Question: What do Shmuel and the Bnei Marava argue about regarding a minor? This seems to be an argument between Rebbi Meir and the Rabbanan in Yevamos (96a). The Beraisa there states that they (the Rabbanan) made the relations of a nine year old like the Ma'amar of an adult. Rebbi Meir says they made the Chalitzah of a nine year old like the Get of an adult. However, according to the Rabbanan, this only applied to relations, not Chalitzah.

The Gemara in Yevamos (105b) says regarding the Mishnah, which states that a woman who receives Chalitzah from a minor has not had valid Chalitzah, that Shmuel says these are the words of Rebbi Meir. However, the Chachamim argue that the Chalitzah of a minor is invalid.

Answer: The Ri answers that here they are arguing regarding the terminology of the Mishnah. Shmuel understands that the term "her Chalitzah is invalid" means that it also makes her unfit for yibum from the other brothers. The Mishnah is therefore according to the opinion of Rebbi Meir, not because Shmuel holds that way, but because this is indicated by the terminology used by the Mishnah. The Bnei Marava understand that "her Chalitzah is invalid" means that it does not make her unfit for yibum from the brothers, and therefore establishes the Mishnah according to the opinion of the Rabbanan.

Question: We understand that there is no Breirah (establishing an intent retroactively) even when applied leniently. This is clear from the Gemara in Bechoros (56b) regarding Ma'aser Beheimah. The Gemara there says that even if the inheritors split nine animals opposite nine animals and ten opposite ten, we do not say this is his fitting portion (from beforehand).

Answer: We still cannot derive Get from the above Gemara. This is due to the Gemara's explanation there (57a) that Rebbi Yochanan possibly only said this law (no Breirah regarding Ma'aser Beheimah) because it has to be like one's son (regarding Pidyon ha'Ben). Just like one only redeems his son if it is clearly his son, also your sheep must only be redeemed if they are clearly yours.

Question: The Gemara in Nedarim (36a) implies that the case is where he had not made them a member of his Korban Pesach, as (the Gemara holds that) the law that there must be a sheep per "each household" (meaning group) is not a Torah law. Therefore, membership in the group is not necessary (according to Torah law).

This is as the Gemara in Nedarim (ibid.) asks, "If you will say that the law that there must be a sheep per each household is a Torah law, how could he have already slaughtered the animal and give it to them (see Ran there)?" Rather, it must be that he said this to them to make them do the Mitzvah more quickly.

Answer: The discussion in our Gemara is according to the opinion that one must be a member of a Korban Pesach group in order to fulfill his obligation according to Torah law.

Explanation: This is not part of the difficulty, as he asked a good question on the answer that he was given.

Observation: This is a Beraisa, as in the Mishnah in Dmai (7:4) only Rebbi Meir's opinion is recorded.

Implied Question: Rebbi Meir decreed that their wine is forbidden in Chulin (6a). (Note: Accordingly, how could this wine be permitted to drink at all?)

Answer: This was taught before he made this decree.

Implied Question: Rebbi Yosi and Rebbi Shimon hold in Menachos (66b) that Kusim are converts out of fear, as indicated by their statement that Terumah can be taken from the produce of Nochrim to exempt the produce of Kusim. (Note: Accordingly, don't they hold that their wine is forbidden as is the wine of all Nochrim (people who convert out of fear are not Jewish)?)

Answer#1: Even so, being that they are separated from idols more than other Nochrim, uphold the Written Torah, and do not worship idols as they used to do in the times of the First Temple, when the decree was made regarding wine of Nochrim it was not made on the wine of Kusim.

Even though we do find that the Chachamim included the bread of Kusim in the decree against bread of Nochrim, they did not include their wine in the decree against Nochri wine.

Answer#2: Alternatively, it could be the case is here when their wine is purified.

