1) TOSFOS DH B'ISSUR

תוספות ד"ה באיסור

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains the concept of an Issur that comes by itself.)

וא"ת והא נמי איתא בהדיא במשנה דמייתי לקמן יש אוכל אכילה אחת וחייב עליה ד' חטאות ואשם אחד וקחשיב מוקדשין אע"ג דאיסור הבא מעצמו הוא וכן האוכל גיד הנשה של עולה בס"פ גיד הנשה (חולין דף קא.)

(a) Question: The Mishnah later states that there is a person who eats one eating and is liable to bring four Korbanos Chatas and one Asham. One of the reasons he is liable is because he is an impure person who ate Kodshim, despite the fact that this is a prohibition that came to him by itself. The same is true regarding a person who ate the Gid ha'Nasheh of an Olah in Chulin (101a).

ויש לומר דהכא באיסור הבא מעצמו על עצמו קאמר דלא אמרינן אבל מוקדשין שאסורין על כל העולם אמרי'

(b) Answer: When the Gemara here says "a prohibition that came on its own," it means it came "to the sinner on his own." [In other words, because the person made a vow, he created a prohibition for himself. The Gemara says that one might have thought that we do not say Issur Kollel in such a situation.] However, a Korban that is forbidden from being eaten by anyone is clearly a valid prohibition.

ומ"מ פריך לקמן שפיר והרי הקדש דאיסור הבא מעצמו

(c) Implied Question: Even so, the Gemara later appropriately asks, "Isn't Hekdesh an Issur that comes from itself." [Using the definition above, how is Hekdesh an Issur that is on the person himself? It is forbidden to the entire world!]

דכיון דלא איירי תנא באיסור הבא מעצמו לא ה"ל למינקט הקדש אע"ג דאסור על כל העולם

(d) Answer: Being that the Tana is not discussing an Issur that one makes on oneself he should not have said Hekdesh, even though it is forbidden to everyone. [In other words, when the person creates the prohibition but it is on the whole world, it is misleading enough to be confused with an actual prohibition one creates specifically for themselves. Therefore, the Tana should not have given that example if he did not mean to include this topic.]

2) TOSFOS DH HA'OCHEL

תוספות ד"ה האוכל

(SUMMARY: Rashi and Tosfos argue regarding whether or not the animal could even have become a Neveilah on Erev Yom Kippur.)

מתוך פ"ה משמע דאיירי אפי' בנתנבלה ביוה"כ

(a) Opinion#1: Rashi implies that he is exempt even if the animal became a Neveilah on Yom Kippur.

וקשיא דלמ"ד ס"פ גיד הנשה (שם דף קג.) בהמה בחייה לאו לאברים עומדת חל איסור יוה"כ מחיים

(b) Question: This is difficult. According to the opinion in Chulin (103a) that an animal is not considered to be alive for the purpose of eating its limbs, the prohibition of Yom Kippur should apply when it is still alive! [Being that there is no preexisting prohibition of Eiver Min ha'Chai at the start of Yom Kippur, there is no reason the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur should not be on the animal before any other prohibition.]

ואפי' למ"ד לאברים עומדת כי מתה פקע איסור אבר מן החי וחלו איסור נבילה ואיסור יוה"כ בבת אחת ור"ש מודה באיסור בת אחת

1. Even according to the opinion that an animal is considered alive for the purpose of eating its limbs (and therefore the prohibition of Eiver Min ha'Chai preceded eating on Yom Kippur), when the animal dies there is no longer a prohibition of Eiver Min ha'Chai! The prohibition of Neveilah and Yom Kippur should arrive at the same time, and Rebbi Shimon agrees that in such a case both prohibitions apply! [Why does he say he is exempt from eating on Yom Kippur?]

ומיהו יש לומר דאיסור יוה"כ לא חייל לא מחיים ולא לאחר מיתה משום דאית ביה איסור עשה שאינה זבוחה דכתיב (דברים יב) וזבחת ואכלת מה שאתה זובח אתה אוכל אבל מה שאי אתה זובח לא

(c) Answer: It is possible to say that the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur never goes on this animal, both when it is alive and when it is dead. This is because there is a positive prohibition against eating it because it is not slaughtered. This is as the Pasuk states, "And you will slaughter and you will eat." This teaches us that what you slaughter you may eat. What you do not slaughter, you may not eat. [Being that this prohibition is always on the animal, the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur cannot take effect.]

