Explanation: When it says it is forbidden to return it, it does not mean to return his hand to himself, but rather to move it to another courtyard.

Explanation #1: The case is where the ledges are on opposite sides of the public domain, as if they were on the same side it would make a difference. This is because a person who would extend from one private domain to another on the same side over a public domain would be liable to offer a Chatas.

Explanation #2: Alternatively, the case is where they are both on the same side, and the case is where they are not extending over a public domain.

Question: This is difficult, as the Gemara can answer that this is regarding a prohibition (that if he would have known would normally be) leading to a Chatas before he transgresses a prohibition leading to stoning.

Implied Question: The Gemara says in Eiruvin (32b) that Rebbi holds that it is good for a Chaver to transgress a small prohibition in order that an Am ha'Aretz should not transgress a major prohibition. (Why doesn't our Gemara seem to agree?)

Answer #1: The Gemara (ibid.) is saying that in order that the Chaver should not cause an Am ha'Aretz to eat untithed grain because of him, he should rather transgress a small sin. This is because the Chaver says to the Am ha'Aretz, "fill up a basket of figs from my figs." However, in our case the person did not cause any prohibition to be done, and therefore we do not say that he should even do a small sin in order to prevent someone from doing a serious sin.

Opinion: The Riva says that one cannot even extrapolate from that Gemara (ibid.) that the person who stuck the dough in the oven can be lenient. In that Gemara (ibid.), there was no prohibition that had already been done. We say it is better for a Chaver to transgress a small sin in order to ascertain he will not cause someone else to commit a serious sin. However, here the sinful act was already done, and it will automatically be finished. It is possible, therefore, that we should say one should not even do a small sin to stop this.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Gitin (41b) says that we force the master of a half slave and half free man to free him. This is despite the fact that earlier (38b), the Gemara there had said in the name of Rebbi Yehudah that whoever frees his slave transgress the positive commandment of "You should always work them." (Why should the master sin in order to help the slave?)

Answer #1: The Mitzvah of Pru u'Revu (having children) is a great Mitzvah (and therefore it is worth it for the master to sin for this cause).

Proof: This is as the Gemara answers that there was an incident where Rebbi Eliezer entered the Beis Medrash and did not find ten people there. He therefore freed his slave in order to form a Minyan, as a Mitzvah for the public is a great merit (worthy of pushing aside this positive commandment).

Answer #2: Alternatively, we only say, "Should we tell someone to sin in order etc." when the other person was negligent.

Proof: This causes the Gemara in Pesachim (59a) to be understandable. The Gemara there says that the positive commandment of Pesach that involves Kares pushes aside the positive commandment that the afternoon Tamid should be the last sacrifice of the day. The Kohanim transgress this and offer the sacrifice of a Mechusar Kipurim in order that he should be able to bring his Pesach sacrifice (and we do not say "Should we tell someone to sin etc.").

Proof: Similarly, the Gemara in Eiruvin (103b) says that a Kohen who is found to have a growth (that is a blemish which prevents him from serving in the Beis Hamikdash) on Shabbos can have his friend bite it off with his teeth, even though it is a Rabbinic prohibition to do so on Shabbos.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Gitin (38b) states that the Rabbanan forced the master of a half maidservant and half free woman who was promiscuous with many men to free her due to her promiscuity. (Why should he sin in order to save her from sin when she was to blame?)

Answer #1: This is because she was making herself available to these men and seducing them, causing these men to be comparable to victims of forced circumstances.

Answer #2: Alternatively (see Maharshal and Maharam that the intent of Tosfos is that this is a separate answer), this is like a Mitzvah for the public (see e1 above).

Question: What kind of question is this regarding whether or not they permitted him to take it out? It is clear a person will not listen if we will tell him not to take it out (and remain liable to receive stoning)!

Answer: The Riva answers that if they would not permit this he would not be stoned, as he is refraining from taking it out because we tell him it is forbidden to do so.

Proof: Similarly, the Gemara in Pesachim (92a) states that regarding three things the Rabbanan stated that their words must be upheld even though it causes a person to transgress a prohibition punished by Kares. They are: A lack of Bris Milah (i.e regarding a convert, see Gemara there), sprinkling (i.e. not sprinkling on Shabbos even if it will mean one does not do the Pesach), and a knife (i.e. one cannot carry it to the Beis Hamikdash on Shabbos even if he will be unable to slaughter his Korban Pesach). This indicates he will not end up being liable to receive Kares, because the Rabbanan forbade him to bring a Korban Pesach in these circumstances.

