Proof #2 (cont.): The Gemara (there) asks (on Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel) from the Beraisa 'If one wrote it (a Mezuzah) on two columns and placed it on two doorposts, it is Pasul', implying that on one doorpost, it will be Kasher?

Proof #2 (cont.): And it answers that what he means is that it is fit to place on two doorposts', and if it is joined, it is not fit to place on two doorposts.

Proof #2 (cont.): So we see that the two columns to which Shmuel is referring are cut in two, and are not joined. Hence it explains that Shmuel is speaking where they have been cut and are not joined together ...

Proof #2 (concl.): And that is why in our Sugya too, the two columns are not joined.

Implied Question: And the Ri explains that when the Gemara in Rosh ha'Shanah (Daf 26.) says that, when the Rabbanan invalidate the horn of a cow, because 'Since it is formed of layers, it is like two or three Shofros', even though they are all joined ...

Answer: That is because the horns tend to grow an additional layer each year, in which case it is like bringing a piece from another Shofar and gluing it on.

Proof: Like we learned in the Mishnah in Rosh ha'Shanah (Daf 27.) 'If one glues together broke pieces of Shofar, it is Pasul, since they were not initially formed together. Consequently, the addition is discernable and joining them will not help.

Proof (cont.): And it can be compared to a Get that one wrote on two columns that one then stitched together.

Elaboration: And it is not only when one writes half the Megilas Sotah on one column and half, on another column, that it is considered two Sefarim ...

Elaboration (cont.): But the same applies there where one writes two Megilos and erases them into one cup.

The Same Applies to Get: And the same will apply to a Get, if a husband gives his wife two Gitin, even though each one is a complete Get, they are Pasul and his she is not divorced - because it is 'two or three Sefarim'.

Proof #1: Like the Gemara says in Perek Shor she'Nagach (Bava Kama, Daf 40.) "One Kofer", the Torah says, 'and not two or three Kofrin'.

Proof #2: And the Gemara says in Lulav ha'Gazul (Succah, Daf 35.) 'Let him take two or three (peppers)?' 'The Torah says "One fruit", and not two or three fruits'.

Refuted Question: Nor can one ask how this differs from someone who places one Shofar inside another Shofar, who is Yotzei, if he hears the inner one, and it is not considered two Shofros?

Refutation: Because the Mitzvah there is to hear the Shofar, and he only heard the tone of one Shofar.

Different #1: This case is not comparable to the B'reirah of 'raising from the pit', which is a Machlokes between Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov and the Rabbanan in 'Shor she'Nagach' (Bava Kama (Daf 51:).

Reason: Since there the respective portions of the two partners had not been clarified, whereas here the writing had been known and later became mixed up.

Different #2: And similarly, regarding the B'reirah of the case of 'Two Lugin that I am going to separate ... ', which the Gemara in Perek Merubeh (Bana Kama, Daf 69:) cites, the Ma'aser was not previously ascertained, and so it is in all the cases that the Gemara cites in Gitin (Daf 25.).

Equivalent: It is however, comparable to the B'reirah that the Gemara cites in Eruvin (Daf 37.) 'Two women whose birds became mixed up or who gave money to the Kohen for him to purchase and to bring whichever bird he wishes as a Chatas and whichever bird as an Olah'.

Equivalent (cont.): There too, even though the ownership of each woman was initially known, we do not say that that one woman can be atones for with the money given by her friend, or that the two birds of the one are brought as Olos, and of her friend, as a Chata'os.

Equivalent (cont.): Alternatively, we will say the reverse, that we do say B'reirah, even though the Gemara there refutes this there, establishes it where they made a condition.

Conclusion: We see however, that the Gemara cites it with regard to other cases of B'reirah, in which case, one cannot draw a distinction between a B'reirah that was initially known and one that was not.