ולריצב"א אין נראה פירוש זה דא"כ למ"ד לאו לאברים עומדת היכי מצי חייל איסור אבר על עשה דשאינו זבוח

(d) Question: The Ritzba does not endorse this opinion. If so, according to the opinion that an animal is not considered as limbs when alive, how can the prohibition of Aiver Min ha'Chai override the prohibition against eating unslaughtered meat? [There should never be a prohibition of Eiver Min ha'Chai!]

ובס"פ גיד הנשה (שם) דאמר כגון שנטרפה עם יציאת רובה דאיסור אבר ואיסור חלב ואיסור טריפה בהדי הדדי קאתו והיכי חיילי כולם על איסור דשאינו זבוח דאפי' במעי האם קיימא באיסור זה

1. In Chulin (ibid.), the Gemara says that the case is where it became a Treifah when most of it came out of its mother. In such a case, the prohibitions against Eiver Min ha'Chai, Cheilev, and Treifah all arrived together. However, how can any of them supersede the prohibition against eating unslaughtered kosher animals that even applies in the mother's womb?

ומהאי טעמא תקשי נמי למ"ד לאברים עומדת איסור אבר מן החי היכי משכחת לה דלא קיימא לאברים במעי האם וא"כ היכי חייל על איסור שאינו זבוח

2. For this reason, one can also ask a question according to the opinion that an animal is considered as limbs when alive. How can we ever find an Issur of Eiver Min ha'Chai? The animal is not considered for limbs when it is in the mother's womb. If so, how can this prohibition take effect when there is the preexisting prohibition against eating unslaughtered meat?

אלא ודאי וזבחת לא אתא לאסור דבלאו הכי אסורה וקיימא מחיים באיסור אבר מן החי ולאחר מיתה באיסור נבילה אלא בא להתיר את האסור ופירש לך דבשחיטה שריא ולא בנחירה

(e) Opinion#2: Rather, it is clear that the Pasuk, "And you will slaughter" is not coming to forbid anything. In any event the animal is forbidden, when alive because of Eiver Min ha'Chai, and when it is killed because it is Neveilah. Rather, this Pasuk is coming to permit something that is forbidden (eating animals), and explains that slaughtering the animal makes it permitted, not tearing it apart in any other way.

אלא כדקיימא קיימא כמו (בכורות דף טו.) תזבח ולא גיזה דלית ביה עשה אלא קאי באיסור לאו הראשון

1. Rather, the Pasuk is saying that the animal stays as is (during its lifetime, and does not have a prohibition of being unslaughtered meat). This is like the Pasuk, "You should slaughter" from which we learn that the shearings of Kodshim that received a permanent blemish after they became Hekdesh and were subsequently redeemed cannot be used. This is not a new positive commandment, but rather says that the original negative prohibition still applies.

ובנתנבלה מערב יוה"כ דוקא איירי

2. Accordingly, the Ritzba holds that the case must be where it became a Neveilah on Erev Yom Kippur.

3) TOSFOS DH ELA HEIN

תוספות ד"ה אלא הן

(SUMMARY: Tosfos discusses oaths that are valid despite the fact that they cause one to sin.)

דאפי' ע"י כולל נמי לא אמרי' דתיחול השבועה לבטל המצוה

(a) Explanation: Even through an Issur Kollel, we do not say that a prohibition should take effect to negate a Mitzvah.

וקשה לריצב"א דתני בירושלמי שבועה שלא אוכל מצה ואכל מצה בלילי פסח חייב אלמא דבאיסור כולל חיילא שבועה לבטל את המצוה

(b) Question: The Ritzba has difficulty with this. The Yerushalmi teaches that if someone swears not to eat Matzah, and he does eat Matzah on the night of Pesach, he is liable for transgressing his oath. This implies that an Issur Kollel will be valid in order to forbid doing a Mitzvah.