Question: How can he possibly be liable for stoning? Isn't this a warning that is doubtful? When he put the dough in the oven, perhaps he intended to take it out before he would transgress a prohibition due to which he would be stoned? It is possible that the only reason he did not end up taking it out was because he forgot the warning!

Answer: The Riva answers that since he stuck the dough in the oven within k'Dei Dibur (approximately two seconds) of the warning, and it will certainly bake if he does not take it down, it is not considered a doubtful warning. He certainly did not intend to take it down before it baked.

Answer (cont.): An example of a case of doubtful warning is a case where one takes the mother along with the chicks according to the opinion in Makos (15a) that even if he nullified the positive commandment, he can fix it (by sending the mother bird away).

Answer (cont.): Perhaps he will not break its wings or slaughter it, and he will thereby still be able to fix what he transgressed. Now that he breaks its wings one can no longer give him warning, as the warning is only regarding his transgressing taking the chicks when the mother is present which he has already done.

Answer (cont.): Similarly, regarding a person who takes an oath, "I will not eat this loaf if I will eat this other loaf" if he eats the prohibited loaf and then eats the other loaf it is a doubtful warning. This is because when he receives a warning when he eats the prohibited loaf, he is still lacking having eaten the other loaf which would cause him to receive lashes for eating the prohibited loaf. However, in our case where he sticks the dough to the oven, there is no lack of action that has to be done in order for him to be liable.

Text: Some Sefarim have the text "Rav Bibi bar Abaye," and in their text Rav Bibi's question is explicitly regarding receiving stoning.

Explanation #1: Rabeinu Tam explains that it is abnormal to place an object on a place less than four Tefachim, and it was probably that way in the Mishkan as well.

Explanation #2: The Ri gives an added explanation that the Pasuk, "A person should not leave his place" implies that it is referring to the object as well, meaning that the object should not leave its place.

Explanation #2 (cont.): This is as we derive in Eiruvin (17b), "he should not go out" refers to "he should not take out."

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the simple explanation of the Pasuk refers to the place of the person, meaning his four cubits. (How can the Gemara derive it refers to the object?)

Answer: Even so, it also implies the place where the object is placed, and a significant place is not less than four Tefachim.

Opinion: One can somewhat prove from here that one is even liable for extending something under ten Tefachim (to a different domain).

Proof: If you will say one is exempt because we did not find this type of extending in the Mishkan since the wagons were taller than ten Tefachim, why doesn't the Mishnah say that if he throws over ten Tefachim everyone agrees that he is liable as we derive throwing from extending?

Proof (cont.): However, now that extending is liable under ten Tefachim one cannot say that above ten Tefachim everyone agrees one is liable for throwing, as if so everyone should agree that one is exempt for throwing under ten Tefachim.

Question: This is not a proof, as one cannot say that everyone agrees that we derive throwing from extending. If we would, who would be the author of the Mishnah later (96a) that says that if they were both on the same side of the public domain throwing would be exempt but extending would make one liable? This Mishnah clearly indicates that we do not derive throwing from extending (as their laws are not the same)!

Proof: This is clearly true, as even if we will say that if one extends under ten Tefachim he is liable, we can say that according to everyone we derive throwing from extending. This would mean that on one side of the public domain, whether it is under ten Tefachim or over ten Tefachim everyone would say one is liable.

Proof (cont.): The only argument would be regarding less than ten Tefachim when the ledges are on the opposite sides of the public domain. One opinion would be that we say that when an object is in the airspace of a domain it is as if it is placed there, and the other opinion would be that it is not as if it is placed there.

Proof (cont.): However, it is still impossible to say that everyone holds we derive throwing from extending due to the Mishnah (ibid. that says they have different laws).

Observation: Based on what we will soon explain, it is understandable that we do not say this.

Question: It is clear that throwing from a private domain to a private domain over a public domain did not occur during the building of the Mishkan.

Proof: If it did, why would one need to derive from extending, and why would the Rabbanan say one is exempt?

Question (cont.): However, since it was not done in the building of the Mishkan, why does Rebbi Akiva say one is liable? Regarding a Toldah of Hotza'ah, which is a weak Melachah, we only make one liable if he carries in a manner that occurred during the building of the Mishkan, as I explained earlier (2a, DH "Pashat").

Answer: Rebbi Akiva holds that throwing is more comparable to extending than other Toldos are like Hotza'ah.