Proof: And similarly the Gemara in Perek Hotzi'u lo (Yoma, Daf 55.) which cites the Mishnah where Rebbi Yehudah says they did not place Shofros (boxes) for Kinei Chovah, on account of (the possible) mix-up, which the Gemara explains to mean the mix-up of the money of a Chatas whose owner died.

Proof (cont.): In answer to the question 'Why not set aside four Zuzim and throw them in to the water, in which case, the remaining money will be permitted?, the Gemara answers that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of B'reirah

Proof (cont.): And in answer to the question from where we know that, the Gemara cite the Mishnah of someone who purchases wine from the Kutim', concluding with the Beraisa of Ayo.

Proof (concl.): So we see that the Gemara compares the B'reirah of 'If the Chacham arrived in the east ... ', where his whereabouts were not previously known, to that of the four Zuz, where their ownership was previously known.

Question #1: If so, what is Rava's She'eilah? Why does he not resolve it from those cases?

Question #2: Or from the case cited by the Mishnah in last Perek in Me'ilah (Daf 21:) where a P'rutah of Hekdesh fell into a purse or where one declares that 'One P'rutah in one's purse Hekdesh', where Rebbi Akiva says that as soon as takes one P'rutah from the purse, one is Mo'el, whereas, according to the Rabbanan, he is only Mo'el when he spends all the money in the purse.

Question (cont.): So we see that Rebbi Akiva holds of B'reirah in such a case, since he says that the first P'rutah that comes out of the purse is the P'rutah of Hekdesh that fell in? Though the basis of their Machlokes is unclear.

Refuted Suggestion: Nor can one extrapolate from Din that is cited in the Gemara in Perek ha'Loke'ach (Bechoros, Daf 22:) 'A Sa'ah of Tamei T'rumah that falls into a hundred Sa'ah of Chulin, Rebbi Eliezer says that one should remove a Sa'ah and leave it to go bad, because we assume that that the Sa'ah that one removerd is the Sa'ah that fell in.

Refuted Suggestion (cont.): Here too, let us say that the erased Parshah of Le'ah went to Rachel?

Refutation: Because there, we are lenient since it is a de'Rabbanan, seeing as min ha'Torah, one in two becomes Bateil.

Question: The Riva asks on the Gemara's question in Perek Hotzi'u lo (Yoma, Daf 55:) 'Why not set aside four Zuzim ... ', from the Tosefta in Me'ilah (Perek 1) regarding a Nazir who set aside money and declared that 'This is for mu Chatas, this is for my Olah and this for my Shelamim" that he purchases with the money three animals, whether from one location or from three locations, and transfers the value of the Chatas ... '.

Question: (cont.): And that is only permitted in this case, but to take a third of the money and to purchase with it a Chatas and declare that it is now clarified that this money was the value of the Chatas (B'reirah), that we do not say?

Conclusion: Question #1: From all of these Gemaros, Rava could have resolved his She'eilah?

Question #2: Moreover, if B'reirah is applicable in this case, then wherever two items are mixed up, they ought to become divisible again by means of B'reirah?

Question #3: Furthermore, why does Rava not resolve it from the first Perek of Rosh ha'Shanah (Daf 13:), where we Pasken 'Yesh Bilah with regard to oil and wine, in which case it will transpire that there is no B'reirah by liquids?

Question #4: And in Perek ha'Ta'aruvos (Zevachim, Daf 80.), the Gemara cites a Machlokes between Rebbi Eliezer and the Rabbanan with regard to a bottle containing Chatas that fell into water ... '?

Answer: We need to therefore explain that the She'eilah here is whether we say the Torah is only concerned that the erasure from the parchment should be discernable as coming from her water, but that if it is erased in one cup, where one can say that each one drinks water that is not hers, it is not a discernable erasure.

Answer (cont.): 'If they hen divided the water' - Do we now say B'reirah, seeing as Tthe water of each woman is now discernable ...

Answer (cont.): Or perhaps we say 'Ein B'reirah' - because we need the ownership of the water to be clarified at the time of the erasure, but the mixture of the ink of the two Megilos does not worry us.