ותירץ דהכא דוקא לא חיילא שבועה משום שהזכיר נבילה ונשבע עליה לאוכלה אבל התם דלא מדכר פסח חיילא עליה שבועה ולפי זה משכחת הן אפי' בדברים האסורים כשאומר סתם שאוכל

(c) Answer#1: The Ritzba answers that the oath is not valid in our Gemara because he mentioned Neveilah, and swore to eat it. However, in the Yerushalmi where he did not mention Pesach (i.e. the Mitzvah of Matzah in his oath), the oath is valid. According to this, we find a possibility of doing things that are forbidden when he says that he will eat. [Just as not eating Matzah did not exclude Pesach night, so too saying, "I will eat" includes forbidden things.]

וקשיא לפי' דקתני התם סיפא שבועה שלא אוכל מצה בלילי פסח פטור אמאי נקט בלא כולל בכולל נמי שאר לילות עם לילי פסח כיון שהזכיר נמי לילי פסח פטור

(d) Question: There is difficulty with his explanation. The Beraisa states there (Yerushalmi) that if someone swears not to eat Matzah on Pesach night (and he eats Matzah anyway), he is exempt. Why did the Beraisa state this without making the prohibition in a general way? Even if someone swore not to eat Matzah at night and on Pesach night, being that he included Pesach night he would be exempt!

וי"ל דה"נ בעי למימר ולא חש למיתני אלא שהזכיר לילי פסח

(e) Answer: It could have said this, but only bothered saying the nights of Pesach. (It still means that this would also be the law if he said at night in general together with Pesach night).

ור"י מפרש דודאי שב ואל תעשה כדאיירי הכא לא חיילא דקאמר שבועה שאוכל ולא אכל אבל התם בנשבע שלא לאכול ואכל דהוי בקום עשה ודאי חיילא

(f) Answer#2: The Ri explains that the oath is certainly not valid in a case where he abstains from action, as in a case where he swears to eat and does not eat. However, if he swears not to eat and eats, meaning that he must do an action to transgress his oath, the oath is valid.

4) TOSFOS DH ELA K'D'RAVA

תוספות ד"ה אלא כדרבא

(SUMMARY: Tosfos defends both Rashi's understanding of the Gemara and the explanation that Rashi attacks.)

פי' בקונט' דסוגיא דעלמא גרסינן משכחת לה כדרבא ומפרש לה בנבילה המסרחת

(a) Text: Rashi explains that the common text of the Gemara reads, "We find a case as per the statement of Rava." The Gemara explains that this is referring to a Neveilah that is rotten (and is not fit to be eaten).

והקשה חדא דמסרחת לא מיקריא נבילה

(b) Question: Rashi asked (on this text) that this would not be called a Neveilah.

ואר"ת דאין זו קשיא דשפיר מיקרי נבילה מדאיצטריך קרא למעוטי לר"ש בשילהי ע"ז (דף סח. ושם) דדריש הראויה לגר קרויה נבילה ור"מ מוקי לה בסרוחה מעיקרא

(c) Answer: Rabeinu Tam answers that this is not difficult, as it clearly can be called a Neveilah. This is indicated by the fact that the Gemara in Avodah Zarah (68a) states that Rebbi Shimon requires a Pasuk to exclude a rotten Neveilah. He derives that a Neveilah that is appropriate for a Ger (i.e. fit to be eaten) is a Neveilah. Rebbi Meir understands that the Pasuk is referring to a Neveilah that was always unfit (when it was alive, and therefore never became forbidden). [Without the Pasuk, we would have seemingly included a rotten Neveilah in the word Neveilah.]

ועוד הקשה בקונט' דמאי בעי לאתויי דרבא הכא ה"ל למימר משכחת לה בנבילה מסרחת

(d) Question: Rashi also asks that it would seem that there is no need to quote Rava. The Gemara should have merely said the case is when the Neveilah is rotten.

והא נמי יש ליישב דה"פ כדרבא דשייך לשון אכילה אפי' במסרחת

(e) Answer: This can also be answered. The Gemara means that this is according to Rava, who holds that one can use the term "eating" even regarding a rotten Neveilah.