Opinion#1: It doesn't mean literally ten and nine Lugin (were taken off as Ma'aser Rishon and Sheini respectively). This is because when two Lugin were taken off originally as Terumah, ninety-eight were left. (Note: Therefore, for example, instead of ten Lugin of Ma'aser Rishon it is really nine point eight Lugin.)

Opinion#2: Some say that Ma'aser is not lessened because of the amount of Terumah that is taken off, being that one grain of wheat technically can make any pile of produce or grain exempt from Terumah (according to Torah law).

Explanation: Kusim do not even take off Terumah.

Implied Question: In Berachos (47b), the Gemara says that Kusim do take off Ma'aser, as they are careful to fulfill whatever the (Written) Torah says. (Note: How, then, can we say that they do not take off Terumah?)

Answer: This is when they prepare their own food, for which they even take off Ma'aser Rishon. However, when they sell produce or grain to others they do not take off any tithes (even Terumah), as they are not careful regarding the prohibition of Lifnei Iver (causing others to sin).

Implied Question: They are not suspected to steal. (Note: Isn't selling produce that has not been tithed as if it has been tithed a transgression of stealing?)

Answer#1: They do not consider this stealing, as the produce or grain that must be tithed is money that has no specific claimant. (Note: This means that they technically have ownership over all of the untithed produce, as no specific Kohen etc. can take it from them. It is therefore not stealing to sell it as totally belonging to the buyer.)

We similarly find that an ignoramus is not suspected of stealing, yet he is suspected of not tithing.

Answer#2: Additionally, as long as the tithes have not been taken there is not really an aspect of stealing, as the (grain for the) tithes have not yet been separated and therefore there is no obligation as of yet to give them to the Kohen and Levi.

Answer#3: Additionally, the Kusim rely on the derivation quoted in Bava Metzia (88b) "And you will eat," and not sell (implying that only one who will eat must take off Ma'aser, not one who sells).

Explanation#1: Rashi explains that with his words he causes the transfer of holiness (of Ma'aser Sheini) to the money, and he can now drink (without actually separating the tithes from the wine).

Question: This does not seem correct. Only regarding Dmai does the second part of the Mishnah say that he can transfer the holiness to money, because it (the Ma'asros) has a set place. The Mishnah there says the Ma'aser Sheini is proclaimed to be in the north or the south, which makes the Ma'asros as if he (physically) separated them. This is because the Mishnah is discussing a case of separating Ma'aser on Erev Shabbos at twilight, as stated in the Tosefta (Dmai ch. 8). Therefore, regarding Dmai one can set aside a place, as when it is only possibly nightfall (on Erev Shabbos) one is allowed to separate Ma'aser from Dmai.

However, the wine of Kusim is considered to certainly not have Terumos or Ma'asros taken off. Therefore, it does not say regarding Kusim that the Ma'aser Sheini is in the north or south, and it does not even say that he transfers the holiness to the money, as is indeed said regarding Dmai.

Explanation#2: Rather, "Meichal" means he starts.

Explanation#3: Or, as Rabeinu Tam explains, "Meichal" is like the word "Meihal," meaning mixed with water and diluted. This is akin to the verse, "Your drink is diluted with water."

After Shabbos they will separate Ma'aser Rishon and Sheini, as is stated in the following Tosefta. The Tosefta says, "The next ten...The next nine..." Being that he cannot say where they are located (because it is certainly Tevel, not just Dmai), if he would drink without separating he would be drinking Tevel retroactively.

Implied Question: This implies that Rebbi Meir holds of Breirah. In the conclusion of the Gemara, Rava says that Rebbi Yehudah also holds of Breirah. He forbade the wine here for a different reason, namely that the wine container might burst.

In Bechoros (48a), however, regarding a case where they gave (five Selaim) before they split the estate, Rava establishes that both Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah hold like Rav Asi that when brothers split an estate they are half inheritors and half purchasers. This shows that they are in doubt (whether or not we say Breirah). (Note: See Rav Ovadya mi'Bartenura on the Mishnah in Bechoros (8:3) at length regarding how Breirah applies in our case.)