Explanation: When the object is in the hand of the poor person or homeowner it is not possible to say it is as if it is in that domain, as when the homeowner puts an object in his hand and sticks it out he is not liable.

Question: The Ri has difficulty with this. If there is a Beraisa somewhere that says that we require that an object is placed on an area of four Tefachim, as is indeed implied by Rebbi Zeira's statement later that this is the opinion of Acheirim, implying that the Rabbanan argue, how can the Gemara here say everyone holds he is liable? Who, then, is the author of that Beraisa?

Answer: This is not difficult, as it is not hard to understand that we will say Rebbi Akiva and the Rabbanan follow our Mishnah and do not hold like this Beraisa, as it is better that we say the Mishnah is according to everyone.

Question: The Ri has difficulty with this. Why does the Gemara ask that it seems it is obvious to Rabah etc.? How does it know that this is obvious to Rabah?

Question (cont.): If it is because he says that this is according to Rebbi Akiva, this is because Rebbi Akiva clearly holds an object in airspace is as if it is placed in that domain. However, he is doubtful whether or not this is true according to the Rabbanan. This is why he could not say that this is according to the Rabbanan.

Question (cont.): If we would say that the Gemara's statement earlier, "Rebbi Akiva holds an object in airspace is as if it is placed in that domain, while the Rabbanan etc." is all a statement said by Rabah, it would be understandable (that Rabah says this is their argument as he said it outright, not because of the implication of his saying it is Rebbi Akiva). However, it does not appear that Rabah said this statement.

Answer #1: The Ri answers that the Gemara means as follows (including 4b). Didn't Rabah ask a question about this? Since their argument is unclear, it is possible that everyone agrees that we do not say an object in airspace is as if it is placed in that domain. Therefore, when the two private domains are on opposite sides of the public domain, everyone will agree he is exempt.

Answer #1 (cont.): They argue when the two are on the same side of the public domain. Rebbi Akiva understands we derive throwing from extending, and the Rabbanan hold that we do not derive throwing from extending. Rabah merely did not see a need to explain all of these questions.

Answer #2: The Ri also says that when the Gemara says, "However, less than ten Tefachim everyone says he is liable because we say an object that is in airspace is as if it is placed" it is according to the Rabbanan. However, according to Rebbi Akiva, an object that it is in airspace is not as if it is placed in that domain, and one is liable because we derive throwing from extending.

Answer #2 (cont.): If he held that it is as if it is placed in that domain, he could not derive throwing from extending, as they incomparable. Since it is as it is placed in that domain, throwing above ten Tefachim is like throwing from a private domain to a Makom Petur, and from a Makom Petur to a private domain. It would be incomparable to extending which occurs from a private domain to another private domain with the public domain between them.

Answer #2 (cont.): It must be that since he holds that we derive throwing from extending he also holds that an object in airspace is not as if it is placed in that domain.

Answer #2 (cont.): It is now understandable that the Gemara asks that it seems it is obvious to Rabah etc. It is also understandable why we could not say earlier that above ten Tefachim everyone agrees he is liable, as we derive throwing from extending. This is because according to Rebbi Akiva we cannot do so, since he holds an object in airspace is as if it is placed in that domain.

Proof: This is also implied from the fact that Rav Chisda asks a similar question to Rabah in the Gemara later (97a). If the conclusion that an object in airspace is as if it is placed in that domain is also according to Rebbi Akiva, how can we say according to Rav Chisda that everyone agrees it is as if it is placed in that domain? Later (8a), the Gemara implies that Rav Chisda only does not require the object being placed on an area of four Tefachim in the private domain (not in the public domain, showing he does not hold it is as if it is placed in any domain)!

Implied Question: However, the Rashba understands in the Gemara later (8a) that even in the public domain Rav Chisda does not require the object to be placed on an area of four Tefachim.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the Gemara deduces this from the fact that Rebbi Akiva did not say that one is liable twice, once due to his taking out to the public domain and once for bringing into the private domain.

Question #1: Perhaps Rebbi Akiva did not say one is liable twice because he does not say one is liable for a Toldah when he is doing its Av?

Question #2: Additionally, the Gemara later quotes Rav Yehudah as saying that Rebbi held one is liable for two prohibitions, even though Rebbi merely says one is liable. It would seem that we could also say Rebbi Akiva means that one is liable for two prohibitions!

Explanation #2: It appears that we can explain that when the Gemara asks we require taking it is because we derive from the Mishkan, where they used to take items out of a box that was four by four Tefachim (at least) and put them in the hands of the people doing the Melachah.