מדקאמר שלא אוכל סתם ואכל עפר פטור הא שלא אוכל עפר ואכל חייב אלמא שייך לשון אכילה אפי' בעפר וכ"ש בנבילה מסרחת

1. Being that Rava says that if someone says, "I will not eat" and he eats earth, he is exempt, he implies that if a person says, "I will not eat earth" and he does eat earth, he is liable. This means that it is possible to use the word "eat" regarding earth, and certainly regarding a rotten Neveilah.

וטפי ה"ל לאיתויי בעיא דרבא שבועה שלא אוכל עפר בכמה דמפורש טפי אלא רישא דמילתא נקט

2. The Gemara should have quoted Rava's question regarding someone who swears not to eat earth. Rava asked, how much does such a person have to eat in order to transgress his oath? [This clearly shows that Rava held the term "eating" can be used regarding earth.] However, it said his first statement (quoted on 22b) instead.

והא דקאמר אף אנן נמי תנינא מייתי ראיה דשייך לשון אכילה גבי נבילה סרוחה דכמה שקצים ורמשים איכא דלא חזו לאכילה טפי מנבילה סרוחה והשתא מיתוקמא שפיר מתני' סיפא במפרש כדאוקימנא ומשכחת לה שפיר בלאו והן

3. When the Gemara says, "We also learned this in our Mishnah," it is bringing proof that it is possible to use the term "eating" regarding a rotten Neveilah. There are many disgusting and crawling creatures that are less unfit to eat than a rotten Neveilah. We can now establish that the second part of the Mishnah is referring to a case where one explicitly stated Neveilah, as we indeed have stated. We also see a way where he did not have to and also could have eaten rotten Neveilah (as this is permitted).

וא"ת וכיון דנבילה סורחת הויא בכלל נבילה בלא כולל דברים המותרים אתי שפיר כיון דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל נבילה מגו דחיילא אסרוחה חיילא נמי אשאינה סרוחה

(f) Question: Being that a rotten Neveilah is included in the term "Neveilah," even without including permitted items the oath should be valid! When someone swears not to eat Neveilah, being that it is valid regarding a rotten Neveilah, it is also valid regarding a regular Neveilah.

וי"ל דלא משמע סרוחה בכלל נבילה אלא כשכולל עמהן דברים המותרים דגלי אדעתיה שרצה לאסור עצמו בדבר המותר

(g) Answer: A rotten Neveilah is not presumed to be included in the term Neveilah unless he explicitly adds permitted things. This would show that he wanted to forbid himself from eating a permitted thing.

אבל קשה לר"י דמאי מייתי רב מרי אף אנן נמי תנינא אדרבה תקשי ליה מינה דהא אוקמה מתני' במפרש שלא אוכל נבילה דאז ודאי הויא לשון אכילה

(h) Question#1: However, this is difficult according to the Ri. Why does Rav Mari say, "We also learned this in the Mishnah?" On the contrary, the Mishnah should serve as a question, as the case of the Mishnah was established as being when he said that he will not eat Neveilah. This is certainly a term of eating!

וכן נמי תקשה לרבא דפטר בנשבע סתם ואכל עפר דלא הוי בכלל לשון אכילה

(i) Question#2: One can also ask this as a question on Rava who said that if he swore not to eat and ate earth that he is exempt, because eating earth is not included in eating.

וצ"ל כדמשני הש"ס דשאני התם דאחשביה מעיקרא

(j) Answer: It must be as the Gemara answers that the case in the Mishnah is different, as he showed before he made the oath that it is important to him.

ולגבי הא דהוי סתם כמפרש הוה ידע מעיקרא דאהני טעמא דאחשבה אבל אי אפי' כי מפרש לא מהני במידי דלאו בר אכילה לא ס"ד דליתהני הא דאחשביה שיחשב כמו בר אכילה

1. Regarding a case where being general is like being specific, the Gemara knew originally that "Achshaveih" -- "showing that something is important" changes status. However, if even when a person explicitly states something it does not help if it is not edible at all, we would not think that Achshaveih helps to consider it food.

