini as well?

Question: Rebbi Yochanan (the author of 'Eipuch') himself rules in Perek Chavis (Shabbos, Daf 143: & 144.) like Rebbi Yehudah regarding other fruit, but not regarding olive and grapes.

Conclusion: So we see that he does not invert the opinions.

Answer: Rebbi Yochanan is saying to those Amora'im who do not hold 'Muchlefes ha'Shitah' that this is how it is according to them.

Answer (cont.): And this is how it seems logically.

Explanation #2: The Shitas me'Aibra however answers that 'Muchlefes ha'Shitah' refers to the case of 'Kalkalah', and Rebbi Yehudah is saying to the Chachamim according to their own opinion 'According to me, the fruit is permitted even on the first day, since it is 'Uchla de'Efras', whereas according to you, who forbid 'Nolad' in the case of 'Ein Sochtin', it will be Asur even on the second day (See Poras Yosef).

Question: In that case, since Rebbi Yehudah is speaking to the Rabbanan, why does Rebbi Yochanan need to say 'Muchlefes ha'Shitah', why can he not simply say that he is speaking according to the Rabbanan, like Ravina does?

Answer: He considers it a Dochek to say that 'he is speaking according to the Rabbanan', without establishing it by 'Muchlefes ha'Shitah', since how can one say 'le'Divreihem' when the Chachamim did not say anything before Rebbi Yehudah?

Conclusion: Whereas Ravina is not bothered by that.

Sugya in Shabbos: Rashi explains that the Gemara asks there (in Shabbos) from that Beraisa on Rebbi Yitzchak, who says that 'A vessel may only be taken for the purpose for which it is normally used.

Sugya in Shabbos (cont.): To which he answers that is speaks when he needs the location of the article.

Extrapolated Ruling: From there the Poskim extrapolate that the Isur of moving an object that is used for something that is Asur on Shabbos, is confined to where it is not needed for a use that is permitted or for its location (Tzorech Gufo u'Mekomo), but where it is, it is permitted.

Extrapolated Ruling (cont.): Moreover, once one has begun moving it le' Tzorech Gufo u'Mekomo, one is permitted to take it even to one's room if need be.

Proof: For we see here, since he began moving it for its location or for its intrinsic use, he may then cover the egg with it.

Question: How can Rebbi Yehudah ignore Beis Hillel and hold like Beis Shamai?

Answer: Rebbi Yehudah maintains that Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel never argued over this point.

Question: It transpires that the Mishnah forbids S'fek S'feika, And in 'ha'Ta'aruvos' (Zevachim, Daf 74. & 74:) the Gemara wonders at Shmuel (who forbids S'fek S'feika) 'Is there anyone who forbids S'fek S'feika by Isurei Hana'ah?'

Question (cont.): Why does the Gemara not cite this Sugya which forbids (Isurei Hana'ah)?

Refuted Question: The Beraisa that we cited earlier ('u'Sefeika Asurah; Nis'arvah be'Elef, Kulan Asuros') is not a problem, since ...

Answer #1: We can explain it like Rabeinu Tam, that 'Nis'arvah be'Elef' the Isur itself refers to the Isur itself

Answer #2: Alternatively, the case earlier is a Beraisa, so what gives the Beraisa here the edge over the Beraisa there. But from a Mishnah it is a Kashya.

Conclusion (Explanation #1): That is why Rabeinu Tam erases 'Acheros ba'Acheros' from the text.

Explanation #2: Rabeinu Yitzchak b'Rebbi Baruch however, retains it in the text ...

Explanation #2 (cont.): And explains that also the Isur got mixed up, The Chidush, he says, is that, since it resembles two majorities, we would have thought that it is permitted. So the Mishnah teaches us that it is not.

Explanation #3: ha'Rav Rav Yitzchak also retains the text. Nevertheless, he explains, the Gemara in Shabbos cannot extrapolate from here, since this Mishnah is based on the principle that whatever is Chashuv, only becomes Bateil with two majorities, which explains why it is not Bateil here ...

Explanation #3 (cont.): Whereas there the Gemara proves its point from the two majorities, since it says 'If one majority got mixed up in another majority, but did we not learn in a Beraisa ... ?'

Conclusion: Tosfos elaborates in Perek ha'Areil (Yevamos, Daf 81.).