Observation: According to what we explained earlier (4a, DH "v'Ha") that we derive from the Pasuk, "A man should not leave from his place" it is understandable that it is talking about taking.

Question: The Rashba has difficulty with this. Why do Rabah and Rav

that one's thoughts about a place cause it to be considered a significant place.

Question (cont.): This is as Rav Yosef says (ibid.) that if one urinates and spits (i.e. from the private domain to the public domain on Shabbos) he is liable to bring a Chatas. The Gemara there asks, don't we require a place of four Tefachim which is not present? The Gemara answers, his thoughts that this is a significant place cause it to be a significant place. Otherwise, how could Rabah say that if one throws into the mouth of a dog or an oven he is liable etc.?

Answer: Rabeinu Tam answers that when they say his thoughts cause it to be a significant place, it is only where he only wants this to occur in this fashion. This fits urinating or spitting, as he cannot urinate or spit in any other way. This similarly applies to throwing something into the mouth of a dog, as he wants the dog to eat what he is throwing or (in the case of throwing into an oven) he wants the wood to be burned in the oven.

Answer (cont.): We do not have the text there, "and it rested in the mouth of a dog" as this would imply he did not specifically intend for it to end up in the mouth of the dog. However, in our Gemara, he does not care if he accepts it with his hand or a vessel.

Implied Question: The Gemara later (5a) says, "I would think that where he though his hand significant etc." even though there he would not mind if he accepted it in a different manner (i.e. a vessel). (This is unlike our answer!)

Answer: This is because the Gemara (ibid.) says that a person's hand is significant to him like a place that is four by four Tefachim. However, regarding other things his thoughts would not make them significant unless he only wanted the object to be placed there.

Question: One can still ask that perhaps it does not require placing, but it does need to be taken from its place!

Answer: The Gemara asks a strong question without having to answer this question.

Text #1: However, this is difficult according to the Sefarim that have the text later (96a) regarding Rav Yehudah's statement later where he says that Rebbi would say one is liable for two prohibitions. Rav Chisda had difficulty with this. Does this mean that Rebbi said one is liable for a Toldah (separately) when he is also doing the Av etc.? Rav Yosef answered him, do you say this is stated by Rebbi and therefore you have your difficulty? We say Rebbi Yehudah said this, that according to Rebbi Yehudah he would be liable for two prohibitions. However, Rebbi does not say one is liable for two prohibitions, as Rebbi does not say one is liable for a Toldah when he does an Av.

Question: If so, what did Rav Yosef answer when he said, "Who is this, Rebbi?" You should still ask that perhaps he did not require placing, but he does require taking (from a place that is four by four Tefachim)!

Answer: Rav Yosef understands that specifically regarding an object in airspace discussed by Rebbi Akiva, when no placing is being done yet at all, one can ask that a taking is required. However, since Rebbi requires placing on some kind of small ledge, he must similarly say one can take from a very small place.

Question: However, the Gemara later does not hold of Rav Yosef's logic, as it asks on Rebbi Zeira that perhaps others require taking from a place of four Tefachim and it is not enough to take from a small place as it is regarding placing an object.

Text #2: Rabeinu Tam understands that the text later (96a) should read that Rav Yosef was sitting and had a difficulty. Rav Chisda told him etc.

Text #2 (cont.): This is understandable, as Rav Yosef was learning the words of Rav Yehudah regarding Rebbi.

Implied Question: When the Gemara later asks, "Wasn't it taught etc." it could have asked this question on Rav Yosef (96b) that Rebbi did not say one is liable for a Toldah if he did the Av, as the Beraisa states that Rebbi derived this from the word "Devarim, ha'Devarim, Eileh ha'Devarim." (Why didn't it ask this question?)

Implied Question (cont.): Rabeinu Tam's text appears correct, as according to the text that Rav Yosef's question was regarding Rav Yehudah on Rebbi Yehudah there is a contradiction in Rav Yosef. The Gemara there says clearly that Rabah and Rav Yosef both say that Rebbi Yehudah holds one is only liable for one (not both the Toldah and the Av).

Answer: It is possible to push this aside by saying that Rav Yosef said this in the name of Rav Yehudah who says one is liable for both, but he does not hold this way.

Implied Question: Our Gemara could have said that the case is where the trunk and branches of a tree are both in a private domain, and its trunk is four Tefachim. Rebbi holds that the branches are like the trunk and therefore are considered to be a significant place of four Tefachim. The Rabbanan hold that we do not say that the branches are like the trunk and they are therefore not considered to be a significant place of four Tefachim.