ומסיק כיון דאחשביה חשיב בר אכילה כיון דאכל מעיקרא והדר אשתבע

2. The Gemara concludes that being that he is Machshiv this it is considered edible, as he ate it first and then swore.

וע"ק לר"י מדתניא בתוספתא דשבועות שבועה שאוכל ואכל אוכלין אסורין כגון פיגול נותר וטמא פטור ור"ש מחייב והיינו בע"כ בשאינם סרוחים מדמחייב ר"ש לפי שלא חלה שבועה עלייהו ע"י כולל אלמא אפי' באין סרוחה חלה שבועה לרבנן ע"י כולל

(k) Question#1: The Ri has another question. The Tosefta here states that if someone swears that he will eat, and he ate forbidden foods such as Pigul, Nosar, and Tamei, he is exempt. Rebbi Shimon holds he is liable. This must be talking about a case where the forbidden foods are not rotten, as Rebbi Shimon holds he is liable because the oath is not regarding these forbidden foods at all, even though "eat" is a general term. This implies that even when the food is not rotten, the Rabbanan hold it is included automatically in the oath in a general manner (together with permitted foods).

ולפ"ה נמי דפירש דמשכחת הן בדברים המותרים קשיא דאפי' באסורין נמי משכחת לה כשאומר סתם שאוכל ואינו מזכיר האיסור כדמשמע התם

(l) Question#2: According to Rashi who explained that the possibility (of fulfilling the act mentioned in the oath) is permitted things, this is difficult. Even regarding forbidden things we can find such a case! The case is where he says he will eat without mentioning forbidden things, as is implied there (Tosefta).

ונראה לר"י דבקונט' לא פירש אלא משום ר"ש דלדידיה לא חיילא שבועה אדברים האסורין אפי' ע"י כולל

(m) Answer: The Ri understands that Rashi's explanation is according to Rebbi Shimon. According to him, an oath does not take effect on forbidden items, even when included in general with permitted items.

ומתוספתא שהבאתי יש ראיה לריצב"א דאפי' בלא קום עשה חייל על ידי כולל בשאין מזכיר האיסור

(n) Proof: The Tosefta above is a proof to the Ritzba, as it shows that even without an action forbidden things can be included in a general manner, as long as the forbidden item is not explicitly mentioned.

וא"ת לפ"ה אמאי איצטריך למימר לקמן בסמוך שבועה שלא אוכל תאנים וחזר ואמר שבועה שלא אוכל תאנים וענבים בחזר ואמר שבועה שלא אוכל סתמא סגי

(o) Question: According to Rashi, why do we have to say later in the case where a person swore not to eat figs, that he went back and swore not to eat figs and grapes? Even if his second oath would be not to eat in general, it would also take effect!

וי"ל דאין הכי נמי דלאו דוקא נקט תאנים וענבים אלא כלומר שאמר שלא אוכל סתם

(p) Answer: It indeed would take effect. The Gemara does not specifically mean "figs and grapes," but rather means in general that he swore not to eat.

וכן נ"ל דאי דוקא נקט תאנים וענבים היכי חיילא שבועה הא ליתא בהן

(q) Proof: This appears to be correct. If it specifically meant "figs and grapes," how could the oath take effect regarding the figs? He cannot eat the figs (as he already swore not to eat them)!

וליכא למימר דלמלקות איירי דלא בעינן לאו והן

(r) Implied Question: One cannot say that it is referring to him receiving lashes, for which the possibility of negative and positive is not necessary (it is only necessary for a Korban Shevuah). [Why not?]

דלקמן בס"פ (דף כט.) משמע דלקרבן איירי גבי ואכל תאנים והפריש קרבן

(s) Answer: This is because the Gemara later (29a) implies that it is referring to a Korban Shevuah when it says, "And he ate figs and separated a Korban."

ומיהו י"ל דמשכחת הן בתאנים השוערים אבל בלא כולל לא הוי תאנים השוערים בכלל תאנים אלא הטובות לאכול

(t) Answer (to q): However, it is possible to find a positive fulfillment in (this vow), namely disgusting figs. However, without his inclusion these disgusting figs would not be included in (his first oath when he said) the word "figs," which would be relegated to figs that are good to eat.

5) TOSFOS DH U'MA'AN D'PATAR

תוספות ד"ה ומאן דפטר

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains that Rava's statement is not according to Rebbi Shimon.)