Answer (cont.): Seeing as at the time of the erasure, the writing is anyway Bateil, and the matter depends only on erasing it in water that has been clarified as being hers'.

Conclusion: And the Gemara now asks whether, if the water fails to examine her, it is because the writing was not erased according to the Halachah, or because she is Tahor.

Implied Question: One cannot resolve the She'eilah from Rava's statement in Perek Arvei Pesachim (Pesachim, Daf 115:) that 'If one wrapped the Matzah in a 'Siv', one has not fulfilled the Mitzvah of Matzah' - from which we can extrapolate that this is not the way that one eats.

Answer: Because the 'Siv' divides between the Matzah and one's throat, the She'eilah here is where it does not.

Source #1: The Gemara says in the third Perek of Maseches Shevu'os (Daf 20:) that 'Whoever answers "Amen", it is as if one has uttered a Shevu'ah from one's lips'.

Source #2: And in Perek Shevu'as ha'Eidus (Daf 36.), the Gemara says that "Amen" contains an undertaking, a Shevu'ah and an affirmation that what has been said is true.

Refuted Explanation: The Yerushalmi explains that Rebbi Meir does not mean that the water examines her already now ...

Correct Explanation: But that the water is deposited inside her, and that, when she sins, it will examine her retroactively.

Clarification: Even to the Rabbanan, who argue with Rebbi Akiva and who hold that Kidushin take effect on Chayvei La'avin, concede in this case ...

Source: As the Gemara says in ha'Ishah Rabah (Yevamos, Daf 92:) - since it is written in connection with her "Lo Sih'yeh Eishes ha'Meis ha'Chutzah le'Ish Zar" - 'She shall not be eligible to become betrothed to another man (who is not the Yavam)'.

Conclusion: So we see that the Pasuk turns her into an Ervah on whom Kidushin does not take effect, and she is like his betrothed who has committed adultery.

Statement: At the end of the first Perek of Sanhedrin (Daf 17:), the Gemara explains that 'Amri be'Ma'rva' refers to Rav Yirmiyah.

Ruling: It seems that even though he Paskens not like Rav Hamnuna, the Halachah is, in fact, like him.

Source #1: Since the Gemara in ha'Ishah Rabah (Yevamos, Daf 92:) citing Rav, rules that 'Kidushin does not take effect on a Yevamah'.

Source #1: Whereas Shmuel is in doubt.

Source #1 (cont.): And Rav Gidal Amar ... Amar Rav says that marriage is effective concerning her like where she committed adultery - like Ra Hamnuna'.

Source #2: And Rebbi Yanai too; holds that Kidushin is not effective on a Yevamah'.

Source #2 (cont): And Rebbi Yochanan proves it from the Mishnah there 'After our Yevamah performs Chalitzah with you', to which Rebbi Yanai commented that 'Had he not removed the piece of clay, he (Rebbi Yochanan) would not have found the pearl underneath it'.

Implied Question: And Resh Lakish said to Rebbi Yochanan that, 'Had a great man not praised im, he would have explained that the author of that Mishnah was Rebbi Akiva'.

Answer: Resh Lakish does not however, argue with Rebbi Yochanan, seeing as he himself, in the very same Perek (Daf 95.) establishes the Beraisa there 'And if already in a place where one has relations with a light Isur, the one who forbids, is forbidden' - by a Shomeres Yavam, like Rav Hamnuna.

Source #3: And at the end of that Sugya and in Perek ha'Choletz (Ibid, Daf 40:) the Gemara cites Abaye, who is in a dilemma whether to rule like Rav or like Shmuel.

Doubts: In Perek ha'Zorek in Gitin (Daf 80:) two versions in the Gemara argue over whether the Mishnah there poses a Kashya on Rav Hamnuna, or whether it is a proof for him.

Doubts (cont.): The Gemara there could have refuted the proof, as it does here, by establishing it like Rabbi Akiva, only it refutes it from the wording of the Mishnah itself.