Answer: It is possible to differentiate between our case, where he explains what he is saying and makes a condition, "...that I am going to separate," to the case of the brothers where nothing was made clear.

Implied Question: In Bava Kama (69b), the Gemara asks about a seeming contradiction in the words of Rebbi Yochanan. Regarding whatever is collected (see 69a regarding Neta Revay) he holds there is Breirah, but regarding the brothers who divide their estate we apparently see he holds that Breirah does not apply. Due to this question, the Gemara retracts its understanding of Rebbi Yochanan. It would seem that it could have answered as we explained above (that there is a difference between a detailed condition and no condition at all which will possibly determine when we say Breirah). (Note: Why didn't the Gemara give this answer?)

Answer#1: Rather, it is better for the Gemara to say that the Mishnah really reverts back to the original text that we had ("Whatever will be gathered" instead of "Whatever is gathered") before we asked this question. It is also better for it to say that the authors of a Beraisa do not have to be switched around.

Answer#2: Additionally, if it would answer this, we would still have difficulty with another statement of Rebbi Yochanan who said earlier (25a) that even the last case of Gitin did not make her unfit for Kehunah.

Observation: Earlier (ibid.), when we said that both statements of Rebbi Yochanan are needed, it could have that the reason they are needed because from his statement that the brothers are considered buyers we would not have known that the last case of Gitin does not invalidate her from marrying a Kohen, based on the reasoning above.

Based on this reason we can also understand how to reconcile Shmuel's statements. Later (65b), we find that Shmuel decreed that the Get of a Shechiv Meira should read "If I die this should be a Get, and if I do not die it should not be a Get." If he dies, the Get is valid. This implies that he holds Breirah is valid. At the end of Beitzah (37b), regarding two people who formed a partnership when they purchased a barrel and animal (on Erev Yom Tov and planned on using the contents of the barrel and animal as food on Yom Tov), Shmuel says that the barrel is also forbidden. (Note: This means that the barrel can only be taken inside their shared permitted Techum. Based on Tosfos' explanation above, we can understand why Shmuel holds of Breirah when the condition was spelled out by the Get, and not hold of Breirah when nothing was specified before Yom Tov.)

Explanation: This implies that Rebbi Yosi does not hold of Breirah.

This is also implied in Eiruvin (37b). In a case when a person says that the Ma'aser Sheini in his house should be transferred on a Sela that will come into his hand when he reaches into his wallet, Rebbi Yosi states that the holiness has not been transferred. (Note: This seems to be because he holds there is no Breirah.)

Question: This is difficult, as later (73a), when the Gemara asks what the status of a woman (who received a Get on condition, see at length there) is during this time, Rebbi Yosi says that she is divorced but not divorced. When he dies, the Get is valid. This implies that Breirah is valid, as the Gemara deduces later.

According to the opinion that differentiates between someone who depends on his own doing and someone who depends on what others will do, this is understandable. (Note: The case in Eiruvin is when he depends on his own doing and is therefore invalid, and the case later (73a) is not in his control, and is therefore valid.) However, according to the opinion that this is not a reason to differentiate between whether or not Breirah applies, this is difficult.

Answer: In the case of Gitin (73a), it will end up being made crystal clear as he will either live or die (and therefore she will either still be married or divorced). However, here (Gitin 25b) it is possible that he will never take off the Ma'asros, or that he will not have a Sela come out of his pocket. This is also why Shmuel is not contradicting himself.

Question: This is difficult. According to our understanding of Rebbi Yehudah that he does not hold of Breirah, he must hold like Rebbi Yochanan who says that brothers who divided an estate are considered to be purchasers, and therefore must return their land to each other. If so, the only person who will bring Bikurim is a person who was a single child, the son of a single child etc. until the times of Yehoshua Bin Nun. This is because everyone only owns the fruit of the land (not the land itself).