Implied Question (cont.): Our Gemara also holds regarding the private domain that we require a place that is four by four Tefachim.

Proof: This is indicated by the Gemara later, "The Mishnah should state, the basket in his hand. This is understandable in the private domain etc." This implies that in the private domain we also require a place of four Tefachim."

Answer: Rather, it says it in this way because Abaye's statement was taught in this chapter regarding the words of Rav Chisda. Rav Chisda said that if a person stuck a reed in the private domain and had an object rest on it, even if it is one hundred cubits tall he is liable. The Gemara asks, does this mean that Rav Chisda holds like Rebbi? The Gemara answers, this is in the private domain, where everyone agrees that Rav Chisda is correct.

Answer (cont.): Here the case is regarding a tree that is standing in the private domain and its branches are in the public domain. The case is where the trunk is not even four Tefachim. Rebbi holds that the branches should go after the trunk, as it is like a private domain which is liable even though there is not four Tefachim, as stated by Rav Chisda. The Rabbanan hold that we do not say the branches have the status of the trunk.

Question: However, there is a difficulty. Why doesn't Abaye answer later regarding a tree that is totally (trunk and branches) in the public domain and whose trunk is four Tefachim that Rebbi says the branches have the status of the trunk and it is considered a place of four Tefachim, while the Rabbanan say the branches are not considered a place of four Tefachim?

Question (cont.): Rav Chisda admits that we require a place of four Tefachim in the pubic domain. Rav Chisda only said his law in the private domain, as implied later that in the private domain everyone agrees, as stated by Rav Chisda.

Answer #1: We cannot say the case is regarding the public domain. If the branches hang down lower than three Tefachim, the Rabbanan would not say he is exempt even though there is not a space of four Tefachim. This is because it would be like firm land. Rebbi would not say one is liable if it is more than three Tefachim, as it would be a Karmelis if it is four Tefachim wide, or a Makom Petur if it is not four Tefachim wide.

Answer #2: The Rashba understands that we could say that the branches have the status of the trunk in the public domain. The case would be if the trunk is less than three Tefachim off the ground, or it is nine Tefachim tall and people use it to put their load onto it. This is considered the public domain. The case is also where its branches are higher than three Tefachim.

Answer #2 (cont.): According to Rebbi, the branches are like the public domain, as we consider them to have the same law as the trunk, just as we do so in order to make it into a private domain (when the trunk has that law). The Rabbanan hold it is not like a public domain.

Implied Question: Why, then, doesn't Abaye hold like this?

Answer: This is because Rav Chisda does not require a place that is four Tefachim in the public domain, as why should it be different (from a private domain)? Rav Chisda only stated his law regarding the private domain because he wanted to teach that even if it is one hundred cubits tall it applies, as the private domain is considered to go up to the heavens. Since he mentioned the private domain, the Gemara said afterward that regarding the private domain everyone agrees with Rav Chisda (even though he similarly said this regarding the public domain).

Implied Question: Abaye later states according to Rav Chisda that the ledge refers to a small ledge, even though they argue even if it is a four Tefachim wide ledge. (Why, then, did he have to say it is a small ledge?)

Answer#1: The Rashba says that Abaye says it is a small ledge because it is over ten Tefachim tall. If it would be four Tefachim wide, it would be a private domain and the Rabbanan would not say one is exempt even if kids (baby goats) go under it if they would hold like Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah later (101a, who is not concerned about this).

Question: This does not appear correct to the Ri, who understands that this is stated to include the position of Rebbi.

Answer #2: The Ri says that if Abaye would have merely stated "a ledge" one would think that it must be four Tefachim wide. Rebbi's reason would not be because the branches follow the trunk. Rather, I would think that he holds like Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah that if a person sticks a reed in the public domain and it has a basket on top of it, one is liable. This is why he mentioned "a very small ledge" in order to teach that the reason of Rebbi is because the branches should be put after the trunk etc.

Opinion: Rashi explains here that one says the branches are like the trunk, and it is like they are in the public domain on an area of four Tefachim.

Question: It is impossible to say this explanation. If it is less than three Tefachim from the ground, everyone agrees we do not require it to be four Tefachim wide. If it is higher than three Tefachim off the ground it is not a public domain, unless we say the case is where it is a thick fig cake and he sticks it onto the branches.