לאו אדר' שמעון קאי דשמעינן ליה בהדיא לרבי שמעון דלית ליה איסור מוסיף בפ' ד' אחים (יבמות דף לב. ושם) גבי נשא חי ואח"כ נשא מת דקאמר רבי שמעון אינו חייב אלא משום אחות אשה בלבד ולא חייל עליה איסור אשת אח אע"ג דאיתוסף בה איסור לגבי שאר אחין

(a) Explanation: This is not according to Rebbi Shimon. We clearly see that Rebbi Shimon does not hold of Issur Mosif (an added new prohibition takes effect) in Yevamos (32a). Rebbi Shimon says there that in a case where two sisters married two brothers, if the surviving brother married a sister before the deceased brother married the second sister when he was alive, the second sister is forbidden to the surviving brother solely because she is his wife's sister. The prohibition of her being his brother's former wife (without a Heter of Yibum) does not take effect, even though this prohibition added new prohibitions on his other brothers. [Rebbi Shimon holds that once the surviving brother married his wife, her unmarried sister became forbidden to him. After she then married his brother, the added prohibition of being his brother's wife is irrelevant to the first married brother, even though this prohibition now prohibited her to the other brothers (if there is no Heter of Yibum).]

אלא אשאר תנאי קאי דלית להו איסור כולל ואית להו איסור מוסיף כגון ר' יוסי בפ' ד' אחין (שם) דקאמר אשת איש ונעשית חמותו נידון באשת איש ואמר דמודה באיסור מוסיף

1. Rather, it is according to other Tanaim who do not hold that an Issur Kollel takes effect, but do hold that an Issur Mosif takes effect. For example, Rebbi Yosi in Yevamos (ibid.) holds that if a married woman becomes his mother-in-law, he is judged as having had an affair with a married woman. The Gemara there still states that he admits that an Issur Mosif takes effect. [It must be he holds of Issur Mosif, but not Issur Kollel.]

6) TOSFOS DH YESH OCHEL

תוספות ד"ה יש אוכל

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains that this is indeed an Issur Kollel, not an Issur Mosif.)

פי' בקונט' דמוקדשין הוי איסור כולל דמיגו דחייל אבשר חייל נמי אחלב

(a) Explanation: Rashi explains that Mukdashin is a prohibition that is general. Being that it is valid for the meat, it is also valid for the forbidden fat.

והדאמר בפ' אמרו לו (כריתות דף יד.) אקדשה מיגו דאיתוסף בה איסור הנאה איתוסף בה איסור לגבי אכילת חלב

(b) Implied Question: Didn't they say in Kerisus (14a) that once a person is Makdish a Korban, being that it now has a prohibition that one cannot benefit from it, there is an added prohibition ("Issur Mosif" not an "Issur Kollel") against its forbidden fats?

התם נמי איסור כולל הוא ולא קרי ליה מוסיף אלא משום שהוא חמור על קל

(c) Answer: The Gemara there means an Issur Kollel. It only called it "Mosif" -- "added" because it is adding a stringent prohibition to a lenient prohibition.

7) TOSFOS DH IM HAYSAH

תוספות ד"ה אם היתה

(SUMMARY: Tosfos argues with Rashi regarding how many prohibitions one transgresses due to this act of carrying.)

פירש בקונטרס משום הוצאת שבת אבל משום הוצאת יוה"כ לא דקסבר אין עירוב והוצאה ליוה"כ

(a) Explanation#1: Rashi explains that he is liable for carrying on Shabbos. However, he is not liable for carrying on Yom Kippur, as he holds that there is no Eiruv and prohibition against carrying on Yom Kippur.

ואין נראה דבכריתות (שם) מסיק הא דרפרם בדותא היא

(b) Implied Question: This does not seem correct, as in Kerisus the Gemara concludes that Rafram's opinion (that there is no Eiruv etc.) is a mistake.

וחייב משום הוצאת שתיהן ונקט שבת לאפושי איסוריה

(c) Explanation#2: He is therefore liable both for carrying on Shabbos and on Yom Kippur. Rebbi Meir said Shabbos in order to add another prohibition (to the case which already clearly is taking place on Yom Kippur).