Rebbi Yehudah holds in Bava Kama (90a), regarding the law of a slave healing after one or two days, that the acquisition of fruits is not like the acquisition of land (or in the case there, the Eved Kenani which has a law of land).

According to Rebbi Yosi as well, this is difficult. In our Gemara he does not hold of Breirah. In Bava Kama (ibid.), regarding the law of a slave healing after one or two days, he is unsure whether or not having an acquisition of fruits (i.e. the rights to the slave's work) gives one acquisition in the land (Eved Kenani) itself. The Gemara deduces this as well later (48a).

Answer#1: Rabeinu Yitzchak answers that from the law regarding a slave healing after one or two days we cannot derive regular laws of Breirah. This is because the Pasuk states, "his money" and "under him." (Note: Tosfos means that the laws there are possibly subject to other Pesukim that would override normal Breirah rules. We therefore cannot judge from one's ruling in that case how he would generally apply Breirah.) This is why the Gemara later (48a) does not cite this case when it discusses the case of an inherited field.

Answer#2: Additionally, Rabeinu Yitzchak says that Rebbi Yochanan is the only one who holds that they (the brothers who divided the estate) have to return their portions to each other on Yovel. However, the other Amoraim hold that even though they are normally considered purchasers (when they divide their estate), they do not have to give back the land to each other on Yovel. They understand from a Pasuk that they are not considered purchasers regarding Yovel.

Rebbi Yochanan, who holds that the brothers have to return their portion, explains that Rebbi Yehudah's reasoning here is that the container might break. Indeed, the conclusion of the Gemara in Bava Kama (69a) is that according to Rebbi Yochanan it must be that Rebbi Yehudah holds of Breirah.

From this statement, that the brothers that split the estate are considered to be purchasers from each other and they give back their portions to each other on Yovel, the Gemara (in Bava Kama ibid.) retracts its first train of thought. (Note: It instead goes on to conclude that Rebbi Yochanan holds that Rebbi Yehudah holds of Breirah.)

Explanation: Rashi explains that this is referring to the first part of the Mishnah. The Mishnah states later (72a) that if someone says, "This is your Get from today if I die from this sickness, it is a Get if he dies. The Gemora there asks, what is her status the entire time he is sick (married or not)?

Question: This is difficult. The Gemara there (73b) asks, is it possible that when he dies she is divorced? There is not Get after death! What kind of question is this? If the case is that she is divorced from "today," the Get is valid retroactively from when he was alive! Rashi there explains that this is not referring to the case of "from today." (Note: The Maharam points out that this does not seem to be Rashi's explanation in our text of Rashi. In any event, Tosfos seems to be asking that the argument whether or not she is considered married (quoted in (a) above) and the Gemara's question here are referring to the same case, whereas Rashi seems to split them up into separate cases.)

Answer: Really, the Gemara is addressing the aspect of "from today." The Gemara is asking the following: Being that she has the status of a married woman until he dies, the Get does not take effect when he is alive, only when he is dead. If so, when he dies how is it a Get? There is no Get after he dies!

The Gemara answers that the case is where he says, "from when I am in the world." This means that when he said "from today," he meant that the Get should take effect one hour before he dies. He didn't literally mean "today," but rather "from the (last) day that he is (alive) in the world." Being that he is making the Get dependent on his death, it seems clear that he just wants the Get to take effect when he is still alive.

This is also implied by the Tosefta. The Tosefta states that if someone says, "This is your Get from today," during the interim (until the Get takes effect) her husband still acquires lost objects that she finds and her earnings. This implies that even though he said "from today," he did not really mean "today" (but rather from the last day that he is alive).

Explanation: Rashi explains that even though this is a condition, it requires Breirah because it is not in his hands to uphold the condition. When the condition was made it was in doubt, and it happens by itself. Without Breirah, it would not be a Get. This is unlike other conditions that he has the power and intent to fulfill.