Yerushalmi: The Yerushalmi asks how Rebbi Yanai could praise Rebbi Yochanan, about whom he said "To those who pour gold from the purse ... " (Yeshayah); 'My son, "Let them not depart from your eyes" (Mishlei); 'My son is wise and I will rejoice; "Give to a wise man and he will become even wiser" (Mishlei); "A wise man will hear, and will increase his learning" (Mishlei).

Yerushalmi (cont.): Resh Lakish said to him 'After all these Pesukim of praise, one can establish the Mishnah like Rebbi Akiva!

Yerushalmi (cont.): And furthermore, the Yerushalmi there rejects the proof 'What does a Mamzer care about Kidushin? The Torah writes "When a man takes a woman", 'even a bit of a woman'.

Conclusion: According to the outcome of the Sugya there, it implies that the Halachah is not like Rav Hamnuna.

Text: This is the text there: If a Shomeres Yavam who committed adultery, Rebbi Elazer says that she is permitted to the Yavam, Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi forbids her. Rebbi Yanai says that she is permitted, and so the Beraisa says "And it is hidden from the eyes of her husband", 'but not from the eyes of her Yavam'.

Text (cont.): Rebbi Ya'akov ben Zavdi says in the name of Rebbi Avahu 'Such a case actually occurred with a Kohenes, and they permitted her to the Yavam'. Rebbi Yossi bar Bun says that 'She is also not Chayav Malkos'.

A Contradiction: According to the Yerushalmi, Rebbi Yanai argues with his own opinion, cited in ha'Ishah Rabah, that 'They took a count and came to the conclusion that "Kidushin does not take effect on a Yevamah" '.

Conclusion: And this is the text in the Yerushalmi 'Rebbi Shmuel said 'Did Rebbi Yanai not say that more than thirty Chachaim took a count 'From where do we learn that Kidushin does not take effect ... .'

Yerushalmi: Rebbi Yanai says 'It is obvious that a man is Mochel (foregoes) the Kinuy, and that if he divorces her, it is as if he has been Mochel her.

Question: What are the ramifications of this ruling?

Answer: If, after he warns her and divorces her, he takes her back and she secludes herself again ...

Answer (cont.): Then if we hold that divorce is as if he was Mochel her, then he will need to warn her again ...

Answer (cont.): Whereas if we do not, then he does not (need to warn her again).

Answer (concl.): But if he warned her and she secluded herself, and, aware of her seclusion, he then divorces her (See Maharshal), and after he takes her back, she secludes herself again. If she then drinks the water and it does not examine her, do we say that she is Tahor ...

Answer (concl.): Or do we say that, since the water will not examine the woman (See Maharshal & See Mesores ha'Shas), she is guilty, and is therefore forbidden to her husband?'

Question: The Yersushalmi cites a proof from Kurk'mis, who after drinking once, repeated the sin and drank another two times in front of Sh'mayah and Avtalyon.

Question: A Kashya from the first Perek of Kidushin (Daf 18.), where the Gemara establishes the D'rashah "bi'Geneivaso" 'once he has been sold, one is not permitted to sell him again' with regard to two people, but that with one person, one may sell him again?

Answer: According to Rashi there however, who explains that, since he was sold once ... (See Rashi there DH 'Ela Ka'n be'Adam Echad'), there is no problem. (From the Tosfos of Tosfos' Rebbe).

Question: But we Darshen in the second Perek of K'risus (Daf 9:) - that 'A person brings only one Korban, even if he warned his wife not to seclude herself with many men'?

Answer: It speaks there where before she actually drank, he warned her against secluding herself with P'loni, but she did, and this happened a few times, he subsequently makes her drink once and brings one Minchah for all of them.

Answer (cont.): And we learn that from "Kena'os" (in the plural).

Answer (concl.): Whereas here, we Darshen "Toras" to teach us that she drinks again, where he warned her and she secluded herself again, after having drunk (the first time), in which case she is obligated to drink again.