8) TOSFOS DH AMRU LO

תוספות ד"ה אמרו לו

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why Rebbi Meir says this is part of the main prohibition that he is doing.)

ור' מאיר חשיב ליה בהדי אכילות משום דבליעתו זו היא הנחתו כדאמרינן (שבת דף פ.) כתב ב' אותיות כשהוא מהלך חייב כתיבתן זו היא הנחתן

(a) Explanation: Rebbi Meir considers this as part of eating, as swallowing the fat is considered putting it down. This is as the Gemara states in Shabbos (80a), that if a person wrote two letters while walking he is liable, as his writing is considered his putting the letters down.

9) TOSFOS DH SHELO OCHEL

תוספות ד"ה שלא אוכל

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains how Cheilev can imply a permitted thing, and why this is not a question on Rebbi Yochanan.)

מפר"ת דאתיא בלאו והן דמשמע נמי חלב שעל גבי הקיבה או של חיה לפי שמזכיר עמו דבר היתר אבל בלאו הכי לא משמע אלא חלב האסור עיקר החלב

(a) Opinion#1: Rabeinu Tam explains that there is a negative and positive side to Cheilev (enabling a Korban Shevuah, as explained above). This is because "Cheilev" implies the fat on the stomach or fat from a wild animal which is permitted. This is because he mentions together with "Cheilev" a permitted item (dates). However, if he had not mentioned a permitted item, "Cheilev" would indeed only imply forbidden fats.

ותימה אמאי לא פריך נמי לר' יוחנן מהכא

(b) Question: This is difficult. Why doesn't the Gemara also ask a question on Rebbi Yochanan (23b) from here? [This shows that a permitted item together with a forbidden item does not make a valid oath!]

וי"ל משום דדלמא קסבר ר' יוחנן דאיכא שום תנא דאית ליה איסור כולל בבא מאליו ולא בבא מחמת עצמו אבל מדרבא משמע ליה דאין חילוק

(c) Answer: This is because Rebbi Yochanan might hold that there is a Tana who holds that an Issur Kollel takes effect when it comes by itself, but not when it comes because he brought it upon himself. However, from Rava the implication is that there is no difference between the two.

והשתא נמי ניחא דאי לאו הכי מאי קמ"ל רבא טפי מר' יוחנן

(d) Observation: This also helps us understand another point. If this were not so, what would Rava be teaching us that Rebbi Yochanan had not already taught through his statement?

ומיהו יש לומר דאיצטריך לאשמועינן אע"פ ששניהן באין מחמת עצמן

(e) Implied Question: However, it is possible to refute this by saying that Rava had to teach that even if both come by themselves it takes effect.

10) TOSFOS DH MIGU D'CHAILA

תוספות ד"ה מיגו דחיילא

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why we would think the prohibition of an oath would take effect when there is already a prohibition of Neveilah.)

אע"ג דמאן דאית ליה איסור כולל מודה דעל חמור לא חייל כדמפרש רבינו תם בפרק ארבעה אחים (יבמות דף לג: ד"ה אמר ר"י) גבי הבערה ללאו יצתה

(a) Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the opinion that holds that an Issur Kollel is valid admits that it does not take effect on a more stringent prohibition. This is explained by Rabeinu Tam in Yevamos (33b, DH AMAR) regarding the Torah's stating that it is forbidden to light a fire on Shabbos in order to show that this prohibition is a basic negative prohibition. [Why, then, should this lenient prohibition of an oath take effect when there is already a more severe prohibition of Cheilev present?]

מ"מ חיילא שבועה אאיסור חלב דקיל הואיל והותר מכללו כדאמרי' בסוף פ' גיד הנשה (חולין דף קג.) התורה אמרה יבא איסור נבילה ויחול אאיסור חלב

(b) Answer: Even so, the prohibition regarding an oath will take effect when there is already a prohibition against Cheilev, being that Cheilev is somewhat lenient itself. This is indicated by the Gemara's statement in Chulin (103a) that the Torah said that the prohibition against Neveilah can take effect on (Cheilev although) the already present prohibition of Cheilev (is in effect).

11) TOSFOS DH HAREI

תוספות ד"ה הרי הקדש (הא בעינן שוה פרוטה)

(SUMMARY: Tosfos gives another possible answer to the Gemara's question.)