Implied Question: However, here it is only possible to work using Breirah. Being that we establish the case later (73b) as when a person says "From when I am still in the world," meaning an hour before his death, and that hour is not clear or known when exactly it will be, Breirah is required to make it work. (Note: It therefore seems that Rashi did not have to give the explanation he gave above. Why did he give this explanation?)

Answer: Even so, Rashi explanation is (also) correct. Even by a condition Breirah is required, as we see later that the case of, "I am having relations with you (for kidushin) on condition that my father will agree," is considered to be a case of Breirah.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Eiruvin (37b) discusses a case where someone says that this should be Terumah on this if it rains today. It would seem that without Breirah this should not be considered Terumah.

Answer: This is according to the opinions that hold of Breirah.

Question: This is difficult. In Eiruvin (36b), Rav says that the Mishnah is pushed aside in favor of the opinion of Ayo. The Gemara asks, on the contrary! Let Ayo be pushed aside due to our Mishnah! The Gemara answers that this is incorrect, as we see that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of Breirah. This is as the Mishnah states etc. Now there is still a question that we should push aside Ayo and the Mishnah before the Mishnah in Eiruvin (36b). However, the Mishnah in Gitin that our Gemara quotes later along with the Beraisa in Bava Kama (69a) where Rebbi Yehudah says that in the morning the owner can say, "Whatever they will collect etc." all indicate that Rebbi Yehudah holds of Breirah. (Note: This is a clear contradiction!)

Answer: Rav differentiates between someone who makes the condition dependent on himself and one who makes the condition dependent on the actions of others. The case here and in Bava Kama are cases where it is not in his control. This is why he holds of Breirah in those cases (as he has totally given up control). However, when a person keeps it in his control, he does not hold Breirah is effective.

This is the explanation of the Gemara in Eiruvin there (36b). We do not hold of the Mishnah that says that Rebbi Yehudah holds of Breirah even if he keeps the condition in his control, in the face of a Beraisa with a statement by Ayo (regarding the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah). The Mishnah regarding the wine, and the Beraisa that the Gemara quotes there to ask on Ayo that there should not be any difference, is not a question on Rav. As we have stated, Rav holds that the difference is whether or not he keeps the condition in his control. Rather, it is a question according to those who do not differentiate between one who keeps the condition in his control and one who does not.

Rebbi Yochanan, as well, who answers in the Gemara in Eiruvin (36b) that the Chacham had already arrived, indeed does not hold of this difference. He certainly agrees that the statement of Ayo is pushed aside in light of all of these sources.

Question: However, this is difficult. At the end of Beitzah (37b), regarding two people who bought a barrel and an animal in partnership, the Gemara deduces that Rebbi Yochanan does not hold of Breirah, as he explains Ayo's statement. However, it is clear that he does not agree with Ayo, as we have just explained!

Answer#1: It could have given this answer, but preferred saying that the authors there should not be switched.

Answer#2: Alternatively, even though Rebbi Yochanan does not agree with Ayo, as he holds that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of Breirah, it is still clear that Rebbi Yochanan does not hold of Breirah as he gives an answer.

Question: However, this is difficult. Even if a person makes the condition dependent on others, we know that Rebbi Yehudah still holds that there is no Breirah. This is apparent from the Mishnah in Shekalim (9b), and is quoted in Yoma (55a). Rebbi Yehudah says that the boxes were not for birds that were obligated to be brought as korbanos, lest they might be mixed up. The Gemara there explains that this is because of the suspicion that one of them might be a Chatas whose owner has died (which must be killed), together with the fact that he does not hold of Breirah, as is apparent from Ayo.

Now, Rav holds that if one makes the condition dependent on others, Rebbi Yehudah holds there is Breirah. Rebbi Yochanan does not hold of Ayo's understanding (of Rebbi Yehudah), and holds that even if one makes the condition dependent on his own actions there will be Breirah.