Puzzle: According to the opinion that holds 'from the son's property', the Ri asked what one should do if he is confronted with Kibud Av, Aveidas Atzmo and Aveidas Chavero?

Option #1: Should he deal with his father's Kavod, his friend's lost article takes precedence, as the Gemara says in 'Eilu Metzi'os' (Bava Metzi'a, Daf 32a) cites a Pasuk that if one's father gives instructions not to return someone's lost article, one may not obey him ...

Proof: And it must be speaking when he tells him to honor him, since not to return a lost article for no reason does not require a Pasuk ...

Proof (cont.): Implying that one's friend's lost article takes precedence over Kibud Av ...

Option #2: Should he deal with his own lost article, which takes precedence over that of his friend, as the Pasuk writes in Devarim (15) "only there shall not be among you a poor person?", 'Your property takes precedence over somebody else's' (Bava Metzi'a, 30b & 33a) ...

Option #3: But his father's Kavod comes first, according to the opinion that holds 'from the son's property'?

Solution: The Ri concludes that he should leave his father's Kavod aand his friend's lost article, and deal with his own lost article ...

Implied Question: Because when the Gemara says that Kibud Av takes precedence ...

Answer: It means to allow his father to do with his money as he sees fit, as that is the actual Kavod ...

Answer (cont.): But when it comes to his own lost article, where his father does not benefit from the lost article, the son is not obligated to lose his article because of his father.

Implied Question : And even though the Gemara will say shortly that according to the opinion that holds 'from the son's property' - 'To the point that his father takes his purse and throws it in to the sea, and he (the son) does not shame him' ...

Answer: It speaks in such a case where the father derives satisfaction from his action, where for example, he throws it into the sea in order to instill fear into the hearts of his family ...

Proof: Because otherwise, if he threw it for no reason, he would be a Rasha - since he was guilty of 'Bal Tashchis' (destroying a useful article) ...

Implied Question: And even where he was a Shogeg and threw it in his anger ...

Answer: Nevertheless he derived benefit from throwing the purse, and it is therefore forbidden to put him to shame.

Halachah: It implies that this is the Halachah, and this is how the She'iltos d'Rav Achai Gaon ruled in Parshas va'Yishma Yisro' (at the end of Si'man 57) ...

Halachah (cont.): He also Paskens that there where the father does not have but the son does, the son is Chayav to sustain his father, and this is also the ruling of the Ri and Rabeinu Chananel - that if the father has no money and the son does, he is obligated to sustain him with his own money ...

Reason: Since he is no worse that a stranger ...

Proof #1: About whom the Gemara writes in 'Na'arah she'Nispatsah' (Kesuvos, Daf 49b) that 'Rava forced Rav Nasan to pay four hundred Zuz for Tzedakah'.

Proof #2: Moreover, the Yerushalmi (See Masores ha'Shas) citing Rebbi Yossi, states 'I wish that all my statements would be as clear to me as this one - that one forces a son to feed his father'.

Proof #3: And another proof emerges from the Yerushalmi (Ibid.) which relates how Rebbi Yonasan and Rebbi Yashiyah were traveling together, when a man came and kissed the feet of the former.

Proof #3 (cont.): In answer to Rebbi Yonasan's request for an explanation, Rebbi Yashiyah explained that he had instructed the man cry out in the Beis-ha'Medrash. To which Rebbi Yonasan asked Rebbi Yashiyah why he did not force the son to sustain his father?

Proof #3 (concl.): And in answer to Rebbi Yashiyah's Kashya whether one forces in such a case, Rebbi Yonasan replied 'Do you need me to tell that that? Of course it is!'

Proof #4: And yet a further proof from the Yerushalmi (Ibid.) that Tosfos quoted earlier (in 31a DH 'Kabeid') ' "Kabeid es Hash-m me'Honach" - If one has money, one is Chayav; if not, he is Patur. Whereas by Kibud Av va'Eim, the Torah writes "Kabeid es Avicha ve'es Imecha" - implying whether one is wealthy or not'.

Clarification: We must say that he informed him in advance ...

Reason: To avoid it being akin to 'Someone who intends to eat the meat of a Chazir and he picked up a piece of lamb' ...

Reason (cont.): About which the Gemara says later in the last Perek (Daf 81b) that it requires forgiveness and atonement.

Refuted Explanation: Initially, this seems to be saying that even if S'kilah was more stringent, they would be subject to stoning.

Refutation: It is not correct to explain like this however

Reason: Because according to the amended text 'ha'Niskalin be'Nisrafin' - even though the majority are Chayav S'reifah, they must be stoned, since it is more lenient.

Authentic Explanation: The correct explanation must therefore be - 'Why do we need to say that 'S'reifah is more stringent'? even if they were equal, why not attribute it to the fact that 'The majority are Chayav S'kilah'?

Explanation #1: Rashi explains 'Ashma'i' to mean a Rasha and an ignoramous.

Question: How can Isi ben Yehudah then say that "Seivah" implies even a 'Zakein Ashma'i', seeing as it is even a Mitzvah to strike and to put him to shame and to treat him with contempt?

Explanation #2: Rabeinu Tam therefore explains that 'Ashma'i is a Lashon of 'Shomemin' (desolate) ...

Source: Like 'broken doorways' in Menachos, Daf 33b) ...

Explanation #2 (cont.): Meaning 'a wild & ignorant person' ...

Proof: Like Unklus translates "ve'ha'Adamah Lo Seisham" (Bereishis, 47) - and the land will not be left desolate'.

Clarification: It is not a proper Gezeirah Shavah ...

Reason: Because, if it was, they would have to be experts like they are there.

Clarification (cont.): Therefore, it must be merely an indication that he may not be a Zakein Ashma'i.

Clarification: What the Pasuk is therefore saying is "Mionei Seivah Takum ve'Hadarta, Takum ve'Hadarta P'nei Zaken" - one has acquired wisdom.

Clarification (cont.): A proof that the Torah is even speaking about a young Chacham.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that, since the Pasuk is particular about Chochmah, we see that a Zaken is not an 'Ashma'i', seeing as he needs to be wise ...

Proof: We cannot say that Rebbi Yossi argues on 'Zaken Ashma'i' as well, and says that we do not require Chochmah, because if so, that would be synonymous with Isi ben Yehudah (Rashi).

Explanation #2: The Ri adds that (like Rashi) one cannot say that Rebbi Yossi argues that Zaken Ashma'i is also included - whereas Isi includes even an old Nochri, since he says that 'Seivah implies every kind of old man' ...

Proof #1: Because nowhere do we find an obligation to honor an old Nochri ...

Proof #2: Moreover, later (on Daf 33a) the Gemara relates how Rebbi Yochanan would stand up before an old Nochri - due to his many life experiences, but not because of Isi.

Question: Since together with age, one also requires Chochmah, as Rashi explains, why, according to Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili, who includes even a young Chacham, does the Torah see fit to write "Seivah"? ...

Question (cont.): Is it not obvious that, if one must honor a young Chacham, how much more so an old one, as why would the fact that he is old make it worse?

Answer: Had the Torah not written "Seivah", we would have thought that he needs to be literally a Zaken and a Chacham ...

Answer (cont.): Therefore the Torah writes "Seivah" to reveal that he need not be both, but that one of them will suffice - even if he is a young Chacham.

Question: In that case, what does the Gemara mean when it says 'If you would have thought like the Tana Kama, why did the Torah not write "Mipnei Seivah Zaken Takum"? on the contrary, it should only have written "Zaken"? ...

Question (cont.): Seeing as Zaken without Seivah implies literally an old man?

Question (concl.): It is therefore clear that "Zaken" implies even a young Chacham, in which case, the previous question remains.

Answer: It is therefore clear to the Ri that a young Chacham needs to be exceptionally wise, which is why the Torah writes "Seivah" - even if he is not exceptionally wise ...

Answer (cont.): Equating an old man who is not exceptionally wise with a young Chacham who is ...

Conclusion: But if both the young Chacham and the old one are equal in wisdom, the young one must rise before the old one, since the former needs to be exceptionally wise, whereas the latter does not.