המ"ל הא אוקימנא בבכור כדמשני לעיל

(a) Observation: The Gemara could have said that we established this as being regarding a Bechor, as the Gemara answered earlier. [The Toras Chaim says that Tosfos can only be understood if the DH does not have the words "Ha Ba'inan Shaveh Perutah." The DH should in fact be on 25a, regarding the fourth line of the Gemara there (see also Tosfos Ha'Rosh).]

12) TOSFOS DH V'HAREI ASHAM

תוספות ד"ה והרי אשם

(SUMMARY: Rashi and Tosfos argue regarding the negative prohibition that causes the bringing of the Asham.)

פי' בקונטרס דמוזר לא יאכל כי קדש הם לא נפקא דההוא בקדשים הנאכלין לכהנים כתיב וכל שיש בו היתר לכהנים אין בו מעילה

(a) Opinion#1: Rashi explains that from the Pasuk, "And a non-Kohen should not eat for they are Kodesh" there is no teaching that a non-Kohen cannot eat (forbidden parts of) Kodshim, as that Pasuk is only referring to Kodshim that a Kohen is permitted to eat. Anything that can be eaten by Kohanim does not bear a prohibition of Meilah.

וכן משמע בפרק בתרא דמכות (דף יח.) דפריך ולילקי נמי משום וזר לא יאכל כי קדש הם ומשני ה"מ היכא דחזי לכהנים הכא לא חזי לכהנים

1. This is also implied in Makos (18a, regarding a non-Kohen eating from an Olah before the sprinkling of the blood, outside the walls of the Mikdash). The Gemara there asks, "Why don't we also give him lashes because of the Pasuk, "And a non-Kohen should not eat for they are Kodesh?" The Gemara answers that this is only referring to parts of Korbanos permitted to Kohanim. In this case, they are not permitted to Kohanim.

וקשה דבכריתות (דף ד.) מוקמינן וזר לא יאכל כי קדש הם בחלב המוקדשין דקאמר התם האוכל חלב המוקדשין לוקה ב' משום וזר לא יאכל כי קדש הם וחלב לא חזי לכהנים

(b) Question: This is difficult, as in Kerisus (4a) the Gemara establishes the Pasuk, "And a non-Kohen should not eat for they are Kodesh" as referring to fats of animals that are Korbanos. The Gemara there says that if someone eats fats from Korbanos he receives two sets of lashes, one for Cheilev and the second for "And a non-Kohen should not eat for they are Kodesh." This is despite the fact that Kohanim are not allowed to eat Cheilev!

מיהו י"ל דאע"ג דחלב לא חזי לכהנים מ"מ קרינן בהאי קרבן ואכלו אותם אשר כופר בהם דהיינו בשר ולא אתא למעוטי אלא כשאוכל בשר חטאת ואשם לפני זריקת דמים דלא קרינן ביה ואכלו

(c) Answer: It is possible to answer that even though the Cheilev cannot be eaten by the Kohanim, the Korban is still considered "And they will eat those that they have an atonement through them" meaning the (entire Korban is considered to have the same law as its meat). This teaching only excludes eating the meat of a Chatas and Asham before the sprinkling of the blood. At that early point, the Korban is not yet considered to be something that is eaten (and therefore fit for the Kohanim).

והשתא מ"ל דלאו באשם מוזר לא יאכל כי קדש הם נפקא

(d) Opinion#2: According to the above answer we can indeed say that the prohibition regarding the Asham is derived from the Pasuk, "And a non-Kohen should not eat for they are Kodesh."

וכן משמע בפ"ק דכריתות (דף ד:) דלאו דזרות לא הוי מג"ש דתרומה גבי מ"ש חלב דאיכא תרי לאוי לאו דזרות דם נמי כו' וצ"ע שם

1. The fact that the prohibition is derived from this Pasuk and not from the Gezeirah Shaveh from Terumah is also implied in Kerisus (4b). The Gemara there asks, why is Cheilev different in that it has two negative prohibitions? The Gemara answers that it is because of the added prohibition of a non-Kohen (implying the Pasuk mentioned above). The Gemara asks that blood should also etc. The Gemara there